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Abstract 
 
The purpose of any applied macroeconomics study should be to provide 
actionable information to world governments on policy questions. This dissertation 
addresses two policies: the first chapter addressed the effects of a VAT on several 
macroeconomic indicators while revisiting its impact on government balance sheets in 
the second chapter, while the third chapter considers the effects of English language 
education. 
Value added taxes have become an important source of government funding in 
past decades, but little empirical work has been done on their macroeconomic impacts. 
Because the decision to implement a VAT is endogenous and includes variation from 
all observational units, not just relevant ones, regression methods analyzing the impact 
of the policy choice will yield biased estimates. To solve this problem, in my first 
chapter I model the VAT adoption decision for 192 countries using survival analysis. I 
then match adopters to non-adopters using propensity score matching. I find that VAT 
adoption is associated with an increase in growth and investment as well as and lower 
inflation and government spending as a share of GDP. In my second chapter, I use 
matching techniques to estimate the impact of a VAT on government debts and deficits. 
The tax is associated with falls in central government debt as well as variance and level 
of expenditure as a share of GDP.  
My third chapter estimates the macroeconomic impact of English skills and  
considers the utility of English language education. A common language lowers the 
transaction costs of international trade, and English is increasingly the language of 
international business. As a result, proficiency with English is often associated with 
xi 
 
higher incomes as well as increased employment, trade, and other economic 
opportunities and is promoted as a policy to improve the wellbeing of people in 
developed and developing countries alike. However it is not clear whether improved 
English abilities raise these variables or higher incomes allow one to invest more in 
better English abilities. Instruction in English is costly and may crowd out other studies 
or generate other outcomes which negate some of its benefits. I estimate the 
macroeconomic impact of English skills at the national level, as measured by English 
proficiency test results from the Test of English as a Foreign Language, TOEFL. I 
address the endogeneity problem by using the difficulty of learning English given one's 
native language as an instrumental variable and consistently find a strong effect of 
English abilities on income and net exports. However, there is no effect of English on 
FDI or Emigration, suggesting that the impacts of language may come from the 
changing nature of domestic industries rather than through remittances or foreign 
investment channels.  
The results of these studies should encourage holdout nations to consider 
adopting a VAT due to its positive effects on macroeconomic growth as well as 
government balance sheets, and to further explore the advantages of English 
proficiency. Future research will consider finer points of these policies and optimal 
implementation of a VAT and English language education.  
Keywords: Matching, Survival Analysis, Value Added Tax, English, 
Instrumental Variables, Linguistic Distance 
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I. Quasi-Experimental Analysis on the Effects of Adoption of a 
Value Added Tax (VAT) 
 
1. Introduction 
 The Value Added Tax (VAT) has displaced many different trade, sales, and 
manufacturing taxes in the past half century, becoming a major source of government 
revenue for an increasing number of countries. The tax has all the desirable non-
distortionary theoretical properties of a sales tax, its incidence ultimately falling on 
consumers, but it is much harder to avoid, as the tax is collected at all intermediate steps 
during the production of a finished retail good rather than at the final sale. As a result, it 
has proven incredibly popular as it can collect a great deal of revenue (Keen and 
Lockwood 2010; Toder and Rosenberg 2010). While this tax is theoretically less 
distorting than other taxes for the each dollar of revenue collected, there is limited 
analysis of its overall impact on the economy. Demonstrating that the tax also has few 
negative side effects would make it invaluable for developing countries looking for an 
effective tax instrument. Showing that a VAT is associated with increases in growth, 
trade, or investment would be solid evidence in favor of its adoption. Yet empirical 
studies of the VAT are rare. This paper seeks to fill a hole in the literature, analyzing 
the overall economic impact of a VAT, which will allow policy makers to make 
informed decisions of the costs and benefits of this tax. 
Understanding the effects of the VAT is vital, as the importance of the VAT is 
unlikely to decline in the future. The IMF increasingly suggests countries raise more 
revenue through adopting a VAT or raise VAT rates (Bird 2010). Many countries, 
facing rising pressures on pension programs due to changing demographics, are funding 
social programs from general revenues rather than payroll taxes, which usually means 
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shifting the overall tax composition of government revenues toward VATs (Bird and 
Smart 2012). A VAT is a requirement for EU membership, and other international 
organizations are considering their own mandatory VATs, with a unified set of rules 
and repayment systems at an international rather than national level, such as the Gulf 
Cooperation Countries (Cnossen 1998; Kapur 2012). As more countries adopt VATs, 
international payment mechanisms for collecting VATs will become more efficient 
(Ebrill et al. 2001) and VATs will become more popular in the future.  
As a country chooses when it will enact a VAT, simply estimating the effect of 
adoption on macroeconomic variables, such as trade or growth, through normal 
regression techniques, will result in biased estimates, as countries that choose to adopt a 
VAT may be fundamentally different from those who do not. In order to solve this 
selection problem, I use survival analysis to generate probabilities of VAT adoption to 
be used as propensity score for 192 countries from 1967-2012. I then employ matching 
methods to obtain the causal effects of VAT adoption among 112 countries, 90 of which 
do eventually adopt, from 1986-2007 in the year of adoption and for five years after.
1
 
This study finds that VAT adoption is associated with increases in investment, and less 
robustly increases in growth as well as decreases in inflation and government spending. 
There is no evidence of changes in trade once controlling for selection.
2
   
                                                 
1
 Depending on the variable considered, fewer than 90 treated countries may be 
compared due to data constraints, but never fewer than 76. See online appendices A-G 
for more details.  
2
 Note that every countries’ adoption event will be different, with VATs replacing some 
taxes in some or being a completely new tax in others. Regardless of the specifics, a 
VAT will represent a move to shift overall government revenue collection more towards 
a specific type of consumption tax. This does not imply that it becomes the only, or 
even dominant form, of taxation revenue. Hence, this paper only can estimate mean 
effects of adopting a VAT. 
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 This paper is organized as follows. Section II covers background on previous 
studies on the VAT and other tax policies. Section III describes the adoption equation 
using survival analysis, both its determinants and results. Section IV introduces the 
matching process. Section V describes the results of the matching as well as some 
robustness checks. Section VI concludes.   
 
2. Background 
Starting with France in 1954, and reaching its first developing country in 1960 
when it was enacted by the Cote D'Ivoire, 166 countries have at some point 
implemented a VAT as of January 2013, and once passed, nearly all countries retain it. 
Figure I-1 shows aggregate VAT adoption over time and Figure I-2 shows the adoptions 
in each year. After slow initial adoption, a number of countries, primarily in Europe and 
South America, adopt in the mid 1970s. Countries then adopt slowly until the late 
1980s, after which adoption rises and then remains high until the early 2000s, with a 
very large spike following the fall of the Soviet Union. By the mid 2000s adoptions 
taper off to only a few a year.  The general shift towards a consumption type tax that 
necessarily accompanies the passing of a VAT should have observable effects if 
different types of taxes have different levels of efficiency or distort economic activities 
differentially.  
 Many papers have demonstrated, empirically or theoretically, that consumption 
taxes like the VAT are superior to income taxes with regard to distortions. Acosta and 
Yoo (2012) and Arnold (2011) show that countries grew faster when more of their 
revenue came from consumption taxes. These papers employed panel regression 
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methods, so selection effects may confound these findings as countries legislate their 
own tax codes. Krusell et al (1996) create a theoretical model that demonstrates 
consumption taxes are less distortionary than income taxes, but are less able to achieve 
redistributive ends. Milesi-Ferretti et al. (1998) finds similar results, with consumption 
taxes distorting the choice between leisure and consumption less than income taxes for 
each dollar of revenue raised. It would appear there is some evidence that consumption 
taxes cause less distortion than income taxes for each dollar raised, but these findings 
are not specific to VATs and the econometric methods employed may not estimate true 
causal effects of a given tax policy.  
 However, there has been less work done to analyze the distortions from VAT 
adoptions. Keen and Lockwood (2010) study government revenue collected as a result 
of VATs. Using regression analysis of a system of equations, they found that the higher 
government revenue was as a share of GDP, the less likely countries were to adopt 
VATs. VATs generally increased government revenue as a share of GDP, with Sub-
Saharan African countries seeing the least benefit. While many authors expect VATs to 
increase revenues collected, and possibly government spending, due to the relative ease 
of tax collection, its effects on government consumption and revenues are not clear 
(Keen 2007; Toder and Rosenberg 2010). Effects on other important macroeconomic 
variables such as investment, growth, trade and inflation are practically unstudied 
empirically. While empirical work is scarce, there is a great deal of theoretical work 
done on VATs that can guide this study.  
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3. Survival Analysis 
3A. Modeling VAT adoption 
 Understanding the causes and processes of VAT adoption is necessary to 
address endogeneity due to selection into a VAT. Previously, other authors have 
modeled the decision to have a VAT as a probit (Keen and Lockwood 2010) or a 
Markov switching model based on a Cox hazard regression (Cizek et al 2012).  Despite 
their popularity in determining the probability of adopting a policy (Dehejia and Wahba 
2002 among others), a panel probit model may not be the best fit for the policy being 
described in this paper due to VAT’s persistence as when a country adopts a VAT, it 
almost never removes this policy, with only 5 countries ever repealing out of 166 
countries adopting (Grandcolas 2005).
3
  
A Cox proportional hazard model is employed here instead to model the 
decision of adopting a VAT. This approach has a number of strengths when applied in 
this case. First, it fits the decision making accurately: countries tend to adopt a VAT 
once and never repeal it, so one could model survival time in the pre-VAT state. 
Second, the hazard model can be used to produce propensity scores for matching. It will 
predict linear hazards at every period, and two countries with the same predicted linear 
hazard would be at the same risk of adoption in that period. Thus, among two countries 
with the same propensity scores, if one adopts and the other does not, one can consider 
                                                 
3
 Vietnam in the 1970s, Grenada in 1986, Ghana in 1995, Malta in 1998, and Belize in 
1999 all attempted to pass a VAT and later repealed it. Vietnam, Grenada, and Ghana 
would later re-adopt a VAT in 1999, 2010, and 1998 respectively, and these re-
introduction events that are not repealed are included in this paper. Belize and Malta are 
included with their original adoption dates. This is in line with what was done by Keen 
and Lockwood (2010). Omitting these observations does not qualitatively change 
results. 
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this assignment to the treatment group as random conditional on observable variables. 
Third, this selection equation also allows one to estimate the average effects of VAT 
adoption immediately following the event as well as several years before and after, as 
adoption is a single event rather than a repeated decision.   
 Cox proportional hazard models assume all observation units are at risk of 
failure, in this case adoption of a VAT, at a rate determined by some baseline hazard as 
well as a vector of time variant and invariant covariates.  Only variation from years in 
which a failure event takes place is used, and once a country fails it contributes no 
further information to the estimation of the hazard model. More detailed explanation of 
a Cox proportional hazard model can be found in Cox (1972), with particular attention 
to the interpretation of covariates and results in Fisher and Lin (1999) and its use in 
experimental design in Lu (2005). 
 
3B. Determinants of VAT Adoption 
 The theoretical literature on VATs and taxation comparisons provides a rich 
pool of covariates that could affect a countries’ VAT adoption decision. Among these, 
international pressure plays possibly the most important role. Keen and Lockwood 
(2010) propose that countries under IMF lending programs are more likely to adopt a 
VAT to pay off their debts, both out of necessity for more revenue in general and due to 
the encouragement they receive from the IMF to adopt a VAT in particular (Bird 2010). 
This can be seen in some recent IMF reports on the fiscal conditions of many nations; if 
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a country does not yet have a VAT, the IMF often suggests it should adopt one.
4
  I thus 
include a dummy equal to 1 if a country is under an IMF lending program, either GRA 
or PRG facility, for any number of months in a given year. Keen and Lockwood (2010) 
use a similar dummy variable approach. Summary statistics on Table I-1 show that 
roughly half of the country-years from 1965-2010 are under some sort of IMF lending 
program.
5
  
Another feature of VAT adoption is its general diffusion through proximity. 
Keen and Lockwood (2010) find evidence that they tend to spread in regional booms 
and Cizek et al(2012) find significant evidence that adoption may be influenced by a 
number of spatial factors. Experience with a neighboring country’s adoption may better 
inform a country on the costs of adopting a VAT, or fears of losing manufacturing to a 
neighbor with a more efficient tax code, could increase the likelihood of a country 
adopting it. I represent this proximity by creating an index variable that is the equal to 
share of bordering countries with a VAT, taking a value between 0 and 1. Thus, if a 
given country borders 4 countries and 2 of them have a VAT, the value of this index is 
.5 for that country for that year. Table I-1 shows that on average 15% of a countries 
neighbor’s have a VAT, but this measure is heavily skewed right.  
  Other elements of national economic composition, specifically agriculture and 
natural resource production, are also likely major determinants of choosing a VAT. 
Edminston and Fox (2006) found that farmer cooperatives were disproportionately 
                                                 
4
 See IMF Country Report No. 12/54 on Palau, IMF Country Report No. 08/186 on the 
Marshall islands, IMF Country Report No. 10/191 on Comoros, and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands-Aruba: Concluding Statement of the 2010 Article IV Consultation Mission, 
among others, as well as various newspaper editorials. 
5
 IMF lending data is not available before 1984, so this table is only looking at lending 
data from this point onward.  
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affected by a VAT, and Cnossen (1998) claims that due to the less formal nature of 
agriculture, enforcing a complex taxation system is likely to lead to compliance 
problems. Agricultural production is included as a share of GDP, and it is expected to 
have a negative effect on the propensity to adopt a VAT. According to Table I-1, on 
average 23.45% of a countries' GDP comes from agriculture, but the standard deviation 
is quite high at 17.51%, and so this variable provides a fair amount of variation. 
Additionally, a country with rich natural resources is less likely to seek tax revenue 
from other sources (Keen and Lockwood 2010). Keen and Lockwood (2010) use a static 
measure of subsoil natural resource wealth in 2000 to capture this effect, while instead 
here I choose to use a series on natural resource rents as a share of GDP from the World 
Development Indicators. This should accomplish the same objective as the subsoil 
resource stock in showing the importance of natural resources to a country, but also 
allow values to change over time, as it is a share of GDP in that year rather than a static 
stock of natural resources. Resource rents as a share of GDP average 10%, but with a 
standard deviation of 15.93% the distribution should be quite skewed right.  
It is possible geopolitical factors affect the choice to have a VAT. Since 
authorities need to be able to observe imports in particular, and economic activities in 
general, in order to tax them, it is possible that large, landlocked countries will have a 
much harder time collecting a VAT compared to small, island countries due to the 
number of possible entry locations (Keen 2010). As a result, I have included log of 
physical size in square kilometers, and whether the country is an island (whether it has 
no neighboring countries with land borders) or landlocked as potential determinants of 
VAT adoption. Approximately 20% of country-year pairs are islands and 20% are 
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landlocked according to Table I-1. On the other hand, as the definition of a small island 
country is subject to interpretation, I have also included a dummy variable for 
membership in a political organization, The Alliance of Small Island States, allowing 
countries to self-select as small islands. While this organization was only founded in 
1990, I treat membership as time-invariant, as countries would likely have considered 
themselves small islands states prior to joining this organization. I also include regional 
dummies for North America, South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia, with Pacific 
being the omitted variable.  
In addition to time invariant geographic factors, time invariant historical factors 
may also influence a nation’s tax design. Keen (2010) suggests that the British legal 
system and French legal systems may both, for various reasons, encourage adoption of 
sales taxes generally and the VAT in particular. Some elements of the VAT in former 
French colonies bear some resemblance to French tax law, including advanced 
collection schemes where some sectors are taxed higher than other. It is also possible 
that the link is not directly from France, but rather just from shared colonial history, 
with countries with similar colonial pasts cooperating on fiscal policies.
6
 British 
common law countries are more likely to set up independent tax authorities or large tax 
offices that would make VAT collection more effective with respect to revenue 
collected, which could make them more willing to set up a VAT in the first place (Keen 
2010). To control for this, I include dummy variables for membership or observer status 
                                                 
6
 This reasoning may suggest other colonial dummies may be possible determinants of 
policy adoption, but no other country colonized nearly as many countries as France or 
Britain, so adding other colonial dummies will not capture much more variation.  
10 
 
in both the British Commonwealth and the Francophonie.
7
 I treat membership as time 
invariant, so if a country was ever a member of either organization it is treated as a 
member at all periods for this adoption equation. While membership in these 
organizations may change over time, often for political reasons, the reason for joining is 
ultimately a historical one, and thus being a member at any point would indicate some 
historical influence from the British or French legal systems.
8
 According to Table I-1, 
approximately 30% of country-years are from Francophonie countries and roughly the 
same amount are from commonwealth countries. Aside from historical origin, the 
structure of the government may matter as well, specifically whether the country is 
governed as a federation or not. Federations are less likely to adopt VATs, due to a 
decentralized tax collecting apparatus (Keen and Lockwood 2010; Ebrill et al 2001; 
Treisman 2002). However, only 8% of countries are federations. 
While not strictly time invariant, membership in the Warsaw pact or being a 
Former Soviet Republic may also affect VAT adoption. There are a large number of 
VAT adoptions among such countries in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union. It 
is thus possible such countries would have adopted a VAT much earlier if they had been 
allowed to do so by the Soviet Union. Thus I include a time invariant dummy for 
                                                 
7
 Using legal origins gives similar results, as they are highly collinear with membership. 
However, as legal origin is not a declared membership like membership in the 
Commonwealth or Francophonie and subject to interpretation. 
8
 While membership in the British Commonwealth usually relies on colonial history, the 
Francophonie is much less restrictive in its membership, allowing countries to join due 
to more general historical reasons. Several countries in Eastern Europe are members of 
the Francophonie, for example, despite never being colonized by France.  
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membership in the Warsaw pact or status as a former Soviet republic.
9
 These combined 
make up only 14% of total country years. 
Several other general demographic variables, employed by Keen and Lockwood 
(2010) in their VAT selection equation, are also included here, including percentage of 
population that are children below 14 and percentage of population that is above 65 
(dependency ratios), log of population level, population growth, log of GDP, and log of 
GDP per capita. The overall size of the economy and the average wealth of its citizens 
may affect the decision to adopt a VAT; a very poor country or very small country may 
not find it worthwhile to construct a large tax collection apparatus that one needs with a 
VAT.  Similarly, the age structure of a country may affect the tax system, as the need 
for revenue and the ability to collect it changes with demographics (Bird and Smart 
2012). 
Additionally, the macroeconomic variables likely to be affected by a VAT, 
investment, growth, trade, inflation, and government consumption, should also be 
considered as determinants of adoption. Policy makers arguably will take into account 
the current state of variables most likely to be affected by a VAT; those seeing a low 
rate of investment or growth may be more likely to adopt a VAT to replace other, more 
distortionary taxes in hopes of raising investment or growth. Investment, in the form of 
gross capital formation as a percent of GDP, and growth, as per capita GDP growth, are 
both included as determinants of the adoption equation.  
                                                 
9
 Former Yugoslavian republics are treated as Warsaw pact countries despite not being 
members of the Warsaw pact due to sharing similar political cold war history and 
experiencing turmoil in the 1990’s. Due to data demands, these observations often drop 
out due to missing information for covariates.  
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Trade in particular is likely to be a major determinant of VAT adoption as well 
as significantly influenced by VATs. As exports are zero rated for taxation purposes and 
imports usually full taxed under a VAT (Ebrill et al 2001) countries must consider both 
the revenue and general economic changes that could arise from such a tax change 
given their trade patterns (Keen 2008). Hines and Summers (2009) also find that more 
open countries are more likely to rely on consumption type taxes, such as the VAT.  
Finally, Swank (2002) shows evidence that increased trade and international 
competition will affect government taxation behavior. Trade here is represented by 
exports plus imports as a share of GDP, commonly referred to as openness in the 
literature. 
As VATs have rebate mechanisms in place, they should not lead to increased 
prices in the same way that other taxes on manufacturing and production do (Ebrill et al 
2001). Thus, if a country believes it faces higher than desired inflation, changing its tax 
system to prevent price cascading is one way that it could affect the price level in the 
short run. Government spending too is a likely determinant of adopting more taxes, 
though the sign is of indeterminate direction (Keen and Lockwood 2010). It is possible 
that individuals in countries with high government consumption as a share of GDP 
would have high preferences for government services and thus be more inclined to 
adopt VATs to fund more spending. Alternatively, they may also consider themselves to 
be at an ideal level of expenditure, and have no desire to raise tax burdens to increase 
spending further.  
Finally, it is important to note the time dimension of adoption. Adoption is 
defined as the national rollout of the tax system. There is some lag between the decision 
13 
 
to pursue a VAT and the collection of the taxes, both from implementing it politically 
and creating a tax collection infrastructure. There may also be pilot programs in certain 
regions before national rollout of the tax, so the effects of a VAT may appear before the 
tax is national. Thus, I lag all independent variables by two years to account for this, in 
line with the 18 month span from VAT being introduced in the legislature to collections 
starting (Ebrill et al 2001). Therefore, if a VAT is adopted in 1988, the determination to 
do so will be based on values of right hand side variables from 1986.  
 
3C. Results of the VAT Adoption Equation 
 Table I-2 presents the coefficients (linear hazards) of the Cox hazard regression 
for selecting a VAT. Five specifications are considered here. The first specification (1) 
contains all covariates discussed above, and as a result has the fewest number of 
observations, spanning from 1986 to 2012 with 112 countries, 90 of them adopting a 
VAT during the observed period. The second specification (2) is the same as the first, 
but omits government consumption and inflation. The third (3) specification also omits 
trade, investment, and per capita GDP growth, as these variables are outcomes we will 
test to see the effects of VAT’s adoption, and conditioning the selection on one of the 
outcome variables may weaken observed effects when one later performs matching.
10
 
The fourth specification (4) omits many time-varying covariates. This is done in order 
to study a much longer window where such data is missing and as result observe many 
more countries, spanning from 1967 to 2012 with 178 total countries and 150 adoptions. 
The final specification (5) omits all time-varying covariates and looks at only time 
                                                 
10
 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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invariant factors of adoption, but gains few other observations over specification (4), 
with 192 countries and 158 adoptions. All countries are considered at risk of adopting a 
VAT starting in 1960, the year the first developing country adopts a VAT.
11
  
 Specifications (1)-(3) show no statistically significant differences in marginal 
effects of covariates on survival. IMF lending has the predicted positive sign, so being 
under an IMF program is associated with a greater risk of implementing a VAT. Being a 
member of the Francophonie also sees countries tend to adopt VATs more quickly. 
Alternatively, having a high share of natural resource rents as a share of GDP  is 
correlated with slower VAT adoption, and countries that are governed as federations 
also tend to adopt VATs at slower rates. These effects are as predicted in the previous 
theoretical literature or match the prior empirical findings. No other included variables 
have a statistically significant effect on adoption rates, aside from continental-level 
controls. 
 Specification (4) cannot exactly be compared to (1)-(3) as it contains different 
covariates, covers a longer period, and has more countries. Being a member of the 
Francophonie or a Federation have the same effect here as they did in (1), but being a 
former Warsaw Pact country is associated with a lower likelihood of VAT adoption. 
This is sensible given the general failure to adopt VATs among these countries until the 
1990s. Countries that are larger (as indicated by log population) or have older 
populations get VATs more rapidly.  Specification (5) finds that, upon omitting all time 
varying variables, larger countries adopt VATs faster and smaller island countries adopt 
                                                 
11
 There is an adoption event in every year from 1984-2012, so specifications 1-3 do not 
drop any years due to lack of adoption events as would happen with Cox hazard 
regressions. Specifications 4 and 5 will have some years drop as some years before 
1984 have no adoption events. 
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them slower, along the same effects of being a former Warsaw Pact, Francophonie 
member or Federal country as seen in specification (4). 
 
4. Matching 
The fitted values from the Cox hazard regressions in section III.C can be used as 
propensity scores. Each country-year pair at risk of adopting a VAT will produce a 
fitted value Xb, the linear hazard of that observation, which describes its current failure 
rate. Using a simple difference algorithm like that used in Lu (2005), countries with 
similar hazard rates will have similar expected times of failure, and so any difference in 
failure time between two country-year pairs Xb1 and Xb2 where |Xb1-Xb2| <  ε for very 
small positive ε can be treated as random. A variety of matching methods can be used to 
compare treatments, but single nearest neighbor matching with replacement is the 
easiest to discuss and implement. In this method, a country [1] implementing a VAT is 
matched to a single other country [2] not implementing a VAT based on the choice of 
country-year pair that minimizes |Xb1-Xb2|. This method is used most often in this 
paper, but other matching methods, kernel matching and radius matching, are also 
employed to demonstrate robustness of results. The properties of matching estimators 
are covered in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983,1985) as well as with a special focus on 
kernel estimation in Heckman et al (1998). 
Figure I-3 provides a visual example of the matching employed here over a 
general panel of N countries over T years. As time increases from 0 to T, many 
countries adopt VAT's and region (1) consists of the treatment group country-years for 
this matching study. After adopting, countries drop out of estimation for the survival 
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equation, so the country-years in region (2) after adoption are not contributing to the 
survival equation and not used for matching. As this paper wants to look at effects over 
time for 5 years after adoption, it cannot use as a control a country 5 years or less before 
they adopt a VAT, region (3) on Figure I-3. These country-year pairs still contribute 
information to the survival equation. Countries that do not have a VAT and will not 
adopt one for 5 years compose the control region (4) and will be used both as controls 
in the matching and contribute variation to the survival equation. Thus, country-years 
from the treatment region (1) are compared to similar country-years in the control 
region (4) to see the effects of adoption.  
In order to verify this method has eliminated differences in observables between 
treatment and controls that would produce bias, one can examine the balance of 
observable covariates between the matches. One obviously cannot control for 
unobserved factors in matching. But if matched controls systematically differ from the 
treated observations on observables, then it will not be clear if the observed difference 
in outcomes between treatment and control arises from the treatment itself or the 
underlying differences between the treatment and control groups. Lu (2005) discusses 
the importance of showing that there exists an equal distribution of all covariates as a 
result of this problem. Table I-3 is the result of matching all treatment (adoption) 
country-years to a single nearest neighbor control, then comparing the difference in 
means for all covariates used in specification (1) of the selection equation from Table I-
2. Note that there will be more observations in this check of covariate balance than 
actually are matched to study given macroeconomic outcomes, as matching looks at a 
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much longer time window on the outcomes of interest and thus is more sensitive to 
missing data.
12
  
 Of the 29 covariates
13
 used to determine adoption, one variable shows a 
statistically significant difference in means between control and treatment at least at a 
10% level. Warsaw Pact country-years are statistically significantly more common in 
the treatment group than in the matched controls. While one may expect a few variables 
to be significant out of 29 due to random chance, this single difference should not be 
dismissed out of hand. One could omit all former Warsaw Pact countries as a later 
robustness check to see if they are driving matching results.  
 The average propensity score of adopters and matched controls are not 
statistically different from one another, with a t statistic of .14. Thus the matched 
control group and adoption group have, on average, the same probability of adopting 
the policy accounting for the total effect of all observables. However, the average 
propensity score of adopters compared to all unmatched observations is significantly 
higher at a 5% level, showing that the adopters, and the controls similar to them, are 
statistically significantly different from the overall population.
14
 These two features are 
needed for the matching performed to be valid. Another difference of note, while not 
actually a dependent variable, is the average year difference between controls and 
                                                 
12
 If one checks covariate matches of only those that will be matched for each of the 
macroeconomic outcomes, the results are qualitatively the same, but this approach 
requires many more tables, one for each macroeconomic variable (Growth, investment, 
etc). studied and if one considers matching through multiple methods the number of 
tables needed grows exponentially. 
13
 The number of covariates is 31 if one includes former soviet republics, all of which 
drop out due to lack of data availability, and the pacific dummy, omitted for perfect 
collinearity.  
14
 Removing 7 very extreme propensity scores among the untreated as outliers raises the 
t statistic to approximately 9, while it is only 2.22 now. 
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treatment. The treatment years are on average 4 years later than control years. This is 
not a surprising result, as there are many more controls that can be drawn from earlier 
years due to the fact countries exit after adopting in a survival framework. This would 
be worrisome if earlier years were systematically different from later years; however, as 
we have already compared 29 variables and found only one of covariates that 
systematically differ at least at a 10% level (roughly what one would expect for 29 
variables), it is unlikely that this difference in years would bias differences in means 
that is not be captured by these variables.
15
  
 
5. Results 
  The selection equation used to generate propensity scores for matching is 
specification (1) of Table I-2, having the fewest observations but containing the most 
covariates and the highest pseudo R
2
 of all specifications attempted.
16
 The 
macroeconomic outcomes of interest here are investment, growth, trade, inflation and 
government consumption as shares of GDP.  
 While matching is performed on a single country-year propensity score, the 
effects on the outcomes of interest of the countries matched are compared several years 
before and after the event of adoption. This in many ways resembles the method 
employed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) in that it matches two countries (or more 
generally in their method, one country to a synthetic composite country that can be 
composed of one or more countries) then follows their respective paths over time, both 
                                                 
15
 I cannot dismiss the possibility that years do matter for the outcomes, but it would 
have to work through a channel not captured by the current observables.   
16
 Evaluating through SIC and AIC is indeterminate between which specification, 1 or 
2, is superior, but specification 1 allows for analysis of the effects of more variables.  
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forward and backward, to identify the impact of a policy change. The countries should 
be identical before the policy change and different after if the policy had a causal effect. 
In the case of this paper, the decision to adopt occurs at time t=-2 and adoption occurs at 
time t=0. I will consider looking back as far as time t=-7, 5 years before the decision to 
adopt occurs, and as far forward as time t=5, 5 years after adoption. Furthermore, I will 
also consider the change in outcomes of interest from 7 years before adoption to 2 years 
before adoption, when the decision to adopt a VAT is made, as well as the change from 
2 years before adoption to 5 years after adoption, to capture the impact over time of 
VAT adoption.
17
 
 As one seeks to observe the average treatment on the treated (ATT), control and 
treatment countries should not differ in the years before a country decides to adopt a 
VAT. The control and treatment groups should have the same means of the variable of 
interest before the VAT is implemented, and the between-group difference in changes 
between 7 years before adoption to 2 years before should be zero. Thus, while both 
control and treatment group may see changes over time in the variable of interest, these 
changes should be the same. However, if the implementation of a VAT has an effect, 
then there should be a difference between changes in the treated group and the control 
group over time, 2 years before adoption to 5 years after, that is not zero. Thus while the 
variable of interest may change for both the control and treatment group, the changes 
should be different between treatment and control groups to assert a causal effect of the 
                                                 
17
 Because actors may expect a VAT, they may change their behavior before it is 
actually being collected, so looking at the effect from decision to adopt forward may 
provide a better picture of the overall change rather than starting 2 years later, when it is 
implemented. Pilot programs that implement a VAT in certain regions a few years 
before national level implementation may mean a country sees some smaller effect prior 
to nationwide adoption.   
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policy. Also, if the average difference in means between matched controls and treatment 
is nonzero in a given year post-adoption, this is further evidence of an effect.  
Results from matching, compared treated to matched controls, are summarized 
by their t statistics on Table I-4 for the five variables of interest over the thirteen year 
periods being tested, seven years before adoption to five years after adoption. Most 
importantly, the average differences in changes over time before adoption as well as 
after adoption are listed at the bottom of the table. Results comparing treated to 
unmatched controls, the whole data set without accounting for selection, are also 
presented for comparison purposes.  
The overall differences in changes over time after adoption are statistically 
significantly different from zero for investment, being positive at a 10% level, and 
inflation and government spending, being negative at a 10% level. Growth is 
statistically significantly higher in the year of adoption, along with three and four years 
after adoption, and inflation is lower four and five years after adoption. These results 
would be consistent with VATs raising growth and investment as a share of GDP at the 
same time they lower inflation and government spending. Combining these generally 
positive effects with previous author’s results that VAT can collect a great of revenue, a 
VAT seems an attractive policy.  
Also important for the validity of the results, the overall difference in changes 
before adoption between adopters and controls is not statistically different from zero for 
all five variables. There is also no difference in any of the given variables in any of the 
years before adoption. If there were a differences, or differences in changes, of any 
variable, it would call into question the interpretation of the results, as it would imply a 
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difference in trajectories between controls and treatment prior to undertaking the 
treatment. As there is no such difference in trajectories before, and a difference in 
trajectories after, there is evidence that VAT adoption caused changes over time among 
these variables.  
Discussing specific variables, it would thus appear over time after adoption, 
VATs caused a gain in investment as a share of GDP. Ferretti and Roubini (1998) 
forecast that investment should rise when taxes are collected more from consumption 
relative to income, which is borne out here. This finding would seem to disagree with 
Cai and Harrison (2011)  who found that Chinese firms did not change investment 
behavior in response to temporary changes in the VAT rate. However, as Cai and 
Harrison studied repeal of VATs for firms, not imposition, and looked at a firm rather 
than a national level, a number of reasons that could explain the difference in findings.   
There is no overall difference in changes in GDP growth either before or after 
the VAT is passed, but several years after adoption growth is statistically significantly 
higher in countries that adopt compared to similar countries who did not. This would 
seem to demonstrate against any large efficiency losses as forecast by Stiglitz and 
Shahe (2005) and Stiglitz (2008) due to the shifting of production from the observed 
formal sector to the unobserved, less efficient informal sector. If VAT is causing 
distortions that drive economic activity underground, which should show up in reduced 
GDP growth numbers, the distortions such as increased evasion efforts are either too 
small to detect or are offset by GDP gains. Positive changes in growth would agree with 
the proposed efficiency gains, as would be forecast by Zagler and Durnecker, (2003); 
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Arnold, (2011); and Hines and Summers, (2009) from moving toward consumption 
taxes. However, it is unlikely that this higher growth would continue indefinitely. 
 There is no statistically significant effect of VAT adoption on trade as a share of 
GDP as seen in Table I-4. Before adoption, trade as a share of GDP is the same among 
adopters and matched non-adopters. Compared to all countries, the unmatched controls, 
countries that would adopt a VAT traded less. After adopting a VAT, while adopters do 
see trade increase as a share of GDP, so do the matched controls. Thus there does not 
appear to be a causal effect of VATs on trade.  However, compared to unmatched 
controls, after adopting a VAT, countries no longer trade less than other countries.  
 These results are not inconsistent with the results of Hines and Desai (2005) 
who found countries with a VAT traded less. While it is true countries that adopt VATs 
trade less than countries that do not adopt VATs, when matched against countries with 
similar characteristics, they do not trade any more or less. Even after adoption, when 
countries with VATs see their trade numbers rise, they still trade (albeit statistically 
insignificantly) less than unmatched controls. Thus panel methods here could find a 
negative correlation of VAT adoption with trade. However, this may be because 
countries who adopt a VAT trade less to begin with, and they may adopt VATs in order 
to attempt to raise trade; VATs themselves do not lower trade.  
 Due to wide ranges of possible values for inflation, and its high variance, 
matching is particularly useful in determining the effects of VATs on inflation. While 
before adoption countries with VATs tended to have roughly the same inflation as 
matched controls, in the years following adoption countries with a VAT see a less 
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inflation in several years compared to matched controls. Due to large yearly swings in 
average inflation, this result must be interpreted with caution.  
 The changes in government consumption as a share of GDP prove to be the most 
interesting. First, compared to unmatched countries, VAT adopters have significantly 
smaller government spending as a share of GDP, but not when compared to matched 
countries. There is no difference in spending in any given year before or after adoption, 
and no difference in changes before adoption, but following the decision to adopt there 
is a statistically significant decrease over time in government consumption as a share of 
GDP among countries with a VAT compared to matched controls. As Keen and 
Lockwood (2010) found sometimes conflicting results of the effects of VATs on 
government revenue, this result is not unexpected. If collecting public funds and as a 
result government consumption has become less distortionary due to a more efficient 
tax system, one would expect government consumption to grow rather than due to the 
lower marginal cost of collecting public funds makes spending easier. However, if 
government changes other taxation or spending behaviors at the same time, such as 
lowering taxes collected by more distortionary means, that could explain this net fall in 
spending. 
 It is possible that the earlier results from VAT adoption on various variables 
arises from the choice of matching method, so six other methods are tested; single 
nearest neighbor without replacement, nearest three neighbors with replacement, caliper 
matching with a .025 and .05 radius, and kernel matching with an Epanechnikov as well 
as Normal kernel. Results are shown in Table I-5, comparing differences in changes 
over time before adoption and after adoption. Results for investment as well as 
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government spending and inflation are reasonably robust. On the other hand, growth is 
less robust, although one may expect single higher years of growth rather than long 
term growth. The impact of VAT adoption on trade is not statistically significantly 
different from zero. Finally, before adoption, there is no systematic difference in 
changes between control and treatment groups on any variable regardless of matching 
method, which one must see for the inferences above to be valid. Table I-5 provides 
strong evidence these changes observed after adoptions are causal effects of the policy 
and not driven by choice of matching methods. 
  
6. Conclusion 
 VATs are believed to be able to raise a large amount of money with little 
overhead or distortion, and so have become more common around the world in recent 
decades. However, studies actually analyzing the impacts of VATs are rare and their 
results are often not conclusive. Resolving this lack of conclusive results is important, 
as signs are that VATs and consumption taxes are likely to grow in importance for 
government funding in future years (Hines and Summers 2009; Bird 2012). This policy 
deserves more analysis before rushing headlong into more VAT reliance.  
 As VATs are adopted voluntarily by nations, it can be hard to obtain causal 
estimates of the effects of the policy due to endogeneity, as those who choose the tax 
may fundamentally differ from those who did not. This paper proposes solving the 
problem through the use a of a two-stage process. In the first stage, country's decisions 
to adopt a VAT are modeled as a Cox hazard regression, with countries surviving for a 
number of years, based on a vector of covariates, before adopting a VAT. Countries' 
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survival times are random conditional on the linear hazards from the survival, so any 
difference in times of VAT adoption is random between two country-year pairs with 
sufficiently close fitted values. In the second stage, each country-year pair in which an 
adoption event occurs is matched to a country-year pair in which it does not occur with 
the closest linear hazards. Then, I compare the difference in means for investment, 
growth, trade, inflation and government spending between treated and controls at time 
of adoption and several years after the adoption event, comparing outcomes before the 
event as a falsification test.  There is evidence that VATs lower inflation and 
government spending, as well as raise investment and growth. Countries most likely to 
adopt VATs trade less as a share of GDP than countries as a whole, and those that adopt 
VATs do see a statistically sigificant gain in trade, but no larger than those of matched 
controls that do not adopt the treatment.  
 These findings can be of use to many policymakers considering implementing a 
VAT. VATs carry with them no major side effects in the form of lowering trade and 
may raise growth and investment, with no feared adverse effects on inflation or 
government consumption. As these results are the mean effects of VAT adoption, they 
leave the door open to investigating more detailed aspects of VAT adoption. This study 
only includes VAT adoption events in over roughly 2 decades, and many earlier VAT 
adopters may have had systematically different experiences, and future ones may see 
different impacts as well. This study does not keep track of VAT rates themselves, how 
many different VAT categories are used by the country, the minimum firm size to 
register for the VAT, or the speed at which one receives rebates. All of these are 
potentially major determinants of the ultimate effect of a VAT which could prove 
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important to the actual effect of VAT adoption (Edminston and Fox 2006). Finally, 
many VATs did not arise in a vacuum but rather took their place among some existing 
taxes and perhaps replaced others. Thus, the true impact of any VAT is likely dependent 
on a rich set of nation-specific tax and other factors. Rather, this paper provides a 
jumping off point for empirical studies of finer points of the VAT, while at the same 
time applying a new method to solve important unanswered questions about the 
empirics of this popular tax policy.  
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Table I-1 
Summary Statistics, Right Hand Side Variables, 1965-2010 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Government Consumption 3692 14.22 10.86 0.64 69.83 
Inflation 3357 29.01 488.18 -49.42 26762.02 
Investment 3060 22.89 10.53 -17.40 113.58 
GDP per Capita Growth 3350 1.91 7.12 -50.29 92.59 
Trade 3213 78.72 53.33 0.31 432.30 
IMF Lending Dummy 1929 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Agriculture 2861 23.45 17.51 0 93.98 
GDP, Log 3364 22.19 2.31 16.13 30.09 
GDP Per Capita, Log 3360 7.32 1.54 4.00 11.02 
Natural Resource Rents 3003 10.00 15.93 0.00 155.22 
Bordering Countries with VAT 4823 0.15 0.29 0 1 
% of Population 0-14 4425 38.25 8.81 11.51 53.03 
% of Population 65+ 4425 4.87 2.94 0.43 14.63 
Population Growth 4790 2.10 1.71 -11.00 18.59 
Population, Log 4791 14.75 2.18 8.83 20.88 
Size, Log Square Kilometers 4823 10.93 2.87 0.69 16.61 
Alliance of Small Island States 4823 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Former Soviet Republic 4823 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Former Warsaw Pact 4823 0.07 0.26 0 1 
British Commonwealth 4823 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Francophonie 4823 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Island 4823 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Landlocked 4823 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Federal 4823 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Asia 4823 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Europe 4823 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Africa 4823 0.31 0.46 0 1 
North America 4823 0.11 0.32 0 1 
South America 4823 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Pacific 4823 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Notes: Observational units are country-year pairs. 
Variables are lagged two periods 
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Table I-2 
Cox Hazard Regressions for VAT Adoption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1986-2012 1986-2012 1986-2012 1967-2012 1967-2012 
Government Consumption 
 
-0.022     
(0.017)     
      
Inflation -0.007     
 (0.005)     
      
Investment 0.011 0.011    
 (0.015) (0.014)    
      
GDP per Capita Growth -0.010 -0.002    
 (0.019) (0.018)    
      
Trade -0.003 -0.002    
 (0.004) (0.004)    
      
IMF Lending Dummy 1.253
***
 1.293
***
 1.302
***
   
 (0.360) (0.347) (0.342)   
      
Agriculture -0.008 -0.005 -0.009   
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)   
      
GDP, Log 6.359 6.453 6.566   
 (4.505) (4.184) (4.246)   
      
GDP per Capita, Log -5.968 -5.953 -6.106   
 (4.491) (4.172) (4.236)   
      
Natural Resource Rents -0.030
**
 -0.034
**
 -0.035
**
   
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)   
      
Bordering Countries with VAT 0.512 0.589 0.608 -0.071  
 (0.450) (0.441) (0.428) (0.324)  
      
% of Population 0-14 -0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.038  
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.024)  
      
% of Population 65+ -0.043 -0.017 0.002 0.152
**
  
 (0.112) (0.108) (0.106) (0.073)  
      
Population Growth 0.004 0.011 0.012 -0.017  
 (0.090) (0.086) (0.086) (0.069)  
      
Population, Log -5.930 -5.978 -6.066 0.362
***
  
 (4.491) (4.171) (4.236) (0.094)  
      
Size, Log of Square Kilometers -0.032 -0.071 -0.078 -0.095 0.133
***
 
 (0.106) (0.103) (0.103) (0.071) (0.046) 
      
Alliance of Small Island States -0.372 -0.419 -0.393 -0.674 -1.085
***
 
 (0.587) (0.551) (0.534) (0.412) (0.403) 
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Former Soviet Republic - 0.368 0.369 0.245 0.409 
 - (1.281) (1.214) (0.407) (0.356) 
      
Former Warsaw Pact -0.953 -1.109 -1.290
*
 -0.958
**
 -0.679
*
 
 (0.716) (0.692) (0.687) (0.432) (0.374) 
      
British Commonwealth 0.005 -0.001 -0.012 0.303 0.308 
 (0.316) (0.317) (0.311) (0.226) (0.220) 
      
Francophonie 0.681
**
 0.683
**
 0.685
**
 0.487
**
 0.404
**
 
 (0.300) (0.293) (0.290) (0.206) (0.196) 
      
Island 0.685 0.794
*
 0.780 0.012 0.189 
 (0.484) (0.477) (0.476) (0.388) (0.347) 
      
Landlocked 0.076 0.117 0.143 0.049 -0.092 
 (0.321) (0.303) (0.298) (0.214) (0.204) 
      
Federal -2.056
***
 -2.184
***
 -2.201
***
 -1.047
***
 -0.695
**
 
 (0.654) (0.649) (0.649) (0.374) (0.349) 
N 1287 1317 1400 4421 4823 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.118 0.112 0.117 0.071 0.051 
Log Likelihood -313.114 -328.122 -334.086 -635.170 -697.526 
Chi Squared 83.686 82.685 88.906 96.815 74.938 
Subjects 112 113 114 178 192 
Adoptions 90 95 96 150 158 
Standard Errors statistics in parentheses. 
 *
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Notes: Observational units are country-year pairs; Values are coefficients for linear 
hazards, not hazard ratios. A coefficient of 0 thus implies no effect. To find the hazard 
ratios, exponentiate the coefficient; All independent variables are lagged 2 periods; All 
estimates use regional dummies for North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and 
Africa (Pacific omitted.)  
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Table I-3 
Balance of Covariates for Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Government Consumption Unmatched 11.82 15.03 -3.21 1.18 -2.71*** 
 ATT 11.82 9.84 1.98 1.32 1.5 
       
Inflation 
 
Unmatched 12.20 77.66 -65.46 105.71 -0.62 
ATT 12.20 11.11 1.09 4.07 0.27 
       
Gross Capital Formation Unmatched 22.21 22.73 -0.52 1.25 -0.41 
 ATT 22.21 22.23 -0.02 1.78 -0.01 
       
GDP per Capita Growth Unmatched 1.63 1.63 0.00 0.73 0.00 
 ATT 1.63 1.06 0.57 0.92 0.61 
       
Trade Unmatched 74.66 84.43 -9.77 5.50 -1.78* 
 ATT 74.66 62.99 11.67 8.07 1.45 
       
IMF Lending Dummy Unmatched 0.72 0.47 0.26 0.06 4.63*** 
 ATT 0.72 0.69 0.03 0.08 0.4 
       
Agriculture Unmatched 22.47 22.38 0.09 1.91 0.05 
 ATT 22.47 23.78 -1.31 3.04 -0.43 
       
GDP, Log Unmatched 22.66 22.04 0.63 0.26 2.41*** 
 ATT 22.66 23.27 -0.60 0.47 -1.29 
       
GDP Per Capita, Log Unmatched 7.07 7.10 -0.03 0.17 -0.19 
 ATT 7.07 7.14 -0.07 0.31 -0.24 
       
Natural Resource Rents Unmatched 6.76 11.82 -5.06 1.61 -3.14*** 
 ATT 6.76 7.92 -1.16 1.94 -0.6 
       
Bordering Countries with 
VAT 
Unmatched 0.38 0.21 0.17 0.04 4.60*** 
 ATT 0.38 0.28 0.10 0.07 1.43 
       
% of Population 0-14 Unmatched 35.99 39.83 -3.84 0.85 -4.52*** 
 ATT 35.99 36.53 -0.55 1.72 -0.32 
       
% of Population 65+ Unmatched 5.62 4.14 1.48 0.27 5.41*** 
 ATT 5.62 5.53 0.09 0.64 0.15 
       
Population Growth Unmatched 1.82 2.17 -0.35 0.17 -2.12** 
 ATT 1.82 2.01 -0.19 0.23 -0.8 
       
Population, Log Unmatched 15.60 14.93 0.67 0.24 2.82*** 
 ATT 15.60 16.12 -0.52 0.36 -1.46 
       
Size, Log Square 
Kilometers 
Unmatched 11.77 11.25 0.52 0.31 1.7 
 ATT 11.77 12.44 -0.66 0.45 -1.46 
       
Asia Unmatched 0.19 0.31 -0.12 0.05 -2.37** 
 ATT 0.19 0.23 -0.04 0.07 -0.6 
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Europe Unmatched 0.18 0.02 0.16 0.02 8.33*** 
 ATT 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.06 1 
       
Africa Unmatched 0.44 0.43 0.01 0.06 0.25 
 ATT 0.44 0.48 -0.03 0.09 -0.37 
       
North America Unmatched 0.07 0.14 -0.08 0.04 -2.05** 
 ATT 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.05 -0.41 
       
South America Unmatched 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.9 
 ATT 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.58 
       
Alliance of Small Island 
States 
Unmatched 0.17 0.27 -0.11 0.05 -2.17** 
 ATT 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.9 
       
Former Warsaw Pact Unmatched 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 7.41*** 
 ATT 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.04 2.66*** 
       
British Commonwealth Unmatched 0.40 0.46 -0.06 0.06 -1.09 
 ATT 0.40 0.44 -0.04 0.09 -0.5 
       
Francophonie Unmatched 0.39 0.28 0.11 0.05 2.25** 
 ATT 0.39 0.34 0.04 0.08 0.52 
       
Island Unmatched 0.21 0.26 -0.05 0.05 -0.98 
 ATT 0.21 0.18 0.03 0.07 0.48 
       
Landlocked Unmatched 0.23 0.21 0.03 0.05 0.55 
 ATT 0.23 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.58 
       
Federal Unmatched 0.08 0.11 -0.03 0.03 -0.97 
 ATT 0.08 0.13 -0.06 0.06 -0.89 
       
Year Unmatched 1996.98 1994.46 2.52 0.70 3.6*** 
 ATT 1996.98 1992.39 4.59 1.13 4.06*** 
       
Propensity Score Unmatched 8.07 6.31 1.76 0.80 2.22** 
 ATT 8.07 8.05 0.02 0.17 0.14 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Total Observations: 863 
Untreated Observations: 773 
Treated Observations: 90 
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Table I-4 
Summary of Matching Results, Single Nearest Neighbor Matching 
 
Investment 
GDP per  
Capita Growth 
Trade Inflation 
Government 
Consumption 
7 Years Pre-Adoption 0.14 0.03 0.87 -0.32 0.86 
6 Years Pre-Adoption -0.52 0.51 0.48 -0.77 0.67 
5 Years Pre-Adoption -0.36 -1.22 0.52 -0.36 0.79 
4 Years Pre-Adoption 0.41 -1.45 0.83 0.35 0.99 
3 Years Pre-Adoption -0.27 0.32 0.95 0.25 0.83 
2 Years Pre-Adoption -0.55 0.67 1.07 0.48 0.92 
1 Year Pre-Adoption 0.00 0.59 0.86 0.00 0.57 
Year of Adoption -0.37 2.17** 0.88 0.40 0.18 
1 Year Post-Adoption 0.31 0.38 1.10 -0.68 0.58 
2 Years Post-Adoption 0.69 1.20 1.09 -0.60 0.47 
3 Years Post-Adoption 1.11 1.79* 1.16 -1.51 0.65 
4 Years Post-Adoption 0.97 1.93* 0.80 -1.82* 0.35 
5 Years Post-Adoption 1.21 1.38 0.87 -1.89* 0.01 
Change 2 Years Pre-
Adoption to 5 Years Post-
Adoption 1.69* 0.49 -0.25 -1.97* -1.75* 
Change 7 Years Pre-
Adoption to 2 Years Pre-
Adoption -0.79 0.37 0.35 0.47 -0.21 
Treated Observations 77 78 76 78 80 
Untreated Observations 639 683 662 684 716 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
 
Notes: T statistics above for mean differences, treated (adopters) minus untreated 
(matched controls); Propensity scores for matching are generated by hazard regression (1) 
on Table I-2. 
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Table I-5 Comparison of Matching Methods   
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Figure I-1 
Adoptions of VAT, Total 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
Figure I-2 
Adoptions of VAT,Yearly 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations  
 
Note for Figures I-1 and I-2: Vietnam in the 1970s, Grenada in 1986, Ghana in 
1995, Malta in 1998, and Belize in 1999 all passed a VAT and later repealed it. 
Vietnam, Grenada, and Ghana would later re-adopt a VAT in 1999, 2010, and 
1998 respectively, and these re-introduction events are included in this paper. 
Belize and Malta are included with original adoption dates. This is in line with 
what was done by Keen and Lockwood (2010). Omitting these observations does 
not qualitatively change results. 
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Figure I-3 
Visual Explanation of Matching 
 
 
Year 
 
Region (1) are country-years that have adoption events. These are the treatment 
observations. Information from these country-years are used in both the selection 
equation and matching. 
 
Region (2) are country-years after adoption events. Information from this region is 
neither included in the selection equation nor the matching equation. 
 
Region (3) are the 5 country-years pre-adoption that cannot be used for matching 
due to the need to have control country-years that do not adopt VATs for 5 years 
after being assigned as a control. They still provide information to the selection 
equation. 
 
Region (4) are country-years 5 years or more before an adoption event. This is the 
pool of controls. Information from these country-year pairs are included in both 
the selection equation and matching. 
 
Matching for this paper covers more countries than the 15 listed and a longer 
period than the 10 listed above, and so this figure is presented solely for 
demonstration purposes.   
  
36 
 
II. The Effect of VATs on Government Balance Sheets 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past half century the value added tax, or VAT, has become a major 
source of government funding for a significant number of countries around the world. 
Hines and Summers (2009) argue that this trend will continue, with consumption taxes 
like the VAT becoming increasingly important due to the increasing mobility of 
economic activity that will make it harder to assess income taxes. Countries often 
consider passing a VAT in order to solve federal budgetary shortfalls, considering it a 
particularly effective strategy to raise revenue and eliminate deficits as it is able to 
collect more revenue for a given amount of government effort than most other taxes 
(Keen 2010). Similarly, Ebeke and Ehrhart (2012) have found that countries with VATs 
tend to have lower variance in tax revenues as a share of GDP relative to countries 
without this tax, making the VAT a useful tool at revenue smoothing for developing 
countries. Widespread belief in the VAT’s ability to gather revenue, solve deficits and 
reduce variance in tax receipts is apparent recently in the words and actions of 
lawmakers, as well as those of international entities such as the IMF. Theoretical papers 
agree with these findings, with Diamond and Zodrow (2013) considering the 
effectiveness of a VAT in reducing US government deficits in a CGE model. They find 
the tax it is able to rectify government budget issues but remain relatively progressive, 
as it is able to tax a broader base with fewer distortions and less enforcement effort. 
However, it is not clear that the increase in government revenue will not then be 
immediately offset by increases in government spending due to lower cost of collecting 
funds, and so the net effect of the VAT on debt remains ambiguous.  
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This paper addresses the ability of a VAT to improve government balance 
sheets. I specifically test the VAT's effects on various measures of debt, government 
deficits, tax revenues and public expenditures as a share of GDP in a broad sample of 
countries that adopted the VAT between 1986 and 2010
18
. The vast majority of 
countries in this sample are developing countries, as developed countries adopted the 
VAT before this period. I consider both the level of these variables, as well as their 
variance, as VATs may improve the stability of some of these fiscal indicators in 
addition to affecting their volume. VATs are likely to affect government revenue, 
government spending, and GDP growth simultaneously, so the policy’s impacts on all 
of these measures are not immediately clear.   
 While previous studies of the VAT use regression analysis, I follow Ufier 
(2014) in employing a matching framework to evaluate the fiscal impact of VATs. This 
method helps to address estimation problems in this setting. As a country chooses 
whether to adopt a VAT, adoption is a choice and naïve OLS estimates will not be 
capture the effect of the tax alone, but also pick up the effect of selection into the tax. 
Not all countries without a VAT are relevant comparisons to countries who adopt the 
VAT as countries select the treatment endogenously. Using matching should alleviate 
the issue of selection on observables by comparing countries that adopted the VAT only 
to those countries which are similar, but did not adopt the tax.  
 Estimation in this paper will follow a two-step process. First, using survival 
analysis, I will estimate the probability of a country adopting a VAT in a given year 
                                                 
18
 While I model adoptions in years following 2007, I cannot look at the impact of these 
adoptions as I lack sufficient data on government balance sheets to look at the impact of 
taxes in these most recent years of adoption. 
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based on observable factors. Second, I will match two (or more) countries with similar 
probabilities of failure
19
, in which one adopted the VAT and the others did not, in order 
to estimate the effect of a VAT in the 5 year span following its adoption. As a 
falsification test, I will also compare adopters and similar non-adopters for 7 years 
before adoption in order to verify there were no pre-existing differences or trends that 
would invalidate the assumption countries were similar prior to choosing the treatment. 
Despite its importance and promised benefits, the VAT is relatively 
understudied in economics. Several such studies including Keen and Lockwood (2010), 
Nellor (1987) and Ebeke (2010) look at the determinants of the VAT and generally find 
it increases tax revenues. Stockfisch (1985) considers its impact on government size in 
OECD countries, finding both adopter and non-adopter governments grow over time, 
with no differential effect of growth coming from the VAT. Ufier (2014) examines its 
macroeconomic impacts, finding it to be generally positive for investment and growth. 
Yet concerns still remain about the longer term fiscal impact of such a tax.  
Some policy makers fear a “money machine” with the VAT leading to the 
government’s spending of all the additional funds it takes in, as it is easier to collect 
taxes and they thus increase collection efforts and immediately spending them, leaving 
balance sheets no better off than before the passage of the tax (Keen 2007). In previous 
general tax papers, authors had found that higher tax receipts did lead to higher tax 
expenditures in some cases (Manage and Marlow 1986) but not in others (Von 
Furstenberg et al 1986.)  Lee, Kim, and Borcherding (2013), however, propose the 
causation flows the other direction- instead of high revenues causing higher demand for 
                                                 
19
 A “Failure” in this case is referring to VAT adoption. 
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public goods, people's preferences for higher levels of public goods tends to lead them 
to pass more revenue collecting measures. The opinion on the VAT is thus mixed, and 
more solid empirical evidence of its impact on debt and deficits would help to better 
understand the possible policy uses of a VAT. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a brief summary and 
introduction, and section 2 provides background on the VAT. Section 3 discusses the 
first part of the estimation, survival analysis, and section 4 discusses the second, 
matching. Section 5 covers results and section 6 concludes.  
  
2. Background 
 France passed the first general VAT in 1954, reforming it significantly in 1968. 
By this time, Cote d'Ivoire had already passed a VAT in 1960 and the tax was beginning 
to spread to Latin America and Western Europe. Initial adoptions came slowly in the 
1970s and early 1980s, spreading eventually to Southern Europe and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. By the early 1990s many countries in Eastern Europe and Asia began to enact 
the tax. In the 2000s, small island nations in the Pacific and Caribbean became one of 
the last major groups to implement the tax, and currently the Middle East remains the 
only major holdout region, with the Arab Gulf states currently investigating a VAT in 
the future. The sole major industrialized economy without a VAT as of 2015 is the 
United States.    
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2A. Further Literature 
A VAT, like any other tax, can be used to solve budget deficits and improve 
government balance sheets. However, it is not at all clear that the tax would be used to 
actually correct budget sheet imbalances faced by countries adopting it. The static 
benefits of raising revenue through an easy to collect tax mechanism may be 
counterbalanced by the dynamic effects of governments instead choosing to raise 
expenditures or cut other taxes, leaving its fiscal position no better than before the tax 
(Keen 2007, Toder and Rosenberg 2010). Additionally, Bird and Smart (2012) highlight 
the increasingly prominent role of the VAT as a tax intended to shore up large 
entitlement programs whose original funding streams prove insufficient. Theoretical 
papers may predict the impact of a VAT or other consumption tax on macroeconomic 
variables, but often lack empirical tests of their theories. While Ufier (2014) considers 
the impact of a VAT on government consumption as a share of GDP, and Ebeke and 
Ehrhart (2012) considers stability of revenues in a regression framework, empirical 
evidence does not definitively state whether VATs tend to reduce debts and deficits in 
countries that have passed them. 
Numerous nations in recent years are looking at a VAT for the reasons of raising 
revenue and reducing deficits, usually under advisement from the IMF or in official 
IMF reports. Bird (2010) claims that the IMF often promotes a VAT to countries which 
are experiencing high budget deficits. Aruba’s recent fiscal reforms selected to replace 
many current taxes with the VAT (IMF 2010). The Bahamas found numerous tax 
deficiencies and suggested reforming the government’s tax structure by imposing a 
VAT, as it does often with many recent article IV missions (IMF 2013.)  The new 
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government of Afghanistan is considering the VAT along with taxes on natural 
resources to be its primary sources of revenue (IMF 2012).  Burundi’s stated goals in 
passing the VAT is to bring its tax code closer in line with the international standard, 
their de facto endorsement of the VAT as the standard world tax (African Development 
Bank 2010).  The Marshall Islands considers a VAT likely to be a successful means of 
securing revenue for the economy, if accompanied with other fiscal reforms (IMF 
2008). Prior to acquiring the VAT, Palau considered their tax system in gross need of 
modernization and reform, with the VAT being the best way to reform it for fiscal 
stability (IMF 2012). More directly, the IMF recently demanded implementation of the 
VAT in Pakistan with no exemptions or changes allowed; If Pakistan were to try to alter 
the law as presented to them, they would cease future assistance in the country (Rana 
2013). There are thus a fair number of countries considering a number of tax reforms 
recently, and their general consensus has been to side with the VAT as the best 
available of those options for raising revenue and keeping it stable. 
The last major bloc of countries without a VAT, oil producing countries in the 
middle east, are now considering the VAT for revenue stability purposes. The Gulf 
Cooperation Countries, long reliant on oil revenues and banking taxes for funding, 
consider this tax to be the best means of acquiring a constant stream of revenue and 
reversing government deficits (Charalambous 2012). Officials in Bahrain, Kuwait, 
UAE, and Qatar have all spoken out in support of this action (Izzak and Saleh 2013, 
Kapur 2012, Peninsula 2012, Rafique 2011.) There is a great deal of international 
support behind the VAT as a tool for solving budget deficits or raising revenue in the 
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long run. Yet for all the strength with which this tax is promoted, there is a relative 
dearth of empirical evidence.  
 
3. Survival Analysis 
 In order to properly account for the selection in acquiring to VAT, one first 
needs to model the decision to adopt a VAT. This paper uses the same selection 
equation and many of the same covariates to model VAT adoption as Ufier (2014), 
employing a Cox proportional hazard model with countries surviving in a VAT-free 
state for a period until they acquire the tax and thus exit the estimation. I will only 
briefly cover the topic of selection equation and its determinant in this paper, as Ufier 
(2014) covers it in greater detail. This paper uses a propensity score matching 
technique, modeling the adoption of a VAT as a Cox proportional hazard model. The 
persistence of a VAT means that a survival model would provide a good fit to the 
observed data, as countries tend to acquire the tax and never repeal it. This analysis 
allows me to estimate the probability of failure, adopting a VAT, in each country in 
each period. I then compare countries at equal risk of failing in the case where one 
failed and the other did not in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effects of 
adopting a VAT, as actual time to failure is random conditional on countries having the 
same probability of failure (Lu 2005). 
 
3A. Determinants of Adoption 
There is a great deal of theoretical guidance as to the determinants of a country 
choosing to pass a VAT, but the major determinants of tax adoption can be split into 
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several groups. International pressure, in the form of IMF lending, could lead to more 
countries acquiring the VAT (Bird 2010). IMF lending is represented here as a dummy 
variable equaling 1 if a country is under an IMF lending program at any point in a given 
year. Proximity to other countries with a VAT could also lead to one acquiring it, either 
from the experience of seeing a neighbor implement it or tax competition, and so the 
share of neighboring countries with a VAT is included as a determinant (Cizek et al 
2012). National economic composition, specifically countries with a large share of GDP 
coming from agriculture or natural resource production, likely affects the type of taxes a 
government chooses to collect. Countries that collect revenue from natural resources 
may be less likely to rely on other types of taxes, and agriculture is considered difficult 
to monitor for providing reimbursement and collecting taxes necessary with a VAT 
system (Keen and Lockwood 2010, Cnossen 1998).    
 Geopolitical factors including landlocked status, island status and log land area 
are all included as dummy variables. These measures all potentially affect a nation's 
decision to acquire a particular tax due to their effects on enforcement, with landlocked 
countries having more difficulties in controlling smuggling of products to avoid VATs 
compared to countries with only a limited number of points of entry (Keen 2010).  
Historical factors, including French or British influence, as well as Warsaw pact 
membership all could affect a countries' legal system and thus decision to adopt the tax 
(Keen 2010). Decentralized federations may also avoid a tax that requires centralized 
collection like a VAT (Ebrill et al. 2001, Treisman 2002). As VATs require a great deal 
of institutional capacity to implement, I include the Polity IV measure of democracy as 
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a measure of institutional quality due to its relatively good coverage over time and 
across countries (used by authors such as Ang 2010.)  
 Demographic factors may affect the optimal tax system for a country, especially 
for ones with large safety nets for the elderly (Bird and Smart 2012). A tax system with 
a fixed setup cost may also not be considered worthwhile in very small or very poor, 
resource constrained countries. Therefore, I also include the log of population, percent 
of population above 65, and log of GDP per capita as determinants of adoption. Next, I 
include the macroeconomic outcome variables of imports, exports, inflation
20
, 
investment and government consumption all as a share of GDP. These variables may 
determine legislator’s decisions to implement the tax.  
Finally, as there is usually some lag between the planning and passage of a VAT 
and the tax actually being collected, I lag all determinants by 2 years. Thus, a country 
choosing to acquire a VAT in 1996 does so based on values of its covariates from 1994. 
This is in line with Ebrill et al. (2001) who state there is roughly an 18 month lag 
between and decision to pass the VAT and its collection, as well as Cizek et al (2012) 
and Ufier (2014) who also use a 2 year lag. I also include regional dummies for Africa, 
Asia, Europe, North America, and South America, with the pacific being the omitted 
category. 
  
3B. Summary Statistics and Results 
Table II-1 presents summary statistics on determinants of VAT adoption, as well 
as the outcome variables affected by the VAT policy. The independent variables used in 
                                                 
20
 I use the natural log of 100+the rate of inflation in an effort to smooth relatively 
frequent extremely high inflation events among countries. 
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the survival analysis have coverage from 1986-2010, allowing me to model countries' 
VAT adoptions during this period. I consider seven outcome variables that summarize 
government fiscal positions, coming from three different data sets. First, the Milesi-
Feretti and Lane (2011) external debt data set covers essentially the entire period of 
interest, combining externally held private as well as public debt. Second, the World 
Development Indicators also collects an external debt (as a share of GDP) series, and it 
covers approximately 80% of the country-years during the period of interest. Finally, 
the World Economic Outlook contributes five data series to this study: central 
government debt, deficit, cyclically adjusted deficit, tax revenue, and government 
expenditure, all as a share of GDP. These series provides numerous alternative ways to 
consider the fiscal impact of a VAT, although it has smaller coverage than either of the 
above measures.
21
 Any null findings using this debt data may be due to the low power 
coming from a smaller sample size rather than evidence of a lack of robustness across 
data sets.   
 Table II-2 shows the result of the Cox proportional hazard regression used to 
model the decision to adopt a VAT. In each year, the country has a probability of either 
surviving in a VAT-free state or adopting a VAT and exiting estimation.  The 
probability of adopting a VAT in each period is affected by 25 variables, both time 
variant and invariant, described in section 3.1. Seven variables are found to be 
statistically significant determinants of choosing to enact a VAT. Countries receiving 
IMF assistance are more likely to pass a VAT as well and countries with a large number 
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 The World Development indicators have data on many of these measures as well, but 
they cover less than 10% of the country years being studied and so may not provide 
useful results.   
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of neighbors that already have the VAT. This would be consistent with the idea that 
VATs spread by proximity and that IMF pressure plays a role in adoption. Countries 
with larger populations or higher GDPs per capita also are more likely to get the VAT, 
which is consistent with the idea that one may be better able to spread the fixed cost of 
the tax in larger countries, and that wealthier countries have an easier time 
administering it. Countries with large natural resource rents as a share of GDP are less 
likely to get the tax, being able to rely on other sources of funding. Countries governed 
as federations are less likely to pass a VAT potentially due to difficulties in 
administration. However, British Commonwealth countries are also less likely to pass it. 
These are all generally consistent with the previous literature. 
 
4. Matching 
 I use the results of the Cox proportional hazard model selection equation from 
Table II-2 to generate propensity scores. For each country-year pair, I save the 
instantaneous probability of adopting a VAT from the hazard model. Using the process 
outlined by Lu (2005), for two observations wherein the difference in failure rates 
approaches 0, failure is random conditional on those observables. Thus I will be 
comparing country-years that fail and acquire VATs to country-years that do not fail but 
were otherwise similar.  
 Several methods are available to produce matching estimates. Most popular is 
nearest neighbor matching. I can compare the n nearest neighbors to a single treated 
observation, comparing the treated units to the average outcome of the n closest 
untreated country-years, both with or without replacing the pool of untreated units after 
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performing a match. Alternatively, one could compare treated units to all untreated units 
with a propensity score within a given distance- a propensity score distance of .05, for 
example- of the treated unit. Finally, one could compare the treated unit to all untreated 
units, but weight them inversely based on the distance between the treated and untreated 
units propensity score. Thus, those with very similar propensity scores make up a larger 
share of the comparison group than those with very different ones. While one could use 
linear weighting, there are a number of other weighting kernels one could employ for 
this matching. This paper primarily uses the inverse propensity score weighting method 
employing a normal kernel, or normal kernel matching for short. I employ several other 
methods as a robustness check to see if results vary by matching methodology.  
 Figure I-3 (from the first chapter of this dissertation) presents a diagram for 
illustrative purposes of country-years that will be studied by this matching method. 
Going from time 0 to time T, countries acquire a VAT, and region (1) of these country-
years, forming the treatment group.  Country-years after this point already have VATs, 
in region (2), and are not used for matches and do not contribute to survival analysis. As 
I will be considering the effect of a VAT 5 years after its adoption, I cannot use any 
country-year observations less than 5 years before that country adopts as a control, in 
region (3). If I do, some control units would acquire the treatment during the studied 5-
year period and bias the treatment effect of the VAT downward. They still can be used 
to estimate VAT adoption probabilities. If a country will not get a VAT for 5 or more 
years, and has not yet adopted one, region (4), it can be used a control observation for 
matching as well as affect the survival equation. Therefore I compare treated country-
years from region (1) to untreated country years from region (4) to obtain an unbiased 
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estimate of the effects of adoption of a VAT. There is no time restriction on matching, 
so adoption events in a given country-year can be matched to a different country that is 
also in a different year. Restricting the time dimension to match only within the same 
year will significantly reduce the number of control observations available for a given 
adoption event, especially in later years when many countries have adopted a VAT and 
thus exited estimation. 
 
4A. Identification Assumptions 
  In order for the estimation method to be valid, the matched controls need to be 
similar to the treated units on all observable covariates. If the two groups differ on 
average on any covariates, it will not be clear if the difference in outcomes among 
groups comes from the treatment or one of the covariates. Table II-3 summarizes these 
differences. Prior to matching, the treated and untreated groups differ on 11 of the 25 
covariates at least at a 10% level. After matching, they differ on zero covariates at least 
at a 10% level. Further, Figure II-1 provides the distribution of propensity scores of 
adopters versus non-adopters. There is a large area in which there is overlap of 
propensity scores, or common support, where adopters and non-adopters both have 
similar probability of adopting the treatment, which is necessary for this method to 
function. The model also correctly assigned the adopters at higher risk of adopting the 
tax than non-adopters, as seen by the difference in peaks of the density function.  Table 
II-3, marked in bold at the bottom, shows that prior to matching, the propensity scores 
of adopters versus non-adopters differed by 10 standard deviations, indicating a large 
difference in initial risk of adoption. After matching, they differ by only .14 standard 
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deviations, indicating that adopters and non-adopters they are at similar risk of adoption 
based on observables.  
 Additionally, while not explicitly a covariate and hence marked in bold on the 
table, VAT adoption country-years tend to be later in the panel than either the matched 
or unmatched controls. As countries exit estimation over time when they adopt a VAT, 
there should be more country-years available for controls at early dates then at later 
ones as seen in Figure I-3 (from the first chapter of this dissertation). While the 
difference in years could be cause for concern, possibly affecting outcome variables, it 
would have to affect the observed outcome variables through a channel other than one 
of the included covariates, as there is no statistically significant difference between the 
groups in all but one of those variables. This evidence indicates that the matching 
method significantly reduces the bias resulting from a country's selection of tax policy, 
allowing me to estimate the treatment effect of a VAT more accurately. 
 
5. Results 
 Using the failure rates generated in Table II-2 as propensity scores, one can 
compare countries with equal probabilities of adopting a VAT in cases where one 
country did and the other countries did not. Countries are matched using a normal 
kernel, in which countries with propensity scores closer to the adopter are weighted 
more heavily than those further from the adopter. As demonstrated in Table II-3, this 
matching significantly reduces the selection on the observables, leaving the control and 
treatment groups on average nearly identical on observable variables. Comparing their 
mean outcomes should reduce the bias of the estimate of the treatment effect of passing 
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a VAT, as one is comparing only similar countries, making the control countries a 
relevant comparison to the treatment group. Table II-4 compares the treated units to 
matched controls. 
5A. Central government Debt 
There is reasonably strong evidence of reduction in central government debt 
from the WEO data series as indicated by (1) on Table II-4. Going from the period two 
years before adoption to five years after, the average debt levels fell in treated countries 
compared to untreated ones as indicated by the negative and significant T statistic.
22
 
This corresponds to an average fall in debt as a share of GDP of 41.23 percentage 
points. The fact this sample is relatively small would mean low power, making a 
significant effect here all the more surprising.  However, there is no evidence of 
changes in variance in debt after adoption, from the two years prior to five years after. 
There is no systematic change in debt variance or levels prior to adoption of treatment 
(seven years to two years before), which one would expect to see if there were no pre-
existing difference in trends.  
 
5B. Deficits 
 There is evidence of changes in Deficits from the WEO data series (2) as well as 
primary adjusted deficits (3) in the years following the VAT adoption.  In the span of 
time after adoption, the change from two years before adoption to five years after, 
average deficits fell (or surpluses rose) in treated countries compared to untreated ones 
as indicated by a positive T statistic significant at a 5% significant level. While the 
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 Recall the determinants are lagged 2 years in the selection equation. 
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effects are also positive for primary deficits, the T statistic is not significant, potentially 
due to the larger smaller sample size. This corresponds to approximately 3.63 
percentage points of GDP, and thus is evidence the VAT can contribute to reducing 
deficits. There is no evidence of such a change over time in the variance of 
surplus/deficits following the passage of a VAT. However, one point of concern is that 
while there was no difference in levels prior to adoption (seven to two years before), 
deficits worsened in adopters relative to non-adopters in the pre-period by 2.89 
percentage points of GDP, indicating that the surpluses afterward are roughly cancelled 
out by the deficits prior to getting the tax. 
 
5C. Revenue and Expenditure 
 Next, there is also a statistically significant effect of VATs expenditures (4), but 
not on tax revenue (5), relative to comparison countries. Expenditures fall significantly 
at the 1% level in the countries adopting the tax, dropping by 5.09 percentage points of 
GDP relative to comparison countries from the period two years before adoption to five 
years aftr. This would argue strongly against the money machine theory, and combined 
with the evidence of falling government debts, indicate that countries took the time 
around VAT adoption as an opportunity to improve their fiscal balance sheets as a 
whole. Revenues on the other hand, show no statistically significant effect, doing worse 
than comparison countries, with their revenue increasing by 1.94 percentage points of 
GDP while comparison countries see a gain of 3.42 percentage points of GDP in the 
same period. This is significant evidence of tax substitution behavior, with the VAT 
replacing other taxes as sources of revenue, rather than being used to increase overall 
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revenue. There is no evidence of changes in variance of either measure after, nor is 
there evidence of pre-existing differences in levels or trends of either revenue or 
expenditure, or their variances.     
  
5D. Externally Held Debt 
Neither data set, World Development Indicators (6) and Milesi-Feretti (7), show 
a statistically significant change in debt in the years following VAT adoption, looking 
from 2 years before adoption to 5 years after adoption. However, as this is a combined 
measure of publically and privately held debt, and there is a fall in government debt in 
some of our measures, this may be indicative of changes in behavior among private 
individuals. 
 
5E. Comparison to Results without Matching 
To show how results would differ without correcting for selection, Table II-5 
compares the difference between VAT adopter country-years and non-adopter country-
years before any matching is applied. Thus any differences will be capturing not only 
the treatment but also the selection into the treatment, including countries that are not 
relevant comparisons to adopters, which may be biasing the results.  
Adopters, when compared to all non-adopters appear to have significantly 
higher central government debts (1), which fall over time both prior to and after getting 
the VAT. Matching allows one to narrow this down to only seeing changes in debt after 
getting the VAT, so that the drop in debt may now plausibly come from the tax instead 
of pre-existing differences. Additionally, variance is much higher for adopters both 
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before and after adoption, which does not appear in the matched results. This would 
indicate that the observed higher variance in debt experienced by VAT adopters comes 
from comparing it to inappropriate comparison countries. 
Findings on deficits (2,3)in Table II-5 before matching do not differ too much 
from the after matching results on Table II-4. Adopters tend to run lower deficits 
compared to all other non-adopters following getting the tax, but run higher ones prior 
to getting the tax. However, unmatched results do show a lower variance in deficits for 
adopters than non-adopters, which disappears when better comparisons are used in 
matching in Table II-4.  
Without using matching and accounting for selection on observables, countries 
that eventually acquire a VAT have lower expenditures and tax revenue as a share of 
GDP (4,5) in the years prior to as well as after adoption. Variance in both falls after 
adoption, however. Note this agrees with the findings of Ebeke and Ehrhart (2012), 
which found that VAT reduced volatility in tax revenue. However, there were no such 
differences in countries when using the matching methods, and thus these differences 
may be driven by selection into the treatment rather than the treatment itself. 
 VAT adopters do not have higher external debt loads (6,7), albeit the world 
development indicators show a slight drop in debt in the fourth and fifth years post 
adoption. This agrees with the mostly null results found in the matching section. 
 These effects, taken together, might lead one to infer that the VAT will reduce 
variance in government expenditure, tax revenues, and surplus/deficits, as well as lower 
government debt and improve deficits as a share of GDP, a significant improvement in 
stability of government operation and government balance sheets. However, these 
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differences in means are not capturing the effect of VAT adoption alone, as one is 
comparing countries that acquire the VAT to all other countries. As countries passing 
the tax likely look different on a number of observables as well as un-observables, this 
difference represents not only the effect of the treatment but also the selection into the 
treatment. After controlling for selection on observables, there is still evidence instead 
for an improvement in central government debt and deficits, but no evidence for 
changes in variance of any of the other measures. However, matching does detect a 
general fall in government expenditures that the unmatched results do not show. 
Matching methods thus show the fears of VAT as a money machine are unfounded, 
while showing it still has a robust effect on debt and deficits. On the other hand, 
matching methods also find little evidence of VAT’s revenue stabilizing effects.  
 
5F. Alternative Matching Methods 
 The findings in Table II-4 could be driven by the choice of matching method, 
and so several different matching methods are attempted in Table II-6. To conserve 
space, only overall changes in outcomes after VAT and before VAT are compared. No 
matching methods should show statistically significant differences changes in the years 
prior to VAT adoption or else the validity of the method may be called into question, 
while if the VAT has an effect that there should be some change in the years after the 
tax is passed. The additional methods used in this case include single nearest neighbor 
with and without replacement, three nearest neighbor with replacement, caliper 
matching of size .1 and .05, as well as Epanechnikov kernel weighting to accompany 
normal kernel weighting.  
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 Only several of the results are robust to alternative matching methods. All 
matching methods employed show a decline in central government debt as a share of 
GDP following adoption of a VAT, with no pre-existing difference before adoption. 
Both measures of surplus and deficit, while showing improvements in surpluses 
following adoption of the tax, also saw them worsen beforehand, indicating a difference 
in trends between adopters and non-adopters prior to getting the tax. These results may 
thus not be valid. There is consistently no effect for changes in tax revenue as a share of 
GDP, while expenditure falls in all cases, with generally no evidence of pre-existing 
differences in trends. There is some weak evidence of falls in externally held debt in the 
world development indicators series, but not in the Milesi-Feretti series.  
Table II-7 compares the changes in variance of outcomes before and after the 
VAT treatment under various matching methods, finding a relatively null picture. Two 
notable events are that government expenditures among adopters, while seeing no effect 
under kernel matching, have statistically significantly lower variance under all other 
matching methods. This would be evidence that a VAT reduces variation in government 
outlays at the same time it makes them smoother.  Secondly, there is significant 
evidence of a pre-existing difference in variances of externally held debt by the World 
development indicator series among VAT adopters, with countries that adopt the tax 
having lower variation in debt levels prior to adopting.  
After performing this robustness analysis, several clear results emerge. First, 
countries that adopt the VAT reduce their debt as a share of GDP, indicating they do get 
their fiscal balance sheets in order. Second, there is no evidence of a money machine 
effect of the VAT, as countries getting the tax see their expenditures fall and become 
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smoother. Lastly, there is a great deal of tax substitution behavior with countries 
replacing other taxes with the VAT, as there is not a large increase in tax revenues as a 
share of GDP. These findings are all potentially affected by changes in GDP affecting 
the denominator of these measures, as Ufier (2014) did find higher growth under a 
VAT.  
  
6. Conclusion 
 The VAT has been considered or implemented in numerous countries as an 
important tool for raising revenue in order to reduce government deficits and debts, 
being entertained recently even by policy makers in the largest VAT-free nation, the 
United States, as well as many developing countries Yet there is mixed opinion as to 
whether this tax is actually effective at lowering deficits and decreasing debt. This paper 
has provided novel evidence that a VAT can indeed be an effective tool in reducing 
debt while at the same time they do not lead to a large increase in government 
expenditure. Without employing matching methods, I would have not detected these 
effects. This study found less evidence of the effect of VAT on revenue levels or 
stability.  
 While the findings of this paper are suggestive and may push many holdouts to 
once again consider acquiring a VAT, the results should be approached with caution. 
First, the method does not differentiate between various other factors that are important 
to the success of a VAT, including taxation rates and operation of the rebate system 
(Edmiston and Fox 2006). Popular VAT exemptions given to staples, such as food, may 
be expensive and ultimately unwise policies (Iorwerth and Whalley 2002.) Second, this 
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paper does not explicitly consider the welfare effects of the tax or its incidence of 
payment, both of which could be of concern to policy makers due to the burden placed 
on consumers and poorer individuals (Politi and Mattos 2011, Stiglitz 2008, Emran and 
Stiglitz 2005.) Third, this analysis is only able to address countries that have gotten 
VATs from 1986-2010, thus only studying some developing countries that implemented 
a VAT and fewer developed ones.  
Finally, this paper uses numerous data sets in order to show the proposed effects 
on debts and deficits, and many of these data sets are missing a significant number of 
observations. Assuming their omission is random, this is not cause for concern. If 
selection is at work, it could be biasing the effects of a VAT upward, as countries 
missing data may have poorer institutions that are less able to benefit from the tax or 
implement it. If the sample size were to increase the power of the test for difference in 
means should increase, likely strengthening the evidence of effects of a VAT. Yet 
despite some shortcomings, these findings are still highly supportive of the fiscal 
balancing effects of a VAT and should provide a basis for further study of the tax. 
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Table II-1 
Summary Statistics, Right Hand Side Variables, 1986-2010 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent      
WEO Central Government Debt 490 82.35 97.85 0 931.66 
WEO Surplus or Deficit 675 -2.30 7.03 -46.24 31.81 
WEO Primary Surplus or Deficit 283 1.13 7.07 -17.36 31.81 
WEO Tax Revenue 682 26.55 11.59 4.49 68.37 
WEO Expenditure 690 29.08 10.83 6.44 82.08 
WDI External Debt 832 105.50 125.31 2.94 1380.77 
MF External Debt 1030 88.79 128.43 2.85 1620.28 
Independent      
Agriculture 1031 24.74 17.13 0.11 80.07 
Bordering Countries with VAT 1031 0.29 0.34 0 1 
British Commonwealth 1031 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Exports 1031 34.01 26.48 2.52 184.96 
Federal 1031 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Francophonie 1031 0.34 0.47 0 1 
GDP Per Capita 1031 7.08 1.49 4.74 10.97 
Government Consumption 1031 13.80 10.47 1.11 69.83 
IMF Lending Dummy 1031 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Imports 1031 41.56 28.08 6.86 175.39 
Inflation 1031 4.79 0.41 4.26 10.20 
Institutions 1031 -1.93 6.58 -10 10 
Investment 1031 21.66 10.27 -2.42 74.82 
Island 1031 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Landlocked 1031 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Natural Resource Rents 1031 14.43 14.45 0 71.61 
Population 1031 15.69 1.74 12.78 20.88 
% of Population 65+ 1031 3.93 2.33 0.43 14.62 
Size, Log Square Kilometers 1031 12.18 2.04 6.51 16.05 
Warsaw Pact 1031 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Africa 1031 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Asia 1031 0.32 0.46 0 1 
Europe 1031 0.04 0.20 0 1 
North America 1031 0.01 0.11 0 1 
South America 1031 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Notes: Observational units are country-year pairs.  
Independent variables are lagged two periods 
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Table II-2 
Cox Hazard Regressions for VAT Adoption 
Variable 1986-2010 
Agriculture .008 
 (.014) 
  
Bordering Countries with VAT 1.067
*
 
 (0.546) 
  
British Commonwealth -0.660
*
 
 (0.353) 
  
Exports 0.003 
 (0.011) 
  
Federal -1.738
***
 
 (0.526) 
  
Francophonie 0.306 
 (0.329) 
  
GDP Per Capita 0.493
*
 
 (0.282) 
  
Government Consumption -0.025 
 (0.018) 
  
IMF Lending Dummy 0.940
**
 
 (0.428) 
  
Imports -0.007 
 (0.012) 
  
Inflation -1.513
*
 
 (0.811) 
  
Institutions 0.040 
 (0.026) 
  
Investment 0.008 
 (0.021) 
  
Island 0.531 
 (0.558) 
  
Landlocked 0.058 
 (0.320) 
  
Natural Resource Rents -0.049
***
 
 (0.017) 
  
Population 0.608
***
 
 (0.182) 
  
% of Population 65+ -0.090 
 (0.107) 
  
Size, Log Square Kilometers -0.127 
 (0.118) 
  
Warsaw Pact 0.242 
 (0.916) 
  
N 1031 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.132 
Log Likelihood -243.354 
Chi Squared 74.180 
Subjects 92 
Adoptions 75 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
 
Notes: Observational units are country-year pairs; Values are coefficients for linear hazards, not hazard ratios. A coefficient of 0 
thus implies no effect. To find the hazard ratios, exponentiate the coefficient; All independent variables are lagged 2 periods; All 
estimates performed with regional dummies for North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Pacific, the last being 
omitted for co-linearity.   
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Table II-3 
Balance of Covariates for Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Agriculture Unmatched 24.91 23.88 1.03 2.13 0.48 
 ATT 24.91 26.58 -1.67 3.65 -0.46 
Bordering Countries with VAT Unmatched 0.43 0.25 0.18 0.04 4.41*** 
 ATT 0.43 0.32 0.11 0.08 1.45 
British Commonwealth Unmatched 0.39 0.36 0.03 0.06 0.5 
 ATT 0.39 0.49 -0.11 0.11 -1.01 
Exports Unmatched 31.58 36.00 -4.43 3.29 -1.34 
 ATT 31.58 33.83 -2.25 5.59 -0.4 
Federal Unmatched 0.11 0.17 -0.06 0.04 -1.31 
 ATT 0.11 0.13 -0.03 0.07 -0.39 
Francophonie Unmatched 0.41 0.29 0.13 0.06 2.29** 
 ATT 0.41 0.45 -0.04 0.10 -0.38 
GDP Per Capita, Log Unmatched 7.08 7.20 -0.12 0.19 -0.63 
 ATT 7.08 7.01 0.07 0.30 0.24 
Government Consumption Unmatched 11.73 14.63 -2.90 1.36 -2.14** 
 ATT 11.73 11.61 0.12 1.94 0.06 
IMF Lending Dummy Unmatched 0.76 0.51 0.25 0.06 4.08*** 
 ATT 0.76 0.84 -0.08 0.09 -0.89 
Imports Unmatched 39.99 42.68 -2.69 3.45 -0.78 
 ATT 39.99 41.19 -1.20 6.16 -0.19 
Inflation Unmatched 4.71 4.81 -0.09 0.06 -1.62 
 ATT 4.71 4.70 0.01 0.03 0.46 
Institutions Unmatched 1.52 -3.50 5.02 0.76 6.59*** 
 ATT 1.52 0.57 0.95 1.47 0.64 
Investment Unmatched 21.96 21.90 0.05 1.33 0.04 
 ATT 21.96 22.51 -0.55 1.94 -0.28 
Island Unmatched 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.82 
 ATT 0.15 0.24 -0.09 0.07 -1.25 
Landlocked Unmatched 0.28 0.26 0.02 0.05 0.43 
 ATT 0.28 0.29 -0.01 0.10 -0.13 
Natural Resource Rents Unmatched 9.64 16.84 -7.20 1.87 -3.85*** 
 ATT 9.64 7.87 1.77 2.27 0.78 
Population, Log Unmatched 16.01 15.54 0.46 0.21 2.16** 
 ATT 16.01 16.00 0.01 0.41 0.03 
% of Population 65+ Unmatched 5.08 3.53 1.54 0.26 5.96*** 
 ATT 5.08 4.97 0.11 0.59 0.19 
Size, Log Square Kilometers Unmatched 12.26 12.13 0.13 0.26 0.5 
 ATT 12.26 12.01 0.26 0.44 0.58 
Warsaw Pact Unmatched 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.01 6.78*** 
 ATT 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.04 1.27 
Africa Unmatched 0.52 0.51 0.01 0.06 0.15 
 ATT 0.52 0.51 0.01 0.11 0.12 
Asia Unmatched 0.21 0.38 -0.16 0.06 -2.79*** 
 ATT 0.21 0.24 -0.03 0.09 -0.29 
Europe Unmatched 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.02 7.03*** 
 ATT 0.13 0.15 -0.01 0.06 -0.23 
North America Unmatched 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.35 
 ATT 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 1 
South America Unmatched 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 1.01 
 ATT 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.06 0 
Year Unmatched 1996.79 1994.9 1.88 0.83 2.27 
 ATT 1996.79 1992.41 4.37 1.33 3.3 
Propensity Score Unmatched 3.55 1.94 1.61 0.16 10.08 
 ATT 3.55 3.52 0.03 0.2 0.14 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Total Observations: 844 
Untreated Observations: 784 
Treated Observations: 60 
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Table II-4 Summary of Matching Results, Normal Kernel
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5
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 P
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-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
0
.5
3
 
0
.1
9
 
0
.5
1
 
0
.4
1
 
0
.4
1
 
-0
.4
9
 
-0
.0
5
 
4
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
0
.4
9
 
0
.2
5
 
0
.3
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.2
3
 
-0
.2
5
 
0
.0
5
 
3
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
0
.6
5
 
0
.3
8
 
0
.3
2
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.2
4
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.1
3
 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
0
.6
5
 
-0
.8
2
 
-1
.0
1
 
0
.8
2
 
0
.2
4
 
0
.2
 
0
.1
7
 
1
 Y
ea
r 
P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
0
.2
4
 
-0
.1
8
 
-0
.9
5
 
0
.6
9
 
0
.4
5
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.1
4
 
Y
ea
r 
o
f 
A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
-0
.4
7
 
-0
.7
 
-1
.0
2
 
0
.8
4
 
0
.2
3
 
-0
.5
 
0
.0
3
 
1
 Y
ea
r 
P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
-0
.3
4
 
-0
.3
2
 
-0
.6
6
 
0
.5
7
 
0
.1
8
 
-0
.5
5
 
0
.0
5
 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
-0
.5
 
0
.4
 
-0
.2
4
 
0
.1
8
 
0
.2
4
 
-0
.7
5
 
-0
.1
7
 
3
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
-1
.2
7
 
0
.8
1
 
0
.1
7
 
-0
.1
7
 
0
.2
1
 
-1
.0
1
 
-0
.0
8
 
4
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
-1
.5
8
 
0
.8
 
0
.6
7
 
-0
.9
2
 
-0
.4
1
 
-1
.2
1
 
-0
.1
1
 
5
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
-1
.9
2
*
 
1
.7
4
*
 
0
.7
4
 
-1
.2
4
 
-0
.3
 
-1
.3
 
0
.1
4
 
C
h
a
n
g
e 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
to
 5
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
-2
.3
4
*
*
 
2
.4
4
*
*
 
1
.5
9
 
-2
.6
1
*
*
*
 
-0
.8
1
 
-1
.5
7
 
-0
.0
1
 
C
h
a
n
g
e 
7
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
to
 2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
-0
.8
7
 
-1
.7
2
*
 
-1
.5
5
 
0
.9
6
 
-0
.5
6
 
1
.3
8
 
0
.2
3
 
V
ar
ia
n
ce
 2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 t
o
 
5
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
1
.2
4
 
-0
.1
4
 
-0
.4
8
 
-1
.4
2
 
-1
.1
5
 
-0
.3
2
 
0
.0
4
 
V
ar
ia
n
ce
 7
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 t
o
 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
1
.3
2
 
0
.2
9
 
-0
.1
6
 
0
.3
8
 
1
.0
4
 
-3
.3
9
*
*
*
 
-0
.1
7
 
T
re
at
ed
 O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
2
1
 
3
2
 
1
1
 
3
3
 
3
2
 
4
9
 
6
1
 
U
n
tr
ea
te
d
 O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
1
1
8
 
2
3
8
 
7
5
 
2
4
8
 
2
4
1
 
4
1
9
 
5
5
3
 
*
 p
 <
 .
1
, 
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
5
, 
*
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
1
 
 
N
o
te
s:
 T
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
a
b
o
v
e 
fo
r 
m
e
a
n
 d
if
fe
re
n
c
es
, 
tr
ea
te
d
 (
a
d
o
p
te
r
s)
 m
in
u
s 
u
n
tr
ea
te
d
 (
m
a
tc
h
e
d
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
),
 a
ll
 m
ea
su
r
es
 a
r
e 
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
. 
P
ro
p
en
si
ty
 s
co
re
s 
fo
r 
m
a
tc
h
in
g
 a
re
 g
en
er
a
te
d
 b
y
 h
a
za
r
d
 r
eg
r
es
si
o
n
 o
n
 T
a
b
le
 I
I-
2
. 
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Table II-5 Comparison of Means without Matching 
T
a
b
le
 I
I-
5
 
C
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
 o
f 
M
ea
n
s 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
M
a
tc
h
in
g
 
 
(1
) 
W
E
O
 C
en
tr
al
 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
D
eb
t 
(2
) 
W
E
O
 
S
u
rp
lu
s/
D
ef
ic
it
 
(3
) 
W
E
O
 P
ri
m
ar
y
 
S
u
rp
lu
s/
D
ef
ic
it
 
(4
) 
W
E
O
 
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
 
(5
) 
W
E
O
 T
ax
 
R
ev
en
u
e 
(6
) 
W
D
I 
E
x
te
rn
al
 
D
eb
t 
(7
) 
M
F
 E
x
te
rn
al
 
D
eb
t 
7
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
3
.2
6
*
*
*
 
-0
.2
6
 
-1
.0
4
 
-3
.2
3
*
*
*
 
-3
.6
5
*
*
*
 
0
.5
9
 
-0
.0
3
 
6
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
3
.4
8
*
*
*
 
-0
.3
3
 
-1
.4
4
 
-3
.0
9
*
*
*
 
-3
.5
1
*
*
*
 
0
.1
4
 
-0
.3
1
 
5
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
3
.2
9
*
*
*
 
-0
.6
3
 
-1
.0
1
 
-2
.9
4
*
*
*
 
-3
.5
9
*
*
*
 
0
.1
6
 
-0
.4
 
4
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
3
.2
5
*
*
*
 
-0
.6
 
-1
.3
5
 
-3
.0
1
*
*
*
 
-3
.5
9
*
*
*
 
-0
.0
3
 
-0
.6
3
 
3
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
3
.3
2
*
*
*
 
-0
.6
5
 
-1
.2
1
 
-2
.7
3
*
*
*
 
-3
.2
*
*
*
 
-0
.2
1
 
-0
.7
6
 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
3
.4
5
*
*
*
 
-1
.8
7
*
 
-2
.8
2
*
*
*
 
-1
.8
3
*
 
-3
.1
2
*
*
*
 
-0
.3
9
 
-0
.9
5
 
1
 Y
ea
r 
P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
2
.8
2
*
*
*
 
-1
.3
 
-2
.4
2
*
*
 
-1
.8
5
*
 
-2
.7
6
*
*
*
 
-0
.6
4
 
-1
.0
4
 
Y
ea
r 
o
f 
A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
1
.5
8
 
-1
.7
6
*
 
-2
.1
5
 
-1
.8
4
*
 
-3
.0
2
*
*
*
 
-1
.2
6
 
-1
.2
 
1
 Y
ea
r 
P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
1
.9
3
*
 
-1
.6
2
 
-1
.6
9
*
 
-2
.2
5
*
*
 
-3
.1
1
*
*
*
 
-1
.3
1
 
-1
.1
7
 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
1
.8
7
*
 
-1
.2
8
 
-1
.3
6
 
-2
.4
2
*
*
*
 
-2
.8
4
*
*
*
 
-1
.4
7
 
-1
.3
5
 
3
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
1
.2
8
 
-1
.1
4
 
-1
.4
7
 
-2
.5
3
*
*
*
 
-2
.6
7
*
*
*
 
-1
.6
1
 
-1
.2
2
 
4
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
1
.1
8
 
-0
.9
4
 
-1
.4
1
 
-3
.0
5
*
*
*
 
-2
.9
3
*
*
*
 
-1
.8
5
*
*
 
-1
.2
 
5
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
0
.8
6
 
-0
.3
9
 
-1
.2
3
 
-3
.0
7
*
*
*
 
-2
.7
3
*
*
*
 
-2
.0
1
*
*
 
-0
.9
3
 
C
h
a
n
g
e 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
to
 5
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
-3
.5
5
*
*
*
 
1
.8
1
*
 
2
.0
6
*
*
 
-0
.9
 
0
.6
 
-1
.5
8
 
-0
.0
6
 
C
h
a
n
g
e 
7
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
to
 2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
-1
.8
6
*
 
-1
.7
6
*
 
-2
.4
3
*
*
*
 
1
.9
9
*
*
 
0
.3
8
 
-1
.2
9
 
-0
.9
2
 
V
ar
ia
n
ce
 2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 t
o
 
5
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
2
.8
3
*
*
*
 
-2
.1
7
*
*
 
-2
.0
5
*
*
 
-2
.6
4
*
*
*
 
-2
.5
*
*
*
 
-0
.9
3
 
-0
.8
3
 
V
ar
ia
n
ce
 7
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 t
o
 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
3
.5
*
*
*
 
-1
.6
9
*
 
-1
.3
1
 
-1
.5
8
 
-1
.4
 
-1
.3
8
 
-0
.8
5
 
T
re
at
ed
 O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
2
1
 
3
2
 
1
1
 
3
3
 
3
2
 
4
9
 
6
1
 
U
n
tr
ea
te
d
 O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
1
1
8
 
2
3
8
 
7
5
 
2
4
8
 
2
4
1
 
4
1
9
 
5
5
3
 
*
 p
 <
 .
1
, 
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
5
, 
*
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
1
 
 
N
o
te
s:
 T
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
a
b
o
v
e 
fo
r 
m
e
a
n
 d
if
fe
re
n
c
es
, 
tr
ea
te
d
 (
a
d
o
p
te
r
s)
 m
in
u
s 
u
n
tr
ea
te
d
 (
n
o
n
-a
d
o
p
te
rs
),
 a
ll
 m
ea
su
r
es
 a
r
e 
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
. 
P
ro
p
en
si
ty
 s
co
re
s 
fo
r 
m
a
tc
h
in
g
 a
re
 g
en
er
a
te
d
 b
y
 h
a
za
r
d
 r
eg
r
es
si
o
n
 o
n
 T
a
b
le
 I
I-
2
. 
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Table II-6 Comparison of Matching Methods, Levels 
  
T
a
b
le
 I
I-
6
 
C
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
 o
f 
M
a
tc
h
in
g
 M
et
h
o
d
s,
 L
ev
el
s 
V
ar
ia
b
le
, 
C
h
an
g
e 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-
A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 t
o
 5
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-
A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
S
in
g
le
 N
ea
re
st
 
N
ei
g
h
b
o
r,
 N
o
 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t 
T
h
re
e 
N
ea
re
st
 
N
ei
g
h
b
o
rs
 
S
in
g
le
 
N
ea
re
st
 
N
ei
g
h
b
o
r 
C
al
ip
er
 
.1
 
C
al
ip
er
 
.0
5
 
E
p
an
ec
h
n
ik
o
v
 
K
er
n
el
 
T
o
ta
l 
S
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
1
0
%
 l
ev
el
 
 
W
E
O
 C
en
tr
al
 G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
D
eb
t 
-3
.2
2
*
*
*
 
-2
.7
0
*
*
*
 
-1
.8
4
*
 
-2
.3
1
*
*
 
-2
.1
3
*
*
 
-2
.1
3
*
*
 
7
 
 
W
E
O
 S
u
rp
lu
s/
D
ef
ic
it
 
2
.7
7
*
*
*
 
3
.6
4
*
*
*
 
2
.3
7
*
*
 
3
.4
6
*
*
*
 
3
.7
2
*
*
*
 
3
.6
9
*
*
*
 
7
 
 
W
E
O
 P
ri
m
ar
y
 S
u
rp
lu
s/
D
ef
ic
it
 
2
.8
3
*
*
*
 
2
.3
1
*
*
 
2
.6
7
*
*
 
1
.4
9
 
3
.1
6
*
*
*
 
3
.1
6
*
*
*
 
5
 
 
W
E
O
 E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
 
-3
.2
3
*
*
*
 
-3
.0
6
*
*
*
 
-3
.5
4
*
*
*
 
-2
.3
1
*
*
 
-2
.8
5
*
*
*
 
-2
.7
9
*
*
*
 
7
 
 
W
E
O
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
u
e 
-0
.8
9
 
-0
.5
9
 
-1
.6
7
 
0
.1
2
 
-0
.4
1
 
-0
.4
1
 
0
 
 
W
D
I 
E
x
te
rn
al
 D
eb
t 
-0
.8
2
 
-1
.8
7
*
 
-0
.6
7
 
-1
.8
2
*
 
-1
.5
6
 
-1
.7
7
*
 
3
 
 
M
F
 E
x
te
rn
al
 D
eb
t 
0
.7
7
 
0
.3
7
 
-0
.0
8
 
0
.1
8
 
0
.4
7
 
0
.1
3
 
0
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
, 
C
h
an
g
e 
7
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-
A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 t
o
 2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-
A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
S
in
g
le
 N
ea
re
st
 
N
ei
g
h
b
o
r,
 N
o
 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t 
T
h
re
e 
N
ea
re
st
 
N
ei
g
h
b
o
rs
 
S
in
g
le
 
N
ea
re
st
 
N
ei
g
h
b
o
r 
C
al
ip
er
 
.1
 
C
al
ip
er
 
.0
5
 
E
p
an
ec
h
n
ik
o
v
 
K
er
n
el
 
T
o
ta
l 
S
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
1
0
%
 l
ev
el
 
 
W
E
O
 C
en
tr
al
 G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
D
eb
t 
-1
.1
5
 
-1
.2
6
 
-0
.6
7
 
-1
.2
1
 
-1
.1
9
 
-1
.1
7
 
0
 
 
W
E
O
 S
u
rp
lu
s/
D
ef
ic
it
 
-2
.9
0
*
*
*
 
-2
.3
9
*
*
 
-2
.1
9
*
*
 
-2
.1
2
*
*
 
-2
.3
1
*
*
 
-2
.3
3
*
*
 
7
 
 
W
E
O
 P
ri
m
ar
y
 S
u
rp
lu
s/
D
ef
ic
it
 
-1
.4
8
 
-2
.1
5
*
*
 
-1
.5
5
 
-2
.2
9
*
*
 
-2
.5
9
*
*
 
-2
.5
8
*
*
 
4
 
 
W
E
O
 E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
 
1
.6
7
 
1
.9
5
*
 
1
.5
2
 
1
.1
 
1
.5
5
 
0
.0
2
 
1
 
 
W
E
O
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
u
e 
-0
.4
3
 
0
.0
2
 
-0
.2
3
 
-0
.3
9
 
-0
.2
3
 
-2
.3
7
*
*
 
1
 
 
W
D
I 
E
x
te
rn
al
 D
eb
t 
1
.2
4
 
-0
.1
5
 
-0
.0
3
 
1
.8
2
*
 
0
.3
6
 
0
.1
0
 
1
 
 
M
F
 E
x
te
rn
al
 D
eb
t 
0
.3
1
 
-0
.3
8
 
-0
.1
5
 
0
.5
1
 
0
.0
1
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
 
 
*
 p
 <
 .
1
, 
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
5
, 
*
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
1
 
N
o
te
s:
 T
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
a
b
o
v
e 
fo
r 
m
ea
n
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s,
 t
re
a
te
d
 (
a
d
o
p
te
rs
) 
m
in
u
s 
u
n
tr
ea
te
d
 (
n
o
n
-a
d
o
p
te
rs
).
 
P
ro
p
en
si
ty
 s
c
o
re
s 
fo
r 
m
a
tc
h
in
g
 a
re
 g
en
er
a
te
d
 b
y
 h
a
za
rd
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
 o
n
 T
a
b
le
 I
I-
2
. 
T
o
ta
l 
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
a
ls
o
 c
o
u
n
ts
 r
es
u
lt
s 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
n
o
rm
a
l 
k
er
n
el
 o
n
 T
a
b
le
 I
I-
4
. 
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Table II-7 Comparison of Matching Methods, Variance 
T
a
b
le
 I
I-
7
 
C
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
 o
f 
M
a
tc
h
in
g
 M
et
h
o
d
s,
 V
a
ri
a
n
ce
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
, 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 P
re
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
to
 5
 Y
ea
rs
 P
o
st
-A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 
S
in
g
le
 N
ea
re
st
 
N
ei
g
h
b
o
r,
 N
o
 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t 
T
h
re
e 
N
ea
re
st
 
N
ei
g
h
b
o
rs
 
S
in
g
le
 
N
ea
re
st
 
N
ei
g
h
b
o
r 
C
al
ip
er
 
.1
 
C
al
ip
er
 
.0
5
 
E
p
an
ec
h
n
ik
o
v
 
K
er
n
el
 
T
o
ta
l 
S
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
1
0
%
 l
ev
el
 
W
E
O
 C
en
tr
al
 G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
D
eb
t 
1
.1
9
 
1
.2
1
 
1
.1
7
 
1
.2
5
 
1
.0
3
 
1
.0
3
 
0
 
W
E
O
 S
u
rp
lu
s/
D
ef
ic
it
 
0
.7
2
 
-0
.1
1
 
0
.4
1
 
-0
.4
2
 
0
.1
1
 
0
.1
5
 
0
 
W
E
O
 P
ri
m
ar
y
 S
u
rp
lu
s/
D
ef
ic
it
 
-1
.4
8
 
-0
.7
5
 
-1
.6
6
 
-1
.2
8
 
-1
.4
7
 
-1
.4
9
 
0
 
W
E
O
 E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
 
-2
.3
8
*
*
 
-2
.4
6
*
*
 
-2
.4
2
*
*
 
-1
.9
4
*
 
-2
.1
1
*
*
 
-1
.9
0
*
 
6
 
W
E
O
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
u
e 
-1
.4
5
 
-1
.1
1
 
-1
.7
3
*
 
-0
.4
0
 
-0
.7
3
 
-0
.7
0
 
1
 
W
D
I 
E
x
te
rn
al
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Figure II-1 
Evidence of Common Support- Kernel Density Plot 
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III. The Impact of English Language Skills on National Income: 
A Cross-National Comparison 
 
1. Introduction 
While education and literacy have received a great deal of attention in 
macroeconomics, languages receive far less attention in the role they play in economic 
development (Arcand and Grin 2012.) This subject deserves far more study, as a 
common language between two countries may raise incomes in each by facilitating 
trade and foreign direct investment via lower transaction costs as well as improve 
access to cost reducing technology. In addition, better foreign language abilities often 
open up more lucrative employment opportunities both within the country and for those 
emigrating (Lee 2012, Angrist and Lavy 1997, Lein et al 2011, Melitz 2007, Meltiz and 
Toubal 2014.) Language specific transaction costs are more important for services than 
for manufacturing, as services generally imply more interpersonal interactions. This 
suggests that the structural changes inherent in the development process, moving from 
agrarian to manufacturing to service industries as countries grow richer, may reinforce 
the importance of improving foreign language skills in the future (Warschauer 2000.)  
English has generally become the de facto international language for business, 
advertising, academia, media, and numerous other fields (Nunan 2003, Crystal 2003.) 
As a result, many developing countries, recently including Rwanda and Madagascar, 
have begun to integrate English as a part of school curriculums, either as standalone 
subjects or by changing the language of instruction to English with the goal of creating 
a better prepared workforce for international industries. At a micro level, citizens often 
work to improve their skills in English in hopes of raising their wages, such as seeking 
better employment in the service sector like call centers (Nunan 2003, Casale and Posel 
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2011, Chakboraty and Kapur 2009, Birdsall 2011.) USAid, the US governmental 
agency responsible for foreign development work, promotes English education in a 
number of developing countries. In a world with ever increasing international 
competitive pressures, English abilities are proposed to be an important component of 
participating in the global economy (Wedell 2008, and Warschauer 2000.)  
However, the benefits from better English skills are currently not well 
understood. While micro studies find individuals with better language skills earn more, 
macro evidence is scarce. Higher English abilities could improve outcomes operate 
through two broad channels. The first channel, through trade, eliminates the need for 
translation or language training that would make it costly to export internationally or 
attract investment from foreign multinationals. The second, through technology, gives 
people access to better information, allow them to use lower per unit cost technologies. 
While benefits of learning English to an individual are readily identified, usually higher 
paying employment, the costs may prove to be too high for a social planner considering 
education in language skills versus other forms of human capital (Wedell 2008.) The 
focus on English language skills may be to the detriment of other useful skills, and this 
may negatively affect poorer students with the fewest opportunities to put their English 
skills to use (Bruthiaux 2002.) While having a shared language definitely increases 
trade volume, which hopefully leads to higher incomes, it is not clear that English itself 
plays a special role in international trade. Hejazi and Ma (2011)finds that two countries 
that both speak English have more bilateral trade than two countries who share a 
different language, while Melitz (2007) and Melitz and Toubal (2014) find that English 
plays no special role compared to other languages.  
68 
 
Empirically identifying the impact of language skills is problematic, as it is not 
clear if English language skills lead to higher incomes and trade, or higher incomes and 
trade leads people to study English. From a policy perspective, English education is 
costly and it should be promoted if it can be shown to most cost effectively improve 
outcomes, as some micro level studies have shown; otherwise, resources may be better 
spent elsewhere. To answer whether on a macro level English skills improve incomes 
and employment opportunities, I employ an index of English language skills, the Test of 
English as a Foreign Language, or TOEFL, to estimate the impact of English language 
proficiency on income per capita, net exports, FDI and emigration over the period of 
1992-2012 for 139 countries.
23
 I use an instrumental variables framework to obtain a 
consistent estimate of English skill’s effects. The instrument, a measure of linguistic 
distance, is hours required to learn English conditional on a country’s official language. 
This measure is correlated with English skills as it represents how much effort would be 
required to learn English. However, aside from this channel, linguistic distance is not 
correlated with any of the outcome variables of income, net exports, FDI and 
emigration.  
I find that while the impact of English abilities on income and net exports is 
positive using OLS, the estimated effect is even larger after using instrumental 
variables. This relationship is robust to several different ways of parameterizing the 
instrumental variables. There is no such observed effect of language abilities on 
emigration or FDI. This indicates that English abilities are correlated with higher 
                                                 
23
 Data availability varies by year: for the 2012 year that gets a large portion of the 
analysis, 139 countries have data available on TOEFL scores. 120 are available in 1992, 
the start of the period. 173 countries have TOEFL data available for some years. Data is 
available from the author upon request.  
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incomes in part through higher net exports, and this is not driven by foreign investment. 
This would support the story that domestic industries are better able to find profitable 
export markets for their products and services when their employees have higher 
English abilities, or countries with higher English abilities are able to go into more 
profitable export-based industries. Better English abilities may also allow countries 
access to lower cost technology. This shows the promise of English language education 
in a positive light, as higher English abilities opens countries to more markets and 
ultimately higher standards of living.  
This paper is organized as follows: section I outlines the goals of this paper, 
section II introduces the relevant literature, section III discusses the estimation strategy, 
section IV discusses the data, section V discusses results, and section VI concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2A. English: Benefits and Costs 
USAid in particular promotes English education in its development work, in 
recent years advertising its English education programs as success stories in 
development. For example, engineers in Kabul taught English are now able to employ 
electronic control equipment, whose use requires one to know English, instead of 
manual control equipment to run the local hydroelectric power plant. With their better 
English abilities, they are also able to seek specialized education abroad. Because of 
access to better education and technology through higher English skills, there are now 
fewer accidents and service outages (USAid 2013.) This argument would lend credence 
to the idea that higher English abilities would allow workers in the developing world to 
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become more productive, as they are able to use better equipment and have better 
access to information. USAid assisted Rwanda’s changing of its official language of 
instruction from French to English, a change intended to raise incomes and improve 
international trade (USAid 2014.) USAid claims its English training programs in 
countries such as Ethiopia and the Philippines are a means of improving the lives of 
people in these countries by broadening job opportunities, going so far as to draw fire 
from US lawmakers fearing the development program will lead to some service jobs 
such as call centers to locate in these developing countries instead of the US (Koch 
2014, De Lotbiniere 2012, May 2012.) English education is thus considered by some 
development agencies as a useful and effective tool, and powerful enough to arouse the 
concern of protectionist lawmakers.  
Despite all these promised benefits, the true effects of higher English language 
abilities and English language education are unclear. There is mounting evidence that 
countries promoting instruction in English may also be exacerbating income 
inequalities. Glewwe et al. (2009) found that the use of English-language textbooks in 
primary school was of limited use to most students in Kenya. Students lacked the ability 
to read English language textbooks and only high achievers and wealthier students saw 
any benefit from receiving these textbooks. Bruthiaux (2002) warns that a focus on 
English language education may worsen income gaps in the developing world. Only the 
rich will have the resources to benefit from learning English or being instructed in 
English, as the poor would never have access to the networks and international 
opportunities that would make learning English worthwhile. Poorer students may have 
better earning potential if they received instruction in their native language, with more 
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emphasis on non-language related subjects such as mathematics, science, trades, or 
writing skills in their native language. This highlights a tradeoff between more general 
human capital, and English specific human capital, as well as the conflict between 
promoting a more internationally useful language against one that would preserve local 
culture and prepare students for domestic-focused employment (Prah 2008.)
24
 
 
2B. Effects of Language: Micro 
There is some literature on the microeconomic returns to language skills, 
specifically English, on income, that will guide the empirics of this paper. Their 
findings and methodology are difficult to generalize from an individual to a national 
level due to data availability, data heterogeneity, and choice of control variables. There 
also exist several papers using gravity models to study the impact of common languages 
on trade that, while taking a different approach to a similar question, are instructive with 
their choice of control variables and parameterization of linguistic similarity. 
Several microeconomic studies have found a positive impact of English skills on 
individual earnings in India and South Africa (Azam et al 2013, Casale and Posel 2011.) 
                                                 
24
 Many developing nations face the challenge between teaching their native 
languages, or teaching a more widely spoken foreign language, often English 
(Bambgbose 2009, Wolhuter et al 2006.) Wedell find that educators worldwide are 
dissatisfied with this tradeoff, being forced to choose between subjects without adequate 
information about their payoffs (2008.) In order to improve literacy rates in sub-Saharan 
Africa, some countries have found success in switching from teaching a colonial 
language- French or English- instead instructing in in the native language of students 
(Bamgbose 2009.) English language skills deserve more empirical study as educators 
and policymakers alike want to maximize opportunities of students through the choice 
of curricula. Due to these expensive tradeoffs and even potential downsides to English 
instruction and study of the English language, the recent moves of some countries, such 
as the Gambia, away from English are now far more understandable.  
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Other studies have considered immigrants in the United States (Kossoudji 1988.) 
However, these studies and likely any study comparing English skills and incomes are 
inherently complicated by endogeneity problems, as language abilities affect income 
and income affects language abilities. Lang and Sinvier show that returns to English 
language skills in the form of higher incomes, even in countries where English is not an 
official language (2006.)  
This pattern is not limited to the English language. Languages may affect trade 
or employment opportunities, as seen in Angrist and Lavy's (1997) study of French in 
Morocco and Rendon's (2007) study of Catalan in Catalonia. Angrist and Lavy’s paper 
use an instrumental variables regression to explore the switch from French to Arabic 
instruction as the language of official instruction in Morocco. This change in instruction 
reduced student's French writing skills, which in turn limited student employment 
opportunities and as a result lowered income. Silvio created a theoretical model of 
language learning, which demonstrated that knowledge of more languages led to higher 
paying job opportunities in Catalonia. These studies are microeconomic in nature, and 
so a macroeconomic study may find different results even if one uses a similar 
methodology. For example, microeconomic literature going back at least as far as 
Mincer (1974) generally find positive returns to education on an individual level, but 
macro studies often finds no effect of countries increasing average levels of education 
on incomes (Pritchett 2001.)  
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2C. Effects of Language: Trade 
Other papers have considered the interaction between language skills and 
bilateral trade. Egger and Lassman (2013) use a case study in Switzerland to find that 
areas with more linguistic similarity tend to trade more, ascribing this effect to cultural 
similarity. Lein et al. (2011), using a gravity model, find that shared languages lead to 
both an increase in bilateral trade and FDI inflows. They propose choosing to study a 
language is an optimization decision where participants maximize benefits of such 
education conditional on its costs. Molnar (2013) looks at the role translation costs play 
in international trade, finding a significant effect on bilateral trade. Finally, Egger and 
Lassman’s (2012) survey and meta-analysis of the literature consistently finds that 
linguistic similarity is a major determinant of trade, even once controlling for factors 
such as legal origin, colonial history, and exchange rates. 
 Looking more directly at the role played by English, Hejazi and Ma (2011) 
employ a gravity model to find if English has a premium as a shared language over 
other common languages among OECD countries. They find results that agree with 
previous authors in that shared languages are positive in their effect on trade, but that 
sharing English has an even greater effect. Melitz (2007) divides linguistic similarity 
into an extensive, whether the country pair has a shared language, as well as intensive 
margin, how many people in those countries share that language. While both effects are 
positive, the intensive margin’s effect is stronger. However, while shared languages 
matter, and shared European languages as a whole have a stronger effect on bilateral 
trade, English itself has no larger positive marginal effect on bilateral trade than other 
European languages.  Melitz and Toubal (2014) extend this paper, using a more 
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complex measure of linguistic proximity, and find similar results. Thus, while common 
languages raise bilateral trade, whether English plays a special role is unclear.  
 
2D. Further Considerations 
 So far, such a comprehensive study of English language skills and education 
worldwide has been hampered by lack of data. While an international database on 
English language education would be ideal, with information on time and money 
committed to the subject of English language study by country as well as their 
languages of instruction, it currently does not exist. A few regional surveys exist, such 
as the one Nunan (2003) performed in East Asia. Even if the data did exist, such cross-
national comparisons are likely limited due to heterogeneity in education as well as data 
quality. Studies looking at the impact of English education may thus be limited to 
considering only one country. 
 Due to these limitations, this paper considers national English language skills 
rather than English language education. This allows me to evaluate the value of the end 
product of English language education, the stock of English language skills.
25
  To this 
end, I use data from the TOEFL, a measure of academic English language skills, to 
proxy for national level English language abilities. I will discuss estimation of these 
effects, the challenges posed, and possible solutions in the next section.  
 
 
                                                 
25
 Whether a particular education program or method produces the most human capital 
per dollar spent is beyond the scope of this paper, as this paper only considers the 
average level of English language based human capital present in a country. 
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3. Estimation Strategy 
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of English skills on 
macroeconomic outcomes, one must solve the problem of endogeneity: 𝑌𝑖, most 
importantly per capita income but also net exports, emigration, and FDI in this paper, is 
a function of English ability 𝐸𝑖. This higher ability enables easier communication and 
translation that could raise trade, better access to technology that raises incomes, make a 
country more attractive to foreign investors attempting to open a call center or other 
industry, or lead to more emigration of people seeking to use their language abilities 
abroad. However, English abilities are also a function of income as well as other 
outcome variables. Countries with higher income likely have an easier time improving 
their language abilities, and inhabitants of countries already experiencing a great deal of 
trade or foreign investment are likely to seek to improve their language abilities. 
Alternatively, very poor countries may be the only ones selecting to improve English 
abilities.
26
 Both the outcome variables and language abilities are likely influenced by 
some historical elements, and the process is likely to be self-reinforcing, with changes 
in one also affecting the other. The model can be described as follows: 
(1)       𝑌𝑖 = 𝐴0 + 𝐴1𝐸𝑖 + 𝐴2𝑋𝑖 
(2)      𝐸𝑖 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑌𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑋𝑖 
Where 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of common exogenous covariates. Using OLS to estimate 
for income per capita as  𝑌𝑖, the estimate 𝐴1will be upwardly biased and inconsistent 
                                                 
26
 Because the cost of learning a language is in large part time, the opportunity cost for 
people to learn a language in poor countries with poor employment opportunities may 
actually be lower than that of wealthier countries relative to their outside options. 
People have after all become multi-lingual throughout history, when even wealthier 
people by that era were quite poor by modern standards.  
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due to this endogeneity if there is self-reinforcement with richer countries focusing 
more on English abilities, or downwardly biased if improving English abilities is a 
treatment only undertaken by already poorer countries. Trying to estimate 𝐴1 
consistently will thus require a different estimation method, such as instrumental 
variables.   
 
3A. Instruments 
Previous research on the impact of language skills on individual level income 
has employed instrumental variable estimation. Akbulut-Yuksel et al (2011) as well as 
Bleakley and Chin (2004) employ an individuals’ age of immigration as an instrument 
for English ability, as younger children are better able to learn a new language than 
adults, and age of immigration itself should have no direct impact on income. Dustmann 
and Van Soest (2002) as well as Rooth (2001) employ parental education as an 
instrument, as it should be correlated with language ability but not directly with income. 
Chiswick and Miller (1995) employ country of origin and marriage status as 
instruments, as married immigrants with a spouse who speaks the same language will 
have less incentive to learn the language of his new country. However, marriage status 
and country of origin may still be correlated with income. Finally, Chakboraty and 
Kapur (2009) use a policy change on English instruction in an Indian state as an 
instrument, and such an experiment does not exist for all countries. As this paper 
considers cross national variation rather than cross individual variation, different 
instruments will be needed from those previously considered, as these instruments 
cannot be generalized to a national level.   
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 A more feasible class of instrument for this paper, suggested by Shastry (2007) 
and also implemented by Isphording and Otten (2014), is linguistic distance. Shastry 
considers the fact that many provinces in India speak languages very linguistically 
different from Hindi, and others speak ones that are more similar. Learning Hindi is 
more common in the latter group, as the costs are lower, while learning English is more 
common in the former, as the benefits are higher for the same level of effort. 
Worldwide, some languages are linguistically close to English and this makes it easier 
for native speakers to learn English compared to native speakers of other languages. 
Thus, one's native language should raise the time required to learn English and this 
increase in the time required to learn English should be exogenous. As a result, 
linguistic distance from English should be negatively correlated with English language 
skills.
27
 Isphording and Otten (2014) find that this increased difficulty of learning 
English can be considerable depending on their original languages and leads to easily 
observable differences in incomes of immigrants. However, these studies can be 
hampered by a lack of concrete measure of distance, with Shastry (2007) relying on 
estimates of how technically different languages are to learn as classified by linguists 
                                                 
27
 There is no reason to expect linguistic distance from English will impact income or 
trade other than through the channel of ease of learning English, as there is nothing 
inherently different between languages' ability to communicate ideas or structure that 
should affect income. Crystal (2003) argues that the supremacy of English in 
international trade, business and media is entirely accidental due to the course of 
history. It is plausible that an alphabet-based language, like English, is superior to a 
pictograph based one, such as Chinese, due to the ease of which it can change and add 
new ideas. But Romanization of Chinese through pinyin, for example, illustrates that a 
pictographic language can be converted to an alphabet based one. Additionally, as 
children learn to speak their first language at roughly the same age, from an equal 
starting point no language is more difficult to learn or communicate with than any other 
(Crystal 2003.) 
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and Isphording and Otten (2014) employing a method of linguistic similarity based on 
comparing grammatical structure and cognates.  
In this paper, I employ a source that gives definitive quantitative measures of 
difficulty for native speakers of one language to learn English. The Foreign Service 
Institute (FSI) produces information on how many hours of instruction are required for 
a native English speaker to learn a foreign language, and assuming this time is 
symmetric, as assumed by Chiswick and Miller (1999), it will also give an unbiased 
estimate of the time it would take a given native language speaker to learn English. 
Languages are classified in 7 categories of difficulty, going from requiring 600 hours of 
study to over 2200 hours of study, with a summary of hours provided on Table III-1. 
Adding in linguistic distance, 𝐷𝑖 the estimation of the earlier system of equations (1) 
and (2) thus becomes: 
(3)      𝑌𝑖 = 𝐴0 + 𝐴1𝐸𝑖 + 𝐴2𝑋𝑖                     
(4)      𝐸𝑖 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑌𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑋𝑖 + 𝐵3𝐷𝑖 
While one cannot identify the English language equation (4), one can identify 
the outcome equation (3), using linguistic distance as an instrument for English 
language skills to obtain a consistent estimate of their impact on per capita income, 
trade as a share of GDP, or emigration.  
This instrumental variables approach’s advantage over previous approaches is 
that it uses a commonly employed cost- measured in hours- to quantify linguistic 
distance, rather than assumed difference based on essentially untestable assumptions 
about how similar languages are at an abstract level. At the same time, the instrumental 
variable clearly satisfies the exclusion restrictions. The difficulty of learning English 
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will definitely affect one’s decision to learn the language, as it will change the relative 
cost of accumulating other forms of human capital or seeking other forms of 
employment instead of studying English. It will have no effect on the outcome 
variables, as the difficulty one has in learning English should not affect income, trade, 
foreign investment, or emigration, aside from one’s actual English abilities.  
However, the proposed functional form of this cost instrument requires two 
assumptions that may be considered restrictive. First, while the costs of learning a 
language may not be linear, the instrument would require this relationship to be linear, 
or at least require a fixed functional form. For example, in a linear form, languages that 
take 800 hours to learn require half the resources of a language that takes 1600 hours to 
learn. This is not necessarily true, as individuals may not place a linear value on time. 
Second, the assumption of symmetry may be inaccurate due to the complexity of 
English. While an English speaker may have an easy time learning Spanish in 600 
hours, a Spanish speaker may take more hours to learn English. However, the difficulty 
of learning English would thus come from two sources- its overall difficulty as a 
language, which should be a constant for all people trying to learn it regardless of one's 
native language, and its closeness to another language, which varies based on one's 
native language. Spanish speakers should thus find it easier to learn English than 
Mandarin speakers, which should preserve the ordinal rank of the time required to learn 
English for other language speakers, even if it does not preserve the cardinality of 
difficulty.  
Both of these concerns can be addressed by using a series of dummy variables 
for the different categories of language difficulty instead of the hours required to learn 
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them, as this does not restrict the linguistic distance to be linear in hours required to 
learn English, or require it to take the same number of hours to go from English to 
Spanish as it does to go from Spanish to English. I parameterize this instrumental 
variable in two ways.. In one specification, each of the seven categories on Table III-1 
receives their own dummy variable, with native English speaking countries being the 
eighth category omitted for perfect co-linearity. This set of dummies is then used as the 
instrument. However, many of these categories have very few languages or include very 
few countries, so I also employ specification that reduces the number of categories 
dummy variables to three (four including omitted native English for perfect co-
linearity.)
28
 As a robustness check, I use a specification created from a separate measure 
of linguistic similarity based on technical proximity of words, the Linguistic Proximity-
2, or LP2 variable, used by Melitz and Toubal (2014.) Higher values of this variable 
represent more linguistic proximity, and lower values less proximity.  
Table III-2 presents basic correlations that are consistent with these instrumental 
variable exclusion restrictions for the 20 years of data available, 1992-2012 excluding 
2011.
29
 TOEFL is positively correlated with natural log per capita real GDP at .3968, 
and TOEFL scores are negatively correlated with hours to learn a language at -.2837. 
Hours to learn English are negatively correlated with per capita income at .0376, 
extremely close to zero. This evidence would support omitting linguistic distance from 
the income equation, and suggesting it is an appropriate instrument for English abilities 
                                                 
28
 The first dummy category is equal to 1 if a native language speaker of a 
country takes 600, 750, or 900 hours (first three categories of Table III-1) to learn 
English and 0 otherwise, the second 1 if it takes 1100 or 1100+ (fourth and fifth 
categories) to learn English and 0 otherwise, and the third category 1 if it takes 2200 or 
2200+ (sixth and seventh categories) to learn English.  
29
 Data is not available for 2011. 
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in that same equation.  LP2 has a stronger correlation with score than hours to learn, 
.4972, but also is highly correlated with the outcome of income at .5382. This would 
indicate that this alternative instrumental variable used by other authors may not satisfy 
exclusion restrictions in this case.  
 
4. Data 
This paper expresses English abilities through the national average performance 
on the TOEFL exam. The TOEFL is an assessment of a student’s ability to use English 
in the classroom, considering four skills: reading, listening, speaking and writing. 27 
million students having taken the test to date in over 4500 testing sites and across 165 
countries since it was organized in 1964, giving a broad base of support for the test 
scores. TOEFL exams were given as a paper test for much of its history, switching to 
local computer based examinations in mid-1998 and then an internet based examination 
in mid-2005.   
The most recent version of the TOEFL has a number of advantages. A major 
strength of the TOEFL is that it allows the scores to be comparable internationally. For 
internet based tests, students should be facing roughly the same testing environment; 
although paper or local computer based testing students may face a different 
environment. It has a broad history, with data available from 1992-2012 for most 
countries, allowing one to construct a relatively balanced panel or observe variation 
over time. Finally, the examination is generally accepted to be the best assessment of 
English language abilities that is widely available, as measured by the number of 
institutions who accept it. TOEFL scores are accepted by over 9000 colleges. This is 
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more than its largest alternative, the International English Language Test IELTS at 
8000, which also has a shorter history, fewer test takers, fewer testing centers, and 
presence in fewer countries, although the difference is relatively small.
30
 TOEFL scores 
are the best proxy of general English abilities available for a country.  
The TOEFL index has several shortcomings, none of which are critical. First, 
there is the incentive to cheat or otherwise compromise the integrity of the test. TOEFL 
scores are usually a major requirement for admission to an English speaking university 
and so high scores in a country may either represent higher ability or better cheating. 
This would introduce an attenuation bias, biasing towards the effects of English 
language abilities on income or other outcomes towards zero. If one observes a positive 
effect, it is possible the true effect is even higher as the current on is observed with 
attenuation from cheating. However, cheating should be more difficult on internet based 
tests than on paper exams, where the central testing body has more oversight on how the 
test is executed and how its results are transported for evaluation.  
Second, while test takers may self-select, it is not clear how selection would bias 
results in this setting. It is possible only more competent English speakers will be 
motivated to take an examination, or that only less competent speakers will take the test 
while more competent ones have advanced positions that do not require testing. 
However, selection to take the exam is likely determined on an individual rather than 
national level, and this study employs national aggregates. Thus, even if only the best 
English speakers in each nation select to take the exam, one would still be comparing 
the scores of the best individuals across nations, which would also be the individuals 
                                                 
30
 IELTS also does not release data publically 
83 
 
most relevant to conducting international business interactions or making use of cutting 
edge technology. A variety of skill levels are present in the index, and most countries 
are represented, so it appears countries with poor language abilities are not avoiding the 
exam altogether. 
Finally, the index shows the average English proficiency of a test taker, a quality 
measure, not the share of inhabitants that speak English, a quantity measure. However, 
if one can determine that average English proficiency is correlated with share of 
inhabitants that speak English, one could claim that the TOEFL is a good summary of 
both quantity and quality of English speakers in a country. Data on English speakers are 
available from a number of sources such as national censuses as well as Crystal (2003). 
Using this data, I can compare English speakers as a share of population to English 
proficiency for about half the countries with TOEFL data available. Table III-2 shows 
correlations that indicate it is indeed the case that the share of population that speaks 
English is correlated with the TOEFL at .3321.  
Table III-3 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the regression. 
Note that there is a reasonably large range of abilities for the TOEFL. Countries that 
have multiple official languages with different linguistic distances from English 
according to the FSI use the value of the language most distant from English among all 
their official languages for this paper.  Additionally, following Meltiz and Toubal 
(2014), I include a control dummy, equal to 1 for a country having English as one of 
their official languages, in order to capture the effect of official endorsement or 
presence of English aside from the actual abilities of a country.   
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Left hand side variables include net exports (exports minus imports as a share of 
GDP). FDI( net inflows from foreign countries as a share of GDP), natural log of real 
GDP per capita, and emigration rate data from the OECD from 2000-2008 across 
different specifications. This emigration data includes 200 countries of origin and 38 
OECD and affiliated countries as destinations, but is not available as a panel.  
For covariates, a natural and important inclusion would be an overall measure of 
education. There is a great deal of interaction between language ability and overall 
education level, with well-educated individuals best being able to leverage the benefits 
of English in other studies (Azam et al. 2013.) Barro and Lee (2013) produce a measure 
of overall education, updated in five year windows, which I employ for this study. I use 
a weighted average of this education measure for the years where measures of education 
are not present, so if education values are available 1995 and 2000, 1996 uses 20% of 
the value from 2000 and 80% from 1995, 1997 uses 40% of the value from 2000 and 
60% from 1995, and so on.  
Persistently high inflation may negatively affect real incomes, so I include 
inflation as an independent variable. Government size as a share of GDP may also 
impact long term growth, so this is also added as a right hand variable. As I am 
analyzing linguistic factors, it is sensible to include a measure of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, as countries with more languages may have lower incomes as well as 
face different incentives to learn English (Arcand and Grin 2012.) 
Geographic factors such as latitude, landlocked status, or island status may also 
affect incomes or the other outcomes being considered. Easterly (2001) and Bloom et al 
(1998), among others, consider these geographic features to be potential determinants of 
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income. The size of the country may also matter, as larger countries have lower 
incentives to learn non-native languages as they have many more commercial 
opportunities within their borders, so I include natural log of population as well as land 
area as a covariate. I also include continent level dummies with Europe being the 
omitted continent due to perfect co-linearity.  
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization comes from Roeder (2001), latitude data is 
from the CIA World Factbook, and continents are specified by the ETS in their TOEFL 
publications. All other covariates come from the World Development Indicators. The 
linguistic distance instrument, hours to learn English as listed by the FSI, is 
parameterized in two different ways as discussed earlier. I also employ Meltiz and 
Toubal’s (2014) LP2 measure as a robustness check.31  
 
5. Results 
5A. Income 
Table III-4 shows the impact of English language abilities and various 
covariates on GDP per capita. The results here are given with standardized betas, where 
a 1 standard deviation change in the X variable leads to a B (listed in table) standard 
deviation change in the Y variable. The OLS specification (1) and (2) shows a positive 
and significant effect of English abilities on incomes, but the magnitude drops 
substantially once covariates are included. The only covariate value that is particularly 
                                                 
31
 Several countries lack official languages that are featured on the FSI list of language 
learning difficulty. The number of hours to learn English by nearest linguistic neighbor 
is used instead. Additionally, for countries with multiple official languages of varying 
linguistic distance from English, the language with the largest distance from English is 
used.  
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surprising is the dummy for English being an official language, which is negative. This 
would imply that once I control for English abilities, officially recognizing English is 
negative in its effect on income. 
All three IV specifications, specification 1 breaking linguistic distance into three 
categories, specification 2 breaking it more finely into seven categories, and the LP2 
measure using a continuous measure of linguistic distance, show a positive and 
significant effect of English language abilities on incomes after accounting for 
covariates. This effect is also much larger than the effect observed using OLS. 
Depending on the specification a one standard deviation increase in TOEFL scores 
raised log income by between .358 and .768 standard deviations. Presented using non-
standardized coefficients, raising the average TOEFL score of a country by 1 point on a 
120 point scale raises its real per capita incomes by between 6 and 13 percent.  
These findings could indicate either that the IVs corrected for an attenuation 
effect, as TOEFL scores may not accurately capture English abilities, or that lower 
income countries were the ones seeing the largest benefit from better English abilities. 
Both stories are consistent with the increased size of the coefficient on the TOEFL 
score. The argument that higher income countries choose to improve, or would find it 
easier to improve, their English abilities is either inconsistent with this evidence or 
dominated by the other two effects. Otherwise, IV results should have a smaller 
coefficient than OLS results. The Hausman test strongly rejects the null of no difference 
between OLS and IV in all cases, indicating a statistically significant systematic 
difference between IV and OLS estimations in all IV specifications.  
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First stage results for IVs in Table III-4a are unsurprising given these findings. 
The coefficients for dummies in specifications 3-4 are steadily decreasing as the hours 
needed to learn English increases, indicating more linguistic distance from English 
leads to lower TOEFL scores. They are decreasing less steadily for specifications 5-6, 
possibly because several of the categories contain a small number of countries. 
Similarly, for 7-8, where higher values of LP2 mean higher levels of linguistic 
proximity, the correlation is positive.  
 
5B. Trade 
Having established that English is correlated with higher incomes, I now explore 
channels by which this effect may work. As argued earlier, English abilities may open 
more export markets due to ease of communication, and they may also give access to 
more productive technology. While the latter is difficult to test due to the general 
inability of economists to identify technology as anything beyond a residual, looking for 
an increase in exports specifically is possible. As higher English abilities is supposed to 
open more export markets due to ease of communication, one may expect higher net 
exports to be a natural result of higher English language abilities. Table III-5 shows 
exactly this, following a similar pattern as seen in Table III-4 with income.  There is a 
positive effect of TOEFL scores on net exports both with and without covariates in the 
OLS specifications (1-2). All IV specifications with covariates (4, 6, 8) show the same 
positive, statistically significant, and statistically different from OLS (as by the 
Hausman test) effect of TOEFL scores on net exports as a share of GDP. This effect is 
comparatively large, with a 1 standard deviation change in TOEFL scores raising net 
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exports as a share of GDP by between .6 and 1.3 standard deviations. In unstandardized 
terms, a 1 point increase in average TOEFL scores on a 120 point scale raises net 
exports between .8 to 1.9 percentage points as a share of GDP. First stage results in 
Table III-5a are similar to Table III-4a. This would agree with Hejazi and Ma (2011), 
finding that English is significant in generating trade specifically, as well as numerous 
authors finding shared languages raise trade.  
 
5C. Foreign investment and Emigration 
While the evidence presented so far would promote the idea that higher English 
abilities are associated with higher incomes, through higher net exports from or through 
access to better technology directly raising productivity or incomes, other channels 
could be at work. International corporations may take advantage of higher English skills 
in these countries, leading to a boost in foreign direct investment (Lein et al 2011) or 
increased migration to opportunities abroad that leads to higher remittances albeit with 
loss of human capital from the original country (Gupta et al 2008.)  
Table III-6 looks at the impact of TOEFL scores on FDI inflows as a share of 
GDP. For all three instrumental variable specifications as well as OLS, there is 
generally no effect of TOEFL scores on FDI after accounting for covariates. For 
specification (4), there is a negative impact of TOEFL scores on FDI, but the Hausman 
test fails to reject the null of no systematic difference between the estimations. There is 
no evidence that higher TOEFL scores leading to increased FDI. It is possible that 
higher incomes and net exports may come from domestic industries taking advantage of 
more international export opportunities as well as having easier access to more 
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information and better technologies, rather than from foreign investment. Foreign 
corporations may have criteria other than English ability in mind for locating a 
production facility. Table III-6a shows similar results to previous first stage estimation 
results.  
Finally, Tables III-7 and III-8 consider the impact of English ability on 
emigration. Unlike previous variables, panel information for emigration is not available, 
so I use cross sectional aggregate migration from 2000-2008 from the World Bank. I 
consider two cross sections using this migration data, one with covariates at the start of 
the dataset, 1992, and the other using covariates at the end, 2012. Table III-7 shows the 
2012 specification results which show, once accounting for covariates, there is 
generally no effect of TOEFL scores on emigration save specification (4), where it is 
negative. However, there is no systematic difference between IV and OLS estimates 
according to the Hausman test even in this case. Table III-7 presents similar results 
using a 1992 cross section of determinants instead of 2012 cross section, across the 
board finding no effect of TOEFL scores on the emigration stock. Tables III-7a and III-
8a show first stage results which, while less significant than previous tables due to the 
smaller sample size, are still roughly similar in direction and magnitude as Table III-4a 
seen earlier. 
The net result of these regressions is that English abilities are indeed statistically 
significantly correlated with several important outcomes. Countries with higher TOEFL 
scores tend to have higher incomes, with a 1 point increase in national average TOEFL 
scores on a 120 point scale being associated with a 6 to 13 percent increase in real per 
capita income. This could be due to access to better technology that raised worker 
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productivity, lower transaction costs, or more export opportunities raising overall 
incomes. There is direct evidence of the latter, with net exports as a share of GDP 
increasing by .8 to 1.9 percentage points for a 1 point national average TOEFL score 
increase. Using these parameters as baseline estimates, policy makers can decide 
whether the particular costs of improving English abilities are worth these stated 
benefits. However, when looking at other potential channels, such as FDI or emigration, 
there are no such effects. Higher TOEFL scores do not lead to more foreign direct 
investment, and they do not increase emigration. The higher income and exports likely 
come from domestic industries being able to better compete internationally, possibly 
due to lower communication costs and easier access to information and technology. 
This finding would also indicate against extensive brain drain from higher English 
abilities. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In an increasingly globalized world, a common language greatly simplifies 
international trade and business, making it easier to invest in foreign countries, export 
products, and exchange production technologies, all with the end result of raising 
incomes. Due to historical accident, English has arisen as this common international 
language. Many countries have begun to teach English to students in hopes of giving 
them a competitive edge, after seeing that English language skills are correlated with 
higher incomes and more employment opportunities.  However, it is not clear that this 
relationship is straightforward; higher English skills may allow an individual to earn 
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higher income, or higher income may lead to one seeking more English skills. Any 
association of English language skills with income may thus be spurious.  
To answer the question as to whether English language skills actually lead to 
higher national incomes, more exports, FDI, or emigration, this paper employs data on 
English test scores from an international education testing companies’ records. To 
account for the fact that income and English proficiency are endogenous, I use the 
difficulty of learning English as an instrument for English language skills. The 
difficulty of learning English given the most common native language in a country 
should be correlated with prevailing English abilities in that country, but will have no 
effect on income after controlling for its effect on language abilities, making it an ideal 
instrument. There is a positive effect of English abilities on income and net exports, but 
not on FDI or emigration. This suggests that English abilities raise incomes and exports 
but not necessarily through higher foreign investment or remittances, perhaps either due 
to better access to technology raising productivity for all firms within the country or 
fundamental changes in domestic industries allowing them to find more export 
opportunities. However, while this paper is able to estimate some of the effects of 
national level English abilities, it is unable to identify the exact costs and benefits from 
investing in English language education. It merely provides a strong starting point to 
quantifying the benefits of English language abilities on average national incomes and 
suggesting broad channels of causation, and I leave the analysis of marginal tradeoffs 
and more specific channels to future papers.  
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Table III-1 Hours Required for an English Language Speaker to Learn another 
Language 
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Table III-2 
Correlations, 1992-2012 
 Score Hours to Learn LP2 GDPPC, Ln 
Score 1    
Hours to Learn -0.2837 1   
LP2  0.4972 -0.1427 1  
GDPPC, Ln  0.3968  0.0376 0.5382 1 
 
Correlation between percent speaking English and TOEFL score is .3321 
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Table III-3 
Summary Statistics, TOEFL Scores and Covariates, 1992-2012 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Time Invariant 
Emigration, % of Population 3440 7.14 10.11 0.10 43 Y 
Net Exports, % of GDP 3612 87.70 51.51 0.31 531.74 N 
Real GDP Per Capita, Ln 3813 8.07 1.65 3.91 11.98 N 
FDI, % of GDP 3579 4.84 12.91 -82.89 366.36 Y 
TOEFL Score 3050 83.43 9.67 51.00 105.74 N 
Hours to Learn English 4297 967.35 637.30 0 2200 Y 
Percent English Speaking 2280 45.59 31.95 0.15 100 Y 
Linguistic Proximity-2 3634 0.74 0.73 0 3.77 Y 
Official English 4297 0.34 0.47 0 1.00 Y 
Schooling, Average Years of 2880 7.51 2.86 0.93 13.18 N 
Inflation, GDP Deflator 3840 43.48 549.47 -32.81 26762.02 N 
Investment, % of GDP 3469 23.13 11.25 -2.42 227.48 N 
Island 4297 0.26 0.44 0 1.00 N 
Land Area, Ln 4232 10.82 3.03 0.69 16.61 N 
Landlocked 4297 0.20 0.40 0.00 1 Y 
Population, Ln 4265 15.06 2.35 9.12 21.02 N 
Government Consumption, % of GDP 3740 12.20 8.92 0.93 68.19 N 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 3400 0.46 0.27 0 0.98 Y 
Latitude 4237 25.47 17.01 0 72 Y 
Europe 4297 0.24 0.43 0 1 Y 
Pacific 4297 0.09 0.28 0 1 Y 
Middle East 4297 0.09 0.28 0 1 Y 
Asia 4297 0.15 0.36 0 1 Y 
Africa 4297 0.23 0.42 0 1 Y 
Americas 4297 0.21 0.40 0 1 Y 
 
  
95 
 
Table III-4 
Determinants of Ln Real GDP per Capita, 1992-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, 
Lp2 
IV, Lp2 
TOEFL Score 0.394**
* 
0.078*** -0.235*** 0.768*** 0.267*** 0.358*** 1.082**
* 
0.575*** 
 (23.03) (4.99) (-3.71) (7.84) (6.41) (7.06) (24.44) (7.89) 
         
Official English  -0.051***  -0.247***  -0.130***  -0.223*** 
 (-3.51)  (-7.37)  (-6.35)  (-8.43) 
         
Schooling, Average Years of  0.470***  0.283***  0.394***  0.324*** 
 (25.77)  (7.92)  (16.91)  (11.21) 
        
Inflation, GDP Deflator  -0.025**  -0.017  -0.022*  -0.019 
 (-2.27)  (-1.08)  (-1.82)  (-1.41) 
         
Investment, % of GDP  0.045***  0.105***  0.069***  0.095*** 
 (3.71)  (5.71)  (5.12)  (5.84) 
         
Island  0.094***  0.093***  0.094***  0.102*** 
  (6.63)  (4.84)  (6.21)  (5.91) 
         
Land Area, Ln  -0.018  0.137***  0.045*  0.088*** 
 (-0.95)  (4.04)  (1.93)  (2.97) 
         
Landlocked  -0.184***  -0.195***  -0.188***  -0.184*** 
  (-14.40)  (-11.20)  (-13.84)  (-12.14) 
         
Population, Ln  -0.046**  -0.161***  -0.092***  -0.121*** 
 (-2.40)  (-5.29)  (-4.23)  (-4.39) 
         
Government Consumption, % 
of GDP 
 -0.133***  -0.110***  -0.124***  -0.114*** 
 (-11.09)  (-6.61)  (-9.60)  (-7.71) 
        
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 -0.031**  -0.046**  -0.037**  -0.037** 
 (-2.19)  (-2.38)  (-2.45)  (-2.04) 
         
Latitude  0.123***  0.029  0.085***  0.051* 
  (5.32)  (0.84)  (3.33)  (1.71) 
         
Pacific  0.006  0.074***  0.033**  0.068*** 
  (0.40)  (3.36)  (2.06)  (3.53) 
         
Middle East  0.069***  0.320***  0.170***  0.257*** 
  (4.06)  (7.67)  (6.81)  (7.63) 
         
Asia  -0.189***  0.008  -0.109***  -0.042 
  (-9.81)  (0.20)  (-4.44)  (-1.35) 
         
Africa  -0.104***  0.107**  -0.018  0.056 
  (-3.90)  (2.30)  (-0.58)  (1.41) 
         
Americas  -0.018  0.016  -0.004  0.017 
  (-0.90)  (0.57)  (-0.20)  (0.67) 
N 2885 2324 2885 2324 2885 2324 2707 2241 
R2 0.155 0.713 -0.240 0.467 0.139 0.672 -0.312 0.590 
F 530.6 336.2 13.73 184.3 41.05 296.5 597.0 230.8 
Underid F Stat P-Value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hausman P value   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table III-4a 
Determinants of Ln Real GDP per Capita, First Stage Results on TOEFL Scores, 
1992-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 1 IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, 
Lp2 
IV, 
Lp2 
600-900 Hour 
Dummy 
  0.062 0.387
***
     
   (1.43) (9.17)     
         
1100-2200 Hour 
Dummy 
  -0.030 0.242
***
     
   (-0.68) (5.74)     
         
2200 Hour and Up 
Dummy 
  -0.306
***
 0.165
***
     
   (-8.53) (3.83)     
         
600 Hour Dummy     0.012 0.340
***
   
     (0.31) (8.45)   
         
750 Hour Dummy     0.254
***
 0.229
***
   
     (11.38) (10.66)   
         
900 Hour Dummy     -0.039
*
 0.187
***
   
     (-1.69) (8.06)   
         
1100 Hour Dummy     -0.030 0.248
***
   
     (-0.72) (6.24)   
         
1100+ Hour Dummy     -0.010 0.122
***
   
     (-0.43) (5.09)   
         
2200 Hour Dummy     -0.292
***
 0.229
***
   
     (-8.55) (5.52)   
         
2200+ Hour Dummy     -0.115
***
 -0.123
***
   
     (-6.35) (-6.83)   
         
Linguistic 
Proximity-2 
      0.497
**
*
 
0.264
**
*
 
       (29.81) (12.68) 
         
Covariates   No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
N   2885 2324 2885 2324 2707 2241 
R
2
   0.107 0.509 0.172 0.541 0.247 0.523 
F   115.3 125.9 85.46 117.6 888.5 143.3 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
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Table III-5 
Determinants of Net Exports as a share of GDP, 1992-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, 
Lp2 
IV, Lp2 
TOEFL Score 0.106**
* 
0.214*** -0.272*** 1.289*** -0.002 0.903*** 0.278**
* 
0.602*** 
 (5.73) (8.77) (-4.52) (8.82) (-0.04) (10.61) (7.02) (6.04) 
         
Official English  -0.207***  -0.507***  -0.399***  -0.324*** 
 (-9.17)  (-10.12)  (-11.61)  (-8.96) 
         
Schooling, Average Years 
of 
 0.372***  0.081  0.185***  0.248*** 
 (12.96)  (1.47)  (4.68)  (6.17) 
        
Inflation, GDP Deflator  -0.013  0.002  -0.003  -0.005 
 (-0.71)  (0.08)  (-0.16)  (-0.26) 
         
Investment, % of GDP  -0.212***  -0.116***  -0.151***  -0.109*** 
 (-11.11)  (-4.05)  (-6.51)  (-4.76) 
         
Island  0.024  0.033  0.030  0.035 
  (1.06)  (1.10)  (1.15)  (1.46) 
         
Land Area, Ln  0.280***  0.517***  0.432***  0.335*** 
 (9.20)  (10.00)  (10.97)  (8.15) 
         
Landlocked  -0.155***  -0.171***  -0.165***  -0.143*** 
  (-7.72)  (-6.27)  (-7.10)  (-6.72) 
         
Population, Ln  -0.152***  -0.329***  -0.265***  -0.193*** 
 (-5.05)  (-7.00)  (-7.13)  (-5.02) 
         
Government Consumption, 
% of GDP 
 -0.100***  -0.060**  -0.074***  -0.102*** 
 (-5.30)  (-2.29)  (-3.37)  (-4.91) 
        
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 0.060***  0.038  0.046*  0.059** 
 (2.67)  (1.24)  (1.76)  (2.34) 
         
Latitude  -0.280***  -0.426***  -0.374***  -0.307*** 
  (-7.69)  (-8.06)  (-8.60)  (-7.31) 
         
Pacific  -0.005  0.096***  0.059**  0.047* 
  (-0.22)  (2.83)  (2.15)  (1.75) 
         
Middle East  0.289***  0.679***  0.539***  0.450*** 
  (10.88)  (10.80)  (12.74)  (9.72) 
         
Asia  0.117***  0.419***  0.311***  0.219*** 
  (3.87)  (7.33)  (7.47)  (5.10) 
         
Africa  0.017  0.341***  0.225***  0.164*** 
  (0.40)  (4.79)  (4.14)  (3.00) 
         
Americas  -0.124***  -0.068  -0.088**  -0.075** 
  (-3.94)  (-1.59)  (-2.42)  (-2.17) 
N 2863 2332 2863 2332 2863 2332 2683 2250 
R2 0.011 0.285 -0.132 -0.314 -0.000 0.040 -0.018 0.191 
F 32.80 54.25 20.39 31.60 0.00190 43.59 49.29 40.63 
Underid F Stat P-Value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hausman P value   0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table III-5a  
Determinants of Net Exports as a share of GDP, First Stage Results on TOEFL 
Scores, 1992-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Lp2 IV, Lp2 
600-900 Hour Dummy   0.019 0.408***     
   (0.43) (9.84)     
         
1100-2200 Hour 
Dummy 
  -0.069 0.261***     
   (-1.56) (6.28)     
         
2200 Hour and Up 
Dummy 
  -0.340*** 0.179***     
   (-9.27) (4.22)     
         
600 Hour Dummy     -0.028 0.366***   
     (-0.69) (9.26)   
         
750 Hour Dummy     0.240*** 0.237***   
     (10.65) (11.14)   
         
900 Hour Dummy     -0.059** 0.197***   
     (-2.47) (8.56)   
         
1100 Hour Dummy     -0.067 0.270***   
     (-1.60) (6.90)   
         
1100+ Hour Dummy     -0.031 0.131***   
     (-1.29) (5.54)   
         
2200 Hour Dummy     -0.326*** 0.247***   
     (-9.33) (6.01)   
         
2200+ Hour Dummy     -0.124*** -0.118***   
     (-6.79) (-6.56)   
         
Linguistic Proximity-2       0.491*** 0.270*** 
       (29.20) (12.99) 
         
Covariates   No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
N   2863 2332 2863 2332 2683 2250 
R2   0.109 0.508 0.176 0.539 0.241 0.521 
F   116.7 125.9 86.94 117.4 852.4 142.8 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table III-6 
Determinants of FDI as a share of GDP, 1992-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 1 IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, 
Lp2 
IV, Lp2 
TOEFL Score 0.020 -0.033 -0.085 -0.548*** 0.107** 0.029 0.076* 0.003 
 (1.07) (-1.19) (-1.51) (-4.28) (2.30) (0.36) (1.87) (0.03) 
         
Official English  -0.003  0.131***  -0.019  -0.002 
 (-0.10)  (3.09)  (-0.58)  (-0.06) 
         
Schooling, Average Years of  0.132***  0.274***  0.115***  0.136*** 
 (4.06)  (5.60)  (2.99)  (3.15) 
        
Inflation, GDP Deflator  -0.014  -0.022  -0.013  -0.015 
 (-0.72)  (-1.01)  (-0.68)  (-0.72) 
         
Investment, % of GDP  0.210***  0.157***  0.216***  0.197*** 
 (9.80)  (5.99)  (9.54)  (7.86) 
         
Island  -0.034  -0.018  -0.036  -0.038 
  (-1.31)  (-0.64)  (-1.39)  (-1.40) 
         
Land Area, Ln  -0.058*  -0.173***  -0.045  -0.037 
 (-1.71)  (-3.78)  (-1.18)  (-0.84) 
         
Landlocked  0.018  0.026  0.017  0.025 
  (0.80)  (1.07)  (0.76)  (1.12) 
         
Population, Ln  -0.173***  -0.076*  -0.184***  -0.196*** 
 (-4.99)  (-1.74)  (-4.96)  (-4.53) 
         
Government Consumption, 
% of GDP 
 -0.021  -0.026  -0.020  -0.030 
 (-0.96)  (-1.10)  (-0.94)  (-1.33) 
        
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 0.103***  0.119***  0.101***  0.088*** 
 (4.05)  (4.33)  (3.97)  (3.24) 
         
Latitude  -0.052  0.027  -0.061  -0.081* 
  (-1.25)  (0.57)  (-1.43)  (-1.77) 
         
Pacific  -0.043*  -0.095***  -0.037  -0.045 
  (-1.67)  (-3.12)  (-1.38)  (-1.58) 
         
Middle East  -0.094***  -0.279***  -0.072*  -0.081 
  (-3.18)  (-5.09)  (-1.82)  (-1.64) 
         
Asia  -0.036  -0.183***  -0.019  -0.030 
  (-1.07)  (-3.61)  (-0.47)  (-0.66) 
         
Africa  -0.086*  -0.232***  -0.068  -0.065 
  (-1.81)  (-3.75)  (-1.32)  (-1.13) 
         
Americas  -0.060*  -0.074*  -0.058*  -0.065* 
  (-1.70)  (-1.96)  (-1.65)  (-1.79) 
N 2796 2292 2796 2292 2796 2292 2648 2209 
R2 0.000 0.114 -0.011 -0.022 -0.007 0.112 -0.001 0.108 
F 1.153 17.21 2.293 15.92 5.281 17.10 3.489 15.62 
Underid F Stat P-Value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hausman P value   0.046 0.388 0.0415 1.000 0.123 0.005 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table III-6a 
Determinants of FDI as a share of GDP, First Stage Results on TOEFL Scores, 
1992-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Lp2 IV, Lp2 
600-900 Hour Dummy   0.030 0.411***     
   (0.71) (10.02)     
         
1100-2200 Hour 
Dummy 
  -0.044 0.265***     
   (-1.03) (6.42)     
         
2200 Hour and Up 
Dummy 
  -0.338*** 0.172***     
   (-9.42) (4.05)     
         
600 Hour Dummy     -0.006 0.373***   
     (-0.14) (9.60)   
         
750 Hour Dummy     0.218*** 0.237***   
     (10.08) (11.30)   
         
900 Hour Dummy     -0.050** 0.197***   
     (-2.14) (8.73)   
         
1100 Hour Dummy     -0.045 0.274***   
     (-1.09) (7.09)   
         
1100+ Hour Dummy     -0.015 0.143***   
     (-0.61) (6.06)   
         
2200 Hour Dummy     -0.324*** 0.248***   
     (-9.42) (6.09)   
         
2200+ Hour Dummy     -0.119*** -0.135***   
     (-6.42) (-7.47)   
         
Linguistic Proximity-2       0.480*** 0.267*** 
       (28.15) (12.82) 
         
Covariates   No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
N   2796 2292 2796 2292 2648 2209 
R2   0.114 0.514 0.167 0.549 0.231 0.526 
F   120.3 126.6 79.78 120.2 792.7 143.2 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table III-7 
Determinants of Emigrant Stock 2000-2008, 2012 Covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, 
Lp2 
IV, Lp2 
TOEFL Score 0.278**
* 
-0.174 0.613** -1.717* 0.443** -0.149 0.348** -1.989 
 (3.27) (-1.29) (2.08) (-1.82) (2.17) (-0.57) (2.12) (-1.61) 
         
Official English  0.251**  0.590**  0.246**  0.672** 
 (2.12)  (2.21)  (2.08)  (2.10) 
         
Schooling, Average Years of  -0.091  0.600  -0.102  0.746 
 (-0.65)  (1.30)  (-0.63)  (1.23) 
        
Inflation, GDP Deflator  -0.109  -0.047  -0.110  -0.003 
 (-1.12)  (-0.32)  (-1.25)  (-0.02) 
         
Investment, % of GDP  0.046  -0.172  0.049  -0.046 
 (0.45)  (-0.86)  (0.50)  (-0.26) 
         
Island  0.219*  0.195  0.219**  0.176 
  (1.92)  (1.15)  (2.13)  (0.91) 
         
Land Area, Ln  -0.249*  -0.595**  -0.244*  -0.672* 
 (-1.72)  (-2.00)  (-1.73)  (-1.79) 
         
Landlocked  -0.128  -0.015  -0.130  0.029 
  (-1.26)  (-0.09)  (-1.40)  (0.16) 
         
Population, Ln  -0.089  0.190  -0.094  0.214 
 (-0.59)  (0.68)  (-0.66)  (0.63) 
         
Government Consumption, 
% of GDP 
 0.130  0.059  0.131  0.056 
 (1.38)  (0.40)  (1.53)  (0.34) 
        
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 -0.087  -0.025  -0.088  0.011 
 (-0.81)  (-0.16)  (-0.91)  (0.05) 
         
Latitude  0.019  0.383  0.013  0.565 
  (0.12)  (1.18)  (0.08)  (1.26) 
         
Pacific  -0.109  -0.159  -0.108  -0.187 
  (-0.95)  (-0.93)  (-1.04)  (-0.94) 
         
Middle East  -0.396***  -0.837**  -0.388***  -0.938** 
  (-3.07)  (-2.57)  (-2.91)  (-2.14) 
         
Asia  -0.458***  -0.590**  -0.456***  -0.575* 
  (-2.77)  (-2.30)  (-3.04)  (-1.92) 
         
Africa  -0.663***  -0.938***  -0.658***  -0.993** 
  (-3.03)  (-2.59)  (-3.27)  (-2.26) 
         
Americas  -0.011  0.056  -0.012  0.102 
  (-0.07)  (0.23)  (-0.09)  (0.37) 
N 129 96 129 96 129 96 119 91 
R2 0.078 0.491 -0.034 -0.363 0.051 0.490 0.076 -0.655 
F 10.67 4.420 4.262 1.773 4.626 4.336 4.429 1.372 
Underid F Stat P-Value  0.008 0.234 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.076 
Hausman P value   0.236 1.000 0.376 1.000 0.969 1.000 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
102 
 
Table III-7a 
Determinants of Emigrant Stock in 2012, First Stage Results on TOEFL Scores, 
2012 Covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Lp2 IV, Lp2 
600-900 Hour Dummy   0.027 0.360*     
   (0.14) (1.86)     
         
1100-2200 Hour 
Dummy 
  -0.072 0.279     
   (-0.40) (1.53)     
         
2200 Hour and Up 
Dummy 
  -0.303* 0.219     
   (-1.78) (1.00)     
         
600 Hour Dummy     -0.016 0.307*   
     (-0.09) (1.71)   
         
750 Hour Dummy     0.268** 0.204*   
     (2.53) (1.86)   
         
900 Hour Dummy     -0.088 0.153   
     (-0.80) (1.40)   
         
1100 Hour Dummy     -0.075 0.236   
     (-0.44) (1.46)   
         
1100+ Hour Dummy     -0.012 0.033   
     (-0.11) (0.31)   
         
2200 Hour Dummy     -0.292* 0.286   
     (-1.79) (1.38)   
         
2200+ Hour Dummy     -0.107 -0.212**   
     (-1.21) (-2.45)   
         
Linguistic Proximity-2       0.538*** 0.175 
       (6.90) (1.62) 
         
Covariates   No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
N   129 96 129 96 119 91 
R2   0.092 0.658 0.177 0.720 0.290 0.667 
F   4.244 7.682 3.705 8.056 47.67 8.595 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table III-8 
Determinants of Emigrant Stock 2000-2008, 1992 Covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Spec 2 IV, 
Lp2 
IV, Lp2 
TOEFL Score 0.037 -0.116 0.295 -0.744 0.217 -0.083 0.283 -0.664 
 (0.43) (-0.98) (1.41) (-1.38) (1.26) (-0.29) (1.57) (-1.57) 
         
Official English  0.002  0.171  -0.007  0.163 
 (0.02)  (0.97)  (-0.06)  (1.02) 
         
Schooling, Average Years of  -0.088  0.151  -0.101  0.095 
 (-0.68)  (0.63)  (-0.64)  (0.48) 
        
Inflation, GDP Deflator  0.013  0.025  0.012  0.037 
 (0.16)  (0.29)  (0.17)  (0.43) 
         
Investment, % of GDP  -0.043  -0.061  -0.042  0.013 
 (-0.51)  (-0.68)  (-0.55)  (0.13) 
         
Island  0.201*  0.120  0.205**  0.126 
  (1.98)  (0.95)  (2.09)  (1.05) 
         
Land Area, Ln  -0.365**  -0.655**  -0.350**  -0.630*** 
 (-2.60)  (-2.31)  (-1.96)  (-2.67) 
         
Landlocked  -0.194**  -0.135  -0.197**  -0.142 
  (-2.26)  (-1.32)  (-2.41)  (-1.53) 
         
Population, Ln  0.001  0.207  -0.009  0.170 
 (0.01)  (0.93)  (-0.06)  (0.92) 
         
Government Consumption, 
% of GDP 
 0.122  0.179*  0.119  0.166* 
 (1.42)  (1.76)  (1.46)  (1.72) 
        
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 -0.050  0.062  -0.056  0.052 
 (-0.45)  (0.42)  (-0.50)  (0.38) 
         
Latitude  0.085  0.273  0.075  0.290 
  (0.53)  (1.19)  (0.45)  (1.34) 
         
Pacific  -0.030  -0.064  -0.028  -0.054 
  (-0.27)  (-0.53)  (-0.28)  (-0.45) 
         
Middle East  -0.371***  -0.582***  -0.360**  -0.576*** 
  (-3.02)  (-2.67)  (-2.51)  (-2.92) 
         
Asia  -0.456***  -0.599***  -0.448***  -0.594*** 
  (-3.07)  (-3.05)  (-3.03)  (-3.22) 
         
Africa  -0.531***  -0.645***  -0.525***  -0.582*** 
  (-2.67)  (-2.81)  (-2.81)  (-2.81) 
         
Americas  -0.060  -0.064  -0.060  -0.041 
  (-0.42)  (-0.43)  (-0.46)  (-0.27) 
N 137 101 137 101 137 101 127 97 
R2 0.001 0.529 -0.065 0.367 -0.031 0.528 -0.063 0.413 
F 0.186 5.477 1.948 4.128 1.572 5.419 2.424 4.193 
Underid F Stat P-Value  0.000 0.148 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.004 
Hausman P value   0.178 1.000 0.227 1.000 0.097 1.000 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table III-8a 
Determinants of Emigrant Stock in 2012, First Stage Results on TOEFL Scores, 
1992 Covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
1 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Spec 
2 
IV, Lp2 IV, Lp2 
600-900 Hour Dummy   0.037 0.089     
   (0.19) (0.42)     
         
1100-2200 Hour 
Dummy 
  -0.156 -0.054     
   (-0.82) (-0.26)     
         
2200 Hour and Up 
Dummy 
  -0.418** 0.176     
   (-2.56) (0.88)     
         
600 Hour Dummy     -0.022 0.110   
     (-0.12) (0.53)   
         
750 Hour Dummy     0.271*** 0.051   
     (2.68) (0.48)   
         
900 Hour Dummy     -0.020 0.086   
     (-0.18) (0.68)   
         
1100 Hour Dummy     -0.161 -0.025   
     (-0.90) (-0.13)   
         
1100+ Hour Dummy     -0.019 -0.003   
     (-0.19) (-0.03)   
         
2200 Hour Dummy     -0.406** 0.272   
     (-2.60) (1.40)   
         
2200+ Hour Dummy     -0.124 -0.137   
     (-1.51) (-1.55)   
         
Linguistic Proximity-2       0.508*** 0.279*** 
       (6.59) (2.75) 
         
Covariates   No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
N   137 101 137 101 127 97 
R2   0.176 0.612 0.254 0.646 0.258 0.648 
F   9.474 6.727 6.269 6.110 43.47 8.558 
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Appendices 
 
Appendices are labelled with a roman numeral corresponding to their chapter. 
Appendix I-A: Countries Included 
1. Countries Included in Specification (1) of Table I-2, 112 countries (Most 
Restrictive): 
Albania; Algeria; Angola; Australia; Bahamas, The; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Barbados; 
Belize; Benin; Bhutan; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brunei Darussalam; 
Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Cape Verde; Central 
African Republic; Chad; China; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Djibouti; Egypt, Arab Rep.; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; 
Fiji; Finland; Gabon; Gambia, The; Ghana; Grenada; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; 
Hungary; Iceland; India; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Japan; Jordan; Kenya; Kuwait; Lao PDR; 
Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Macedonia, FYR; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; 
Maldives; Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; 
Namibia; Nepal; New Zealand; Niger; Oman; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; 
Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Serbia; Sierra Leone; 
Singapore; Slovenia; Solomon Islands; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; St. Lucia; St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Syrian Arab Republic; 
Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Uganda; United Arab 
Emirates; United States; Vanuatu; Venezuela, RB; Vietnam; Yemen, Rep.; Zambia; 
Zimbabwe. 
2. Countries Included in Specification (5) of Table I-2, 192 countries (Least 
Restrictive): 
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Andorra; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; 
Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas, The; Bahrain; Bangladesh; 
Barbados; Belarus; Belize; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; 
Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; 
Canada; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; 
Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech 
Republic; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt, Arab 
Rep.; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; 
Gabon; Gambia, The; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; 
Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hong Kong SAR, China; Hungary; Iceland; 
India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; 
Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kiribati; Korea, Dem. Rep.; Korea, Rep.; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz 
Republic; Lao PDR; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Liechtenstein; 
Lithuania; Macao SAR, China; Macedonia, FYR; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; 
Maldives; Mali; Malta; Marshall Islands; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Micronesia, 
Fed. Sts.; Moldova; Monaco; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; 
Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; 
Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palau; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; 
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Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Samoa; 
San Marino; Sao Tome and Principe; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Seychelles; Sierra 
Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Solomon Islands; Somalia; South Africa; 
Spain; Sri Lanka; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Sudan; 
Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; 
Tanzania; Thailand; Timor-Leste; Togo; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Tuvalu; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; 
United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Venezuela, RB; Vietnam; West Bank 
and Gaza; Yemen, Rep.; Zambia; Zimbabwe  
3. Countries included in Matching 
Note the countries included in each matching specifications will be slightly different in 
each case, as the method here demands 13 continuous years of data (7 before Year of 
Adoption and 5 after plus the actual year of the adoption.) Thus, one can only study the 
impact of adoptions from 1986-2007, even though one can study the determination of 
adoptions up through 2012. Exact countries included in each specification are available 
upon request from the author.  
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Appendix I-B: Data Definitions 
Agriculture: Percent of GDP contributed by agricultural activities, from the World 
Development Indicators. 
Alliance of Small Island States: Equal to 1 if a country identifies as a member of the 
Alliance of Small Island States at any time in the sample period, from the Alliance of 
Small Island States. 
Bordering Countries with VAT: Number of bordering countries with a VAT divided by 
the number of bordering countries, from author's calculations. 
British Commonwealth: Equal to 1 if a country is a member of the British 
Commonwealth at any time in the sample period, from the Commonwealth Network. 
Exports: Exports as a percent of GDP, from the World Development Indicators. 
Federal: Equal to 1 if a country is governed as a federation, from Treisman (2002) with 
updates from the author. 
Former Soviet Republic: Equal to 1 if a country was created by the collapse of a 
Warsaw Pact Nation, from author's calculations. 
Former Warsaw Pact: Equal to 1 if a country was a Warsaw Pact Nation, from author's 
calculations. 
Francophonie: Equal to 1 if a country is a member of the Francophonie at any time in 
the sample period, from Organisation internationale de la Francophonie. 
GDP per capita growth: Real GDP per capita growth, from the World Development 
Indicators 
GDP Per Capita, Log: Natural log of GDP per capita as measured by current US dollars, 
from the World Development Indicators. 
GDP, Log: Natural log of GDP as measured by current US dollars, from the World 
Development Indicators. 
Government Consumption: Government Consumption, as a percent of GDP from the 
Penn World Tables. 
IMF Lending Dummy: Equal to 1 if the country has a nonzero balance in either a PRG 
or GRA credit facility in any months of that year, a stock measure, from the IMF 
Financial Data query tool.  
Imports: Imports as a percent of GDP, from the World Development Indicators. 
Inflation: Yearly inflation as measured by the CPI, from the World Development 
Indicators. 
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Investment: Gross capital formation as a percent of GDP from the world development 
indicators. 
Island: Equal to 1 if a country has no other countries it borders by land, from author's 
calculations. 
Landlocked: Equal to 1 if a country has no land bordering an ocean, from author's 
calculations. 
Natural Resource Rents: Percent of GDP coming from natural resource production, 
from the World Development Indicators. 
Net Exports: Exports as a percent of GDP minus imports as a percent of GDP, from the 
World Development Indicators. 
Population Growth: Growth rate of the population, from the World Development 
Indicators. 
Population, Log: Natural log of population, from the World Development Indicators. 
% of Population 0-14: Percent of population between 0 and 14 years of age, from the 
World Development Indicators. 
% of Population 65+: Percent of population above 65 years of age, from the World 
Development Indicators. 
Size, Log Square Kilometers: Natural log of the surface area of a country, from the 
World Development Indicators. 
Trade: Exports as a percent of GDP plus imports as a share of GDP, from the World 
Development Indicators. 
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Appendix I-C: Additional Tables 
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Table I-7 
Impact of VAT adoption on Investment, Single Nearest Neighbor Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       Investment, 7 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 23.27 23.86 -0.60 1.24 -0.48 
 
ATT 23.27 22.98 0.28 2.08 0.14 
       Investment, 6 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 22.88 23.73 -0.85 1.24 -0.69 
 
ATT 22.88 23.94 -1.07 2.07 -0.52 
       Investment, 5 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 22.53 23.59 -1.06 1.25 -0.84 
 
ATT 22.53 23.24 -0.71 1.98 -0.36 
       Investment, 4 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 22.80 23.27 -0.47 1.26 -0.38 
 
ATT 22.80 22.06 0.73 1.79 0.41 
       Investment, 3 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 21.95 23.03 -1.08 1.27 -0.85 
 
ATT 21.95 22.42 -0.47 1.75 -0.27 
       Investment, 2 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 21.50 22.96 -1.45 1.28 -1.14 
 
ATT 21.50 22.56 -1.05 1.92 -0.55 
       Investment, 1 Year Pre-Adoption Unmatched 22.44 22.85 -0.41 1.30 -0.32 
 
ATT 22.44 22.44 -0.01 1.91 0.00 
       Investment, Year of Adoption Unmatched 21.66 22.78 -1.12 1.30 -0.86 
 
ATT 21.66 22.32 -0.66 1.79 -0.37 
       Investment, 1 Year Post-Adoption Unmatched 22.32 22.67 -0.34 1.30 -0.26 
 
ATT 22.32 21.85 0.48 1.52 0.31 
       Investment, 2 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 22.68 22.70 -0.03 1.31 -0.02 
 
ATT 22.68 21.53 1.15 1.67 0.69 
       Investment, 3 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 22.91 22.67 0.24 1.30 0.18 
 
ATT 22.91 21.20 1.71 1.54 1.11 
       Investment, 4 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 22.53 22.74 -0.21 1.29 -0.16 
 
ATT 22.53 21.11 1.43 1.48 0.97 
       Investment, 5 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 22.69 22.80 -0.12 1.29 -0.09 
 
ATT 22.69 20.71 1.98 1.64 1.21 
       
Investment, Change 2 Years Pre-Adoption to 5 Years Post-
Adoption 
Unmatched 1.18 -0.15 1.33 1.06 1.26 
ATT 1.18 -1.85 3.03 1.80 1.69* 
       
Investment, Change 7 Years Pre-Adoption to 2 Years Pre-
Adoption 
Unmatched -1.77 -0.91 -0.86 1.06 -0.81 
ATT -1.77 -0.43 -1.34 1.70 -0.79 
       * p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Treated Observations: 77 
Untreated Observations: 639 
Notes: Propensity scores for matching are generated by hazard regression (1) on Table I-2. 
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Table I-8 
Impact of VAT adoption on GDP per Capita Growth, Single Nearest Neighbor  
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 7 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 1.69 1.21 0.48 0.91 0.53 
 
ATT 1.69 1.64 0.04 1.45 0.03 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 6 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 1.99 1.17 0.82 0.83 0.98 
 
ATT 1.99 1.42 0.57 1.11 0.51 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 5 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 1.30 1.24 0.06 0.83 0.07 
 
ATT 1.30 2.58 -1.29 1.06 -1.22 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 4 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 1.18 1.06 0.12 0.66 0.18 
 
ATT 1.18 2.57 -1.39 0.96 -1.45 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 3 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 1.53 1.12 0.41 0.71 0.58 
 
ATT 1.53 1.13 0.41 1.26 0.32 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 2 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 1.49 1.44 0.05 0.68 0.08 
 
ATT 1.49 0.79 0.70 1.05 0.67 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 1 Year Pre-Adoption Unmatched 1.65 1.44 0.21 0.77 0.27 
 
ATT 1.65 1.05 0.60 1.02 0.59 
       GDP per Capita Growth, Year of Adoption Unmatched 2.63 1.60 1.03 0.78 1.32 
 
ATT 2.63 0.36 2.26 1.04 2.17** 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 1 Year Post-Adoption Unmatched 1.69 1.76 -0.08 0.77 -0.10 
 
ATT 1.69 1.33 0.35 0.93 0.38 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 2 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 2.32 1.92 0.40 0.74 0.55 
 
ATT 2.32 1.31 1.01 0.84 1.20 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 3 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 2.08 1.84 0.24 0.77 0.31 
 
ATT 2.08 0.50 1.58 0.89 1.79* 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 4 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 2.33 1.80 0.53 0.77 0.70 
 
ATT 2.33 0.36 1.97 1.02 1.93* 
       GDP per Capita Growth, 5 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 2.07 1.70 0.37 0.70 0.53 
 
ATT 2.07 0.72 1.34 0.97 1.38 
       
GDP per Capita Growth, Change 2 Years Pre-Adoption 
to 5 Years Post-Adoption 
Unmatched 0.57 0.26 0.32 0.92 0.34 
ATT 0.57 -0.07 0.64 1.32 0.49 
       
GDP per Capita Growth, Change 7 Years Pre-Adoption 
to 2 Years Pre-Adoption 
Unmatched -0.19 0.23 -0.43 1.06 -0.40 
ATT -0.19 -0.85 0.66 1.76 0.37 
       * p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Treated Observations: 78 
Untreated Observations: 683 
Notes: Propensity scores for matching are generated by hazard regression (1) on Table I-2. 
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Table I-9 
Impact of VAT adoption on Trade, Single Nearest Neighbor Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       Trade, 7 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 71.99 84.63 -12.63 6.34 -1.99** 
 
ATT 71.99 63.59 8.41 9.65 0.87 
       Trade, 6 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 69.49 84.50 -15.02 6.36 -2.36** 
 
ATT 69.49 64.48 5.00 10.33 0.48 
       Trade, 5 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 70.59 83.70 -13.11 6.28 -2.09** 
 
ATT 70.59 65.05 5.54 10.70 0.52 
       Trade, 4 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 69.93 83.12 -13.20 6.18 -2.13** 
 
ATT 69.93 61.91 8.01 9.66 0.83 
       Trade, 3 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 70.79 82.78 -12.00 6.12 -1.96* 
 
ATT 70.79 61.90 8.89 9.33 0.95 
       Trade, 2 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 71.29 82.81 -11.52 6.08 -1.90* 
 
ATT 71.29 61.39 9.90 9.21 1.07 
       Trade, 1 Year Pre-Adoption Unmatched 73.47 82.98 -9.51 6.10 -1.56 
 
ATT 73.47 64.88 8.59 9.94 0.86 
       Trade, Year of Adoption Unmatched 73.91 82.85 -8.94 6.13 -1.46 
 
ATT 73.91 64.89 9.02 10.24 0.88 
       Trade, 1 Year Post-Adoption Unmatched 76.30 83.50 -7.21 6.18 -1.17 
 
ATT 76.30 65.13 11.16 10.11 1.10 
       Trade, 2 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 77.91 84.23 -6.32 6.19 -1.02 
 
ATT 77.91 67.19 10.71 9.79 1.09 
       Trade, 3 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 78.30 84.67 -6.38 6.12 -1.04 
 
ATT 78.30 67.03 11.27 9.70 1.16 
       Trade, 4 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 78.22 85.10 -6.88 6.08 -1.13 
 
ATT 78.22 70.36 7.86 9.85 0.80 
       Trade, 5 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 80.89 85.71 -4.83 6.08 -0.79 
 
ATT 80.89 72.06 8.83 10.15 0.87 
       
Trade, Change 2 Years Pre-Adoption to 5 Years Post-
Adoption 
Unmatched 9.60 2.91 6.69 3.19 2.10** 
ATT 9.60 10.67 -1.07 4.21 -0.25 
       
Trade, Change 7 Years Pre-Adoption to 2 Years Pre-
Adoption 
Unmatched -0.71 -1.82 1.12 2.79 0.40 
ATT -0.71 -2.20 1.49 4.28 0.35 
       * p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Treated Observations: 76 
Untreated Observations: 662 
Notes: Propensity scores for matching are generated by hazard regression (1) on Table I-2. 
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Table I-10  
Impact of VAT adoption on Inflation, Single Nearest Neighbor Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       Inflation, 7 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 22.56 82.81 -60.26 120.81 -0.50 
 
ATT 22.56 26.47 -3.91 12.09 -0.32 
       Inflation, 6 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 20.17 89.57 -69.40 121.88 -0.57 
 
ATT 20.17 29.56 -9.39 12.26 -0.77 
       Inflation, 5 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 23.81 90.06 -66.25 121.91 -0.54 
 
ATT 23.81 28.94 -5.13 14.36 -0.36 
       Inflation, 4 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 22.22 88.58 -66.36 121.78 -0.54 
 
ATT 22.22 18.04 4.18 12.05 0.35 
       Inflation, 3 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 16.73 81.84 -65.12 120.50 -0.54 
 
ATT 16.73 14.35 2.37 9.58 0.25 
       Inflation, 2 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 12.38 82.15 -69.77 120.57 -0.58 
 
ATT 12.38 10.31 2.07 4.27 0.48 
       Inflation, 1 Year Pre-Adoption Unmatched 13.23 76.61 -63.38 118.60 -0.53 
 
ATT 13.23 13.21 0.02 5.14 0.00 
       Inflation, Year of Adoption Unmatched 14.13 84.30 -70.17 120.82 -0.58 
 
ATT 14.13 12.30 1.83 4.58 0.40 
       Inflation, 1 Year Post-Adoption Unmatched 11.28 83.47 -72.19 120.71 -0.60 
 
ATT 11.28 13.90 -2.62 3.83 -0.68 
       Inflation, 2 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 11.37 79.74 -68.38 120.37 -0.57 
 
ATT 11.37 13.81 -2.44 4.08 -0.60 
       Inflation, 3 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 22.95 76.75 -53.80 120.20 -0.45 
 
ATT 22.95 95.35 -72.40 47.98 -1.51 
       Inflation, 4 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 10.10 68.35 -58.25 117.90 -0.49 
 
ATT 10.10 166.67 -156.57 85.82 -1.82* 
       Inflation, 5 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 7.24 67.80 -60.56 117.90 -0.51 
 
ATT 7.24 73.55 -66.31 35.06 -1.89* 
       
Inflation, Change 2 Years Pre-Adoption to 5 Years 
Post-Adoption 
Unmatched -5.14 -14.35 9.21 167.14 0.06 
ATT -5.14 63.24 -68.38 34.72 -1.97* 
       
Inflation, Change 7 Years Pre-Adoption to 2 Years 
Pre-Adoption 
Unmatched -10.18 -0.67 -9.51 168.77 -0.06 
ATT -10.18 -16.16 5.98 12.64 0.47 
       * p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Treated Observations: 78 
Untreated Observations: 684 
Notes: Propensity scores for matching are generated by hazard regression (1) on Table I-2. 
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Table I-11 
Impact of VAT adoption on Government Consumption, Single Nearest Neighbor 
Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       Government Consumption, 7 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 11.70 15.55 -3.86 1.30 -2.97*** 
 
ATT 11.70 10.20 1.50 1.73 0.86 
       Government Consumption, 6 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 11.48 15.53 -4.05 1.29 -3.14*** 
 
ATT 11.48 10.34 1.14 1.70 0.67 
       Government Consumption, 5 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 11.55 15.47 -3.92 1.30 -3.03*** 
 
ATT 11.55 10.25 1.30 1.64 0.79 
       Government Consumption, 4 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 11.70 15.40 -3.70 1.29 -2.87*** 
 
ATT 11.70 10.12 1.58 1.60 0.99 
       Government Consumption, 3 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 11.44 15.23 -3.79 1.27 -2.99*** 
 
ATT 11.44 10.12 1.32 1.59 0.83 
       Government Consumption, 2 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 11.34 15.08 -3.74 1.26 -2.98*** 
 
ATT 11.34 9.99 1.35 1.46 0.92 
       Government Consumption, 1 Year Pre-Adoption Unmatched 11.16 14.94 -3.78 1.25 -3.03*** 
 
ATT 11.16 10.23 0.93 1.62 0.57 
       Government Consumption, Year of Adoption Unmatched 10.77 14.69 -3.92 1.22 -3.23*** 
 
ATT 10.77 10.46 0.31 1.66 0.18 
       Government Consumption, 1 Year Post-Adoption Unmatched 10.80 14.49 -3.69 1.18 -3.12*** 
 
ATT 10.80 9.95 0.84 1.45 0.58 
       Government Consumption, 2 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 10.72 14.26 -3.54 1.14 -3.12*** 
 
ATT 10.72 10.01 0.71 1.51 0.47 
       Government Consumption, 3 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 10.71 14.14 -3.43 1.12 -3.07*** 
 
ATT 10.71 9.74 0.97 1.48 0.65 
       Government Consumption, 4 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 10.51 14.11 -3.60 1.10 -3.28*** 
 
ATT 10.51 10.02 0.48 1.38 0.35 
       Government Consumption, 5 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 10.27 14.05 -3.78 1.07 -3.52*** 
 
ATT 10.27 10.26 0.01 1.47 0.01 
       
Government Consumption, Change 2 Years Pre-
Adoption to 5 Years Post-Adoption 
Unmatched -1.07 -1.03 -0.04 0.69 -0.05 
ATT -1.07 0.27 -1.34 0.77 -1.75* 
       
Government Consumption, Change 7 Years Pre-
Adoption to 2 Years Pre-Adoption 
Unmatched -0.36 -0.47 0.11 0.60 0.19 
ATT -0.36 -0.21 -0.15 0.70 -0.21 
       * p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Treated Observations: 80 
Untreated Observations: 716 
Notes: Propensity scores for matching are generated by hazard regression (1) on Table I-2. 
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Table I-12 
Impact of VAT adoption on Imports, Single Nearest Neighbor Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       Imports, 7 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 40.66 48.62 -7.96 3.59 -2.21** 
 
ATT 40.66 34.42 6.24 5.43 1.15 
       Imports, 6 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 39.04 48.38 -9.35 3.56 -2.63*** 
 
ATT 39.04 35.19 3.85 5.89 0.65 
       Imports, 5 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 39.42 47.78 -8.36 3.52 -2.38** 
 
ATT 39.42 35.18 4.24 5.99 0.71 
       Imports, 4 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 39.26 47.06 -7.80 3.46 -2.25** 
 
ATT 39.26 33.05 6.22 5.41 1.15 
       Imports, 3 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 39.49 46.57 -7.09 3.40 -2.08** 
 
ATT 39.49 33.60 5.88 5.15 1.14 
       Imports, 2 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 39.44 46.36 -6.92 3.37 -2.05** 
 
ATT 39.44 33.51 5.93 5.11 1.16 
       Imports, 1 Year Pre-Adoption Unmatched 40.60 46.21 -5.61 3.37 -1.67* 
 
ATT 40.60 35.40 5.20 5.51 0.94 
       Imports, Year of Adoption Unmatched 40.34 46.03 -5.69 3.36 -1.69* 
 
ATT 40.34 35.18 5.15 5.66 0.91 
       Imports, 1 Year Post-Adoption Unmatched 41.87 46.18 -4.31 3.40 -1.27 
 
ATT 41.87 34.59 7.28 5.63 1.29 
       Imports, 2 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 43.31 46.38 -3.07 3.42 -0.90 
 
ATT 43.31 36.05 7.26 5.38 1.35 
       Imports, 3 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 43.08 46.54 -3.46 3.36 -1.03 
 
ATT 43.08 35.57 7.51 5.19 1.45 
       Imports, 4 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 42.78 46.72 -3.94 3.33 -1.18 
 
ATT 42.78 36.99 5.79 5.26 1.10 
       Imports, 5 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 44.13 46.94 -2.81 3.29 -0.86 
 
ATT 44.13 37.96 6.17 5.46 1.13 
       
Imports, Change 2 Years Pre-Adoption to 5 Years 
Post-Adoption 
Unmatched 4.69 0.58 4.11 1.88 2.18** 
ATT 4.69 4.44 0.24 2.36 0.10 
       
Imports, Change 7 Years Pre-Adoption to 2 Years 
Pre-Adoption 
Unmatched -1.22 -2.25 1.04 1.74 0.59 
ATT -1.22 -0.90 -0.31 2.61 -0.12 
       * p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Treated Observations: 76 
Untreated Observations: 662 
Notes: Propensity scores for matching are generated by hazard regression (1) on Table I-2. 
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Table I-13 
Impact of VAT adoption on Exports, Single Nearest Neighbor Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       Exports, 7 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 31.33 36.01 -4.68 3.21 -1.46 
 
ATT 31.33 29.17 2.16 4.81 0.45 
       Exports, 6 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 30.45 36.12 -5.67 3.25 -1.75* 
 
ATT 30.45 29.29 1.16 5.00 0.23 
       Exports, 5 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 31.18 35.93 -4.75 3.21 -1.48 
 
ATT 31.18 29.87 1.31 5.18 0.25 
       Exports, 4 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 30.66 36.06 -5.40 3.19 -1.69* 
 
ATT 30.66 28.87 1.79 4.75 0.38 
       Exports, 3 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 31.30 36.21 -4.91 3.17 -1.55 
 
ATT 31.30 28.30 3.01 4.62 0.65 
       Exports, 2 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched 31.85 36.44 -4.60 3.16 -1.46 
 
ATT 31.85 27.88 3.96 4.53 0.88 
       Exports, 1 Year Pre-Adoption Unmatched 32.87 36.77 -3.90 3.19 -1.22 
 
ATT 32.87 29.48 3.38 4.83 0.70 
       Exports, Year of Adoption Unmatched 33.57 36.82 -3.25 3.23 -1.01 
 
ATT 33.57 29.70 3.87 4.97 0.78 
       Exports, 1 Year Post-Adoption Unmatched 34.42 37.33 -2.90 3.26 -0.89 
 
ATT 34.42 30.54 3.88 4.98 0.78 
       Exports, 2 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 34.60 37.85 -3.25 3.26 -1.00 
 
ATT 34.60 31.14 3.46 4.87 0.71 
       Exports, 3 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 35.22 38.13 -2.91 3.23 -0.90 
 
ATT 35.22 31.45 3.76 4.90 0.77 
       Exports, 4 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 35.44 38.38 -2.94 3.21 -0.92 
 
ATT 35.44 33.37 2.07 4.95 0.42 
       Exports, 5 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched 36.76 38.77 -2.01 3.23 -0.62 
 
ATT 36.76 34.10 2.65 5.05 0.53 
       
Exports, Change 2 Years Pre-Adoption to 5 Years Post-
Adoption 
Unmatched 4.91 2.33 2.59 1.63 1.59 
ATT 4.91 6.22 -1.31 2.26 -0.58 
       
Exports, Change 7 Years Pre-Adoption to 2 Years Pre-
Adoption 
Unmatched 0.51 0.43 0.08 1.44 0.06 
ATT 0.51 -1.29 1.80 2.13 0.85 
       * p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Treated Observations: 76 
Untreated Observations: 662 
Notes: Propensity scores for matching are generated by hazard regression (1) on Table I-2. 
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Table I-14 
Impact of VAT adoption on Net Exports, Single Nearest Neighbor Matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
       Net Exports, 7 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched -9.33 -12.60 3.28 2.50 1.31 
 
ATT -9.33 -5.24 -4.08 3.48 -1.17 
       Net Exports, 6 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched -8.59 -12.27 3.68 2.43 1.51 
 
ATT -8.59 -5.90 -2.69 3.54 -0.76 
       Net Exports, 5 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched -8.24 -11.85 3.61 2.44 1.48 
 
ATT -8.24 -5.31 -2.93 3.32 -0.88 
       Net Exports, 4 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched -8.60 -11.01 2.41 2.46 0.98 
 
ATT -8.60 -4.18 -4.42 3.19 -1.39 
       Net Exports, 3 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched -8.18 -10.36 2.18 2.42 0.90 
 
ATT -8.18 -5.31 -2.88 2.94 -0.98 
       Net Exports, 2 Years Pre-Adoption Unmatched -7.60 -9.92 2.32 2.39 0.97 
 
ATT -7.60 -5.63 -1.97 2.88 -0.68 
       Net Exports, 1 Year Pre-Adoption Unmatched -7.73 -9.44 1.71 2.44 0.70 
 
ATT -7.73 -5.91 -1.82 2.95 -0.62 
       Net Exports, Year of Adoption Unmatched -6.76 -9.21 2.45 2.43 1.01 
 
ATT -6.76 -5.48 -1.29 2.94 -0.44 
       Net Exports, 1 Year Post-Adoption Unmatched -7.45 -8.85 1.40 2.46 0.57 
 
ATT -7.45 -4.04 -3.40 3.26 -1.04 
       Net Exports, 2 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched -8.71 -8.53 -0.18 2.52 -0.07 
 
ATT -8.71 -4.91 -3.80 3.10 -1.23 
       Net Exports, 3 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched -7.86 -8.41 0.55 2.45 0.22 
 
ATT -7.86 -4.12 -3.74 2.80 -1.34 
       Net Exports, 4 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched -7.35 -8.34 1.00 2.42 0.41 
 
ATT -7.35 -3.62 -3.72 2.71 -1.37 
       Net Exports, 5 Years Post-Adoption Unmatched -7.37 -8.17 0.80 2.36 0.34 
 
ATT -7.37 -3.85 -3.52 2.77 -1.27 
       
Net Exports, Change 2 Years Pre-Adoption to 5 Years 
Post-Adoption 
Unmatched 0.22 1.75 -1.52 1.49 -1.02 
ATT 0.22 1.78 -1.55 1.90 -0.82 
       
Net Exports, Change 7 Years Pre-Adoption to 2 Years 
Pre-Adoption 
Unmatched 1.73 2.68 -0.96 1.56 -0.61 
ATT 1.73 -0.39 2.12 2.08 1.02 
       * p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Treated Observations: 76 
Untreated Observations: 662 
Notes: Propensity scores for matching are generated by hazard regression (1) on Table I-2. 
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Appendix I-D: Additional Figures 
 
Figure I-4 
Effect of VAT Adoption on Investment 
 
Notes: VAT adopters are treated. 
 
Figure I-5 
Effect of VAT Adoption on GDP per Capita Growth 
 
Notes: VAT adopters are treated. 
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Figure I-6 
Effect of VAT Adoption on Trade 
 
Notes: VAT adopters are treated. 
 
 
Figure I-7 
Effect of VAT Adoption on Inflation  
 
Notes: VAT adopters are treated. 
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Figure I-8 
Effect of VAT Adoption on Government Consumption 
 
Notes: VAT adopters are treated. 
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Appendix I-E: Supporting Literature 
 
Theoretical models show a VAT and other consumption taxes are less 
distortionary than other forms of taxation with respect to investment decisions, though 
nearly all taxes will distort such decisions to some degree (Van den Noord and Heady 
2012, Zagler and Durnecker 2003.)  Thus it is possible investment would be higher 
under a regime in which VATs are collected. Relevant to this prediction, a study on the 
investment behavior of VAT exempt firms in China finds no increases in investment for 
the VAT exempt firms compared to the non-exempt firms (Cai and Harrison 2012.) 
This could imply the presence of a VAT did not affect their investment decisions, as its 
removal had no effect. It could also point to other policy implementation problems. The 
effects of VATs on investment decision are thus not clear.  
 Due to a need for businesses to report purchases and sales in order to be taxed, a 
VAT may encourage tax evasion activities, though it is not clear whether increased 
effort to hide economic activity will actually result in more hidden activity, as VATs are 
in general harder to evade than a standard sales tax (e.g. Barbone et al 2012, Ebeke 
2012, Keen 2010.) If activity is hidden in the informal sector, observed GDP could fall 
for two reasons. First activity that exists may be hidden, and thus not officially counted. 
Secondly, in an effort to hide activities, suboptimal decision are made, for example, 
investing in favor of easier to conceal or more mobile capital, further lowering GDP 
growth (Emran and Stiglitz 2005.) As a result, VATs could either raise economic 
growth due to less deadweight loss in collecting public funds and less evasion activities, 
or lower it due to increasing incentives for evasion activities. It is possible these 
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incentives, and thus direction of growth effect, are very different depending on the 
countries' level of development (Stiglitz 2008.)  
 As VATs are usually zero rated on exports, with producers paying no taxes on 
goods that are exported, and levied on imports at their full value, there are likely to be 
impacts on trade from passing a VAT. Nicholson (2012) finds that when countries pass 
a VAT they increase their trade with the United States, which may be indicative of 
increased trade in general from VAT passage. VATs are often replacements for simpler 
taxes on trade, and are often more amenable to exporters due to the reimbursement 
mechanism (Bird 2010.) However, because one is dependent on receiving timely 
rebates from the government for taxes paid, countries with poorly functioning civil 
services may not reimburse exporters and thus discourage, rather than encourage, 
exports (Hines and Desai 2005, Kelly and Fox 2006.)  
 VATs often replace turnover or production taxes, a tax on the value of a good at 
each stage of the manufacturing process. Since many of these taxes do not have 
mechanisms for rebates like the VAT does, this tax would be assessed multiple times 
throughout the process, with the end product’s price being significantly inflated before 
reaching the consumer (Ebrill et al. 2001.) The VAT’s rebate system, at least in theory, 
prevents this cascading of prices due to taxation. It is therefore possible that replacing 
some taxes with VATs will lower price pressures and reduce inflation that resulted from 
the structure of the previous taxes.  
 Finally, given the ease of tax collection, one may expect VAT adoption to lead 
to governments choosing to collect more taxes in order to raise spending. This fear of a 
"money machine" leads many, especially in the United States, to dislike the idea of a 
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VAT due to potential of government growth (Keen 2007.) However, it is hard to 
demonstrate if a VAT causes government to get larger without need for intent, or if a 
government adopts it in hopes of increasing spending. While Keen (2007) shows that 
VATs should, on its own, raise government spending if distortions fall, it is hard to see 
its net effect as governments may shift away from other sources of revenue that are 
more distorting. 
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Appendix I-F: Choice of Hazard model over Probit 
This paper settled on modeling the VAT adoption decision via survival analysis 
in which countries exit estimation once they adopt the policy, a standard feature of 
survival analysis. If one were to use a probit to model whether or not a country has a 
VAT in a given period, it would require a dummy for having a VAT in previous 
periods, as because of the policies' persistence, this lagged VAT dummy will likely 
explain the majority of variation in the data for the countries that have adopted, as it did 
in Keen and Lockwood (2010.) 
 However, as the goal of this adoption equation is to create matches to evaluate 
the impact of VATs, one cannot have an overly deterministic adoption equation. If the 
adoption equation assigns observational units to treatment and control groups too 
strongly, accurate matching will be impossible as the distribution of propensity scores 
will be bimodal (Glick et al 2006.) The countries that do not adopt will cluster close at a 
very low propensity score, and the countries that do adopt will cluster at a very high 
propensity score. Accurately matching a treated (adopter) to a control (non-adopter) will 
be difficult as their propensity scores, and possibly underlying covariates, will be 
fundamentally different, and some overlap is necessary for matching to be successful. It 
will thus be unclear as to what is actually causing the difference in observed outcomes- 
the treatment itself, or the pre-existing differences between the groups choosing to be 
treated and not treated.   
 One of these two limitations cannot be resolved without exacerbating the other 
when modeling this phenomenon using a probit regression. To properly model the 
decision to have a VAT, one must include a lagged dummy for having a VAT in the 
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selection equation. To conduct matches, one must have some overlap in the 
distributions of propensity scores. If the lagged dummy for having a VAT causes 
assignment to treatment and control groups to become too deterministic, as is likely 
with only 5 repeal events, there will be no overlap of propensity scores and matching is 
thus impossible. If the lagged dummy is omitted, the probit will be mis-specified. Thus 
to have a probit that produces valid matches, one would have to omit a lagged policy 
dummy, but to properly model the decision, one must have a lagged policy dummy.  
 Another concern is that a country will be choosing to have a VAT multiple times 
under a probit specification, so it will be hard to separate the immediate effects of VAT 
adoption compared to longer term effects. Thus, I chose survival analysis to model this 
adoption decision. One could restrict the probit so one drops countries from estimation 
as soon as they adopt the policy, but this will produce results similar to a survival 
model. Coile and Gruber (2007) encounter a similar issue modeling the decision to 
retire for the first time and settle on using a probit restricted in such a way; results do 
not differ significantly. 
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Appendix I-G: Supporting Information on Matching 
There are two main considerations that must be accounted for using matching in 
this paper in particular. First is the increasing scarcity of matches over time, a symptom 
of the overwhelming success of the VAT. The majority of countries studied adopts a 
VAT and as a result exits survival estimation at some point. In later years, being forced 
to match between adopters and only non-adopting countries in the same year could 
result in particularly poor propensity score matches as few control countries will 
remain. To overcome this problem, this paper puts no restrictions on country matching 
with regards to the time dimension, treating matching and control countries as one large 
cross section.
32
 For example, the pairing that minimizes |Xb1-Xb2|, Jordan adopting in 
2001 with a propensity score of 8.05 is Ethiopia not adopting in 1991 with a propensity 
score of 8.04. 
Second is the possibility of contamination. As this paper seeks to look at the 
effect of VAT adoption over time, it will be necessary to look at the time path of 
variables of interest for several years after the adoption event. It is possible that a 
treatment country-year that adopts will be matched to a control country-year that adopts 
a VAT a few years after being matched. Trying to observe the long run impact of a 
VAT will thus be complicated, as one must choose a control country-year that does not 
adopt for several years. This problem should be common, as the two countries being 
matched will, by design, have very similar failure times for choosing a VAT.  Failing to 
                                                 
32
 This would be a problem if one was systematically matching treatment country-years 
to controls country-years in a fundamentally different period. When comparing 
matches, this paper will look at mean differences in independent variables to see if there 
is a systematic difference in control and treatment observations, and no such systematic 
differences exist. Were there a systematic difference, there would be cause for concern.  
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control for this problem will downwardly bias results, as one will be comparing a 
treated country to a control that actually later received treatment. Referring to the earlier 
match, Spain 1986 should not be matched to Japan 1987, as Japan would adopt a VAT 
in 1989. If it were, in comparing the impacts of a VAT for 5 years after adoption, Spain 
1991 to Japan 1992, the control would have actually received the treatment in that 5 
year window and mean differences will be biased downward.  
The most obvious fix carries with it a tradeoff. If one wishes to observe the 
effect of VAT for N years after it is first adopted, one can simply drop all countries as 
possible controls for the N years before that country adopts a VAT. As N gets very 
small, matches should not be adversely affected, but one may miss longer term effects 
of VAT adoption. As N grows larger, the matches will necessarily become worse as one 
is requiring the difference in survival times for treatment and control groups to be 
higher, but longer term effects can be studied. However, looking at very long term 
effects may be beyond the power of this model to begin with, as it matches on a single 
year and the key assumption that the only difference between treatment and control 
group is the treatment becomes less supportable on a longer time horizon. For the 
purpose of this paper, I will look at only a 5 year window after the VAT adoption event. 
This is the lower bound predicted by Bird et al (2005) on how long it will take to see the 
full effects of a VAT.   
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Appendix II-A: Countries Included 
I) Countries Included in Table II-2 (92): 
Albania; Algeria; Angola; Australia; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Benin; Bhutan; Botswana; 
Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Central African Republic; 
Chad; China; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.; Croatia; Cyprus; Djibouti; 
Egypt, Arab Rep.; El Salvador; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; Gabon; Ghana; Guinea; 
Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; India; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Japan; Jordan; Kenya; Lao PDR; 
Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Macedonia, FYR; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; 
Mauritania; Mauritius; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; New 
Zealand; Niger; Nigeria; Oman; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Philippines; 
Qatar; Romania; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovenia; 
Solomon Islands; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Switzerland; 
Syrian Arab Republic; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; 
Uganda; United Arab emirates; United States; Venezuela, RB; Vietnam; Yemen, Rep.; 
Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
II) Countries included in Matching 
Note the countries included in each matching specifications will be slightly different in 
each case, as the method here demands 13 continuous years of data (7 before Year of 
Adoption and 5 after plus the actual year of the adoption.) Thus, one can only study the 
impact of adoptions from 1986-2007, even though one can study the determination of 
adoptions up through 2010. Exact countries included in each specification are available 
upon request from the author.  
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Appendix II-B: Data Definitions 
Agriculture: Percent of GDP contributed by agricultural activities, from the World 
Development Indicators, updated January 2015. 
Bordering Countries with VAT: Number of bordering countries with a VAT divided by 
the number of bordering countries, from author's calculations updated February 2015. 
British Commonwealth: Equal to 1 if a country is a member of the British 
Commonwealth at any time in the sample period, from the Commonwealth Network 
updated February 2015. 
Exports: Exports as a percent of GDP, from the World Development Indicators updated 
January 2015. 
Federal: Equal to 1 if a country is governed as a federation in that year, from Treisman 
(2002) with updates from the author, updated February 2015. 
Francophonie: Equal to 1 if a country is a member of the Francophonie at any time in 
the sample period, from Organisation internationale de la Francophonie updated 
February 2015. 
GDP Per Capita: Natural log of GDP per capita as measured by current US dollars, 
from the World Development Indicators updated January 2015. 
Government Consumption: Government Consumption, as a percent of GDP from the 
Penn World Tables updated September 2013. 
IMF Lending Dummy: Equal to 1 if the country has a nonzero balance in either a PRG 
or GRA credit facility in any months of that year, a stock measure, from the IMF 
Financial Data query tool updated February 2015.  
Imports: Imports as a percent of GDP, from the World Development Indicators updated 
January 2015. 
Inflation: The natural log of 100 plus the yearly inflation as measured by the CPI, from 
the World Development Indicators updated January 2015. 
Institutions: The polity2 variable of level of democracy as measured by the Polity IV 
project updated February 2015. 
Investment: Gross capital formation as a percent of GDP from the World Development 
Indicators updated January 2015. 
Island: Equal to 1 if a country has no other countries it borders by land, from author's 
calculations updated February 2015. 
Landlocked: Equal to 1 if a country has no land bordering an ocean, from author's 
calculations updated February 2015. 
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MF External Debt: Externally held debt as a share of GDP as measured by Lane and 
Milesi-Feretti updated 2011.  
Natural Resource Rents: Percent of GDP coming from natural resource production, 
from the World Development Indicators updated January 2015. 
Population: Natural log of population, from the World Development Indicators updated 
January 2015. 
% of Population 65+: Percent of population above 65 years of age, from the World 
Development Indicators updated January 2015. 
Size, Square Kilometers: Natural log of the surface area of a country, from the World 
Development Indicators updated January 2015. 
Warsaw Pact: Equal to 1 if a country was a Warsaw Pact Nation, from author's 
calculations updated February 2015. 
WDI External Debt: Externally held debt as a share of GDP as recorded by the World 
Development Indicators updated January 2015.\ 
 
WEO Central Government Debt: central government debt as a share of GDP as 
recorded by the World Economic Outlook updated February 2014. 
 
WEO Expenditure: government expenditure as a share of GDP as recorded by the 
World Economic Outlook updated February 2014. 
 
WEO Primary Surplus or Deficit: Cyclically adjusted surplus or deficit as a share of 
GDP as recorded by the World Economic Outlook updated February 2014. 
 
WEO Surplus or Deficit: Surplus or deficit as a share of GDP as recorded by the World 
Economic Outlook updated February 2014. 
 
WEO Tax Revenue: Tax revenue as a share of GDP as recorded by the World 
Economic Outlook updated February 2014. 
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Appendix III-A: Countries Included 
Countries with at least one observation of TOEFL scores for the years studied 
(173): 
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; American Samoa; Andorra; Angola; Argentina; 
Armenia; Aruba; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belarus; 
Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Brunei 
Darussalam; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Cape 
Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Congo, Dem. Rep.; 
Congo, Rep.; Costa Rica; Cote d'Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; 
Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt, Arab Rep.; El Salvador; 
Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; French Polynesia; Gabon; Gambia, 
The; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; 
Honduras; Hong Kong SAR, China; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic 
Rep.; Iraq; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea, Dem. Rep.; 
Korea, Rep.; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao PDR; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; 
Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macao SAR, China; Macedonia, FYR; 
Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Marshall Islands; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.; Moldova; Monaco; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; 
Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Caledonia; New Zealand; 
Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Northern Mariana Islands; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; 
Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Puerto 
Rico; Qatar; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; San Marino; Saudi Arabia; 
Senegal; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab 
Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Tonga; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United 
States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela, RB; Vietnam; Yemen, Rep.; Zambia; 
Zimbabwe. 
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Appendix III-B: Data Definitions 
Africa: 1 if area is in Africa, as defined by ETS. 
Americas: 1 if area is in the Americas, as defined by ETS. 
Asia: 1 if area is in Asia, as defined by ETS. 
Emigration, % of Population: OECD immigration data showing how large the expatriate 
population of a country is relative to the total population of that origin country, updated 
2008. 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization: Greener sum of squares index constructed by Roeder 
2001, comparing whether two randomly selected individuals in a country share the 
same mother tongue. 
Europe: 1 if area is in Europe, as defined by ETS. Omitted in most specifications. 
FDI, % of GDP: Net foreign investment as a share of GDP from World Development 
indicators.  
GDP Per Capita, Ln real 2005 US dollars: Natural log of GDP per capita as measured in 
Real 2000 US dollars, from the World Development Indicators.  
Government Spending, % of GDP: Government consumption as a share of GDP from 
Penn world tables.  
Hours to Learn English: How many hours for a native English speaker to learn the 
official languages of a given country. This is assumed to be symmetric, so it would take 
the same time for the native official language speaker to learn English. From Foreign 
Service Institute. 
Inflation, GDP Deflator: Inflation as measured by the GDP deflator, from the World 
Bank.  
Institutional Quality: Sum of World Government indicators from the World Bank.  
Investment, % of GDP: Gross capital formation as a share of GDP, from the World 
Bank. 
Island: Equal to 1 if a country has no other countries it borders by land, from author's 
calculations. 
Land Area, Ln: Natural log of square kilometers of land area of a country.  
Landlocked: Equal to 1 if a country has no land bordering an ocean, from author's 
calculations. 
Latitude: The latitude of a country from CIA World Factbook. 
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Linguistic Proximity-2: Measure of linguistic proximity with higher values being closer 
to English, from Melitz and Toubal (2014.) 
Middle East: 1 if area is in the Middle East, as defined by ETS. 
Official English: Equal to 1 if a countries’ official languages include English, CIA 
world Factbook. 
Population: Natural Log of population, from the World Bank 
Pacific: 1 if area is in the Pacific, as defined by ETS. 
Schooling 1990:  Average years of education per person in 1990, from Barro-Lee.  
Speaks English, % of Population: % of the population that reports they are Proficient in 
English. Provided from various national census bureaus and Crystal (2003) 
TOEFL Score: Test of English as a Foreign Language, the Average TOEFL score in a 
country, from ETS 1992-2012 omitting 2011 as data is unavailable. TOEFL scores are 
rescaled here so that paper, computer and internet based test scores can be compared. 
Paper scores are rescaled such that the minimum score in the first year available for the 
paper exam, 223 in 1992, is the same as the lowest score in the first year recorded for 
the internet based exam, 0 in 2006, and so that the maximum scores are the same, and 
677 and 120 respectively. This yields a (rounded) linear transformation of Y = (X-
223)/3.78, where X is the paper score and Y is the comparable transformed score. Using 
similar methodology with a reference year of 1998, Y = (X–7)/2.44 is used to transform 
computer test scores into internet based test scores using a base year of 1998 with a 
minimum score of 7 and maximum score of 300. 
 
 
 
